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PAST IS PRESENT:
URBAN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND HOUSING
REFORM IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
William D. Soileaut
Abstract Since the early 1980s China has embarked on an ambitious program of
reform in the systems of urban real property rights and allocation. In many respects,
these reforms recall the policies of private property rights protection which prevailed in
the early post-Liberation period of P.R.C. history, but which were subsequently aban-
doned in the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution. In the intervening thirty
years, however, the system of "public" urban housing ownership and allocation deterio-
rated to such an extent that no one - neither the state, its agents, nor private individuals
- had sufficient incentives to increase or even preserve these resources. Faced with the
widespread shortages and allocative crises, the reform leaders have again realized that
enforcement of substantial property rights is an essential prerequisite to the investment in
and conservation of real property resources.
This Article will utilize an economic theory of property rights to analyze the
P.R.C.'s system of urban housing rights as it has evolved from Liberation through the
modem reforms. It concludes that although the modem reforms have made major pro-
gress toward establishing a more rational system of property rights in urban housing,
further progress will require still larger investments of political and economic resources.
This is because the modem housing rights reforms imply nothing less than market allo-
cation under the rule of law, while administrative allocation under the rule of local
bureaucrats is the norm inherited from the past. In short, the housing reforms are
dependent upon parallel reforms across the range of legal-institutional factors impinging
on property rights.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the late 1980s, the government of the People's Republic of
China ("P.R.C.") has embarked upon an ambitious program of reform in the
area of urban real property rights law.' From the beginning, these legal
reforms have existed in order to serve the reform-era imperative of
economic development. The purpose of housing reform has been to reverse
the irrational patterns of use and allocation, and the accompanying high
I Two distinctions in Chinese real property law largely define the structure of this paper: that be-
tween urban and rural land; and that between land and housing. As to the first, China has maintained a
fundamental practical and theoretical distinction between urban and rural land since the founding of the
P.R.C. Generally, urban land is that within the cities and may also include that in adjacent suburbs, but the
basic distinction is that between land used for agricultural production in rural areas, and that used for
enterprises, residential housing, offices, common spaces, etc. in urban areas. Because of the different
means of production and economic relations characterizing these two broad types of land, two distinct re-
gimes of urban and rural property rights have been maintained throughout the history of the P.R.C. This
article will address only P.R.C. law and policy with respect to property rights in urban real property as
defined in the relevant legislation.
The second distinction of note is that between urban land and the housing thereupon. This distinction
was somewhat important early in the history of the P.R.C., but has taken on central importance in the
modem reforms. This article will focus primarily on urban housing policy, but will also necessarily treat
urban land insofar as housing rights are intimately connected with rights in the underlying land.
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costs to government and society, that were caused by the prior system of
state ownership. While this reform process has given rise to significant
changes in the laws governing property rights, this paper proposes that these
changes and others in the institutional environment must progress much
firther in order to reverse the excesses of the past and establish a rational,
economically efficient system of property rights in urban housing in China.
Scholars have characterized these legal reforms as a move toward the
privatization of real property rights,2 but this characterization proves too
much both in historical and conceptual terms. In fact, far from this being
the P.R.C.'s first experience with western-style private property rights
regimes, private property rights were the official norm immediately after
Liberation.3 Though the early recognition of private property rights even-
tually gave way to socialization and radicalization in the political turmoil
from the Great Leap Forward,4 this early experience with private property
rights provides a rich, if uneven, history of practical and theoretical prece-
dent for the modem reforms. Moreover, the modem reform effort is
addressing substantially the same problems that were encountered early and
persisted into the modem post-Mao era. Thus, a historical perspective on
urban real property rights in the P.R.C. provides essential ground for
understanding the current reforms and, in particular, whether the current
reforms represent truly unique innovations or merely a return to the failed
formulas of the past.
The description of the P.R.C. real property reforms as an exercise in
privatization is, conceptually, extremely weak. Property rights are complex
phenomena that transcend easy categorization. A number of different rights
and duties, for example, may attach to a given piece of real property, and
these may or may not combine to constitute formal "ownership."5
2 See Paul Cantor & James Kraus, Changing Patterns of Ownership Rights in the People's Republic
of China: A Legal and Economic Analysis in the Context of Economic Reforms and Social Conditions, 23
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 479, 496 (1990) (arguing that the basic goal of the recent P.R.C. legal reforms in
this and other areas is the privatization of property).
3 Liberation is marked by Mao Zedong's proclamation of the establishment of the People's
Republic of China on October 1, 1949. The dominance of private property in the early post-Liberation
period held as a matter of fact as well as formality. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
4 See infra note 121 and accompanying text on the Great Leap Forward.
5 Formal rights in Chinese rural land, for example, are said to include: formal ownership, rse
rights, transfer rights, product rights, and labor rights. See Mark Seldin & Aigou Lu, The Reform of
Landownership and the Political Economy of Contemporary China, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
CHINESE SOCIALISM, 181 (Mark Seldin ed., 1988) (citing to JIANG XUEMO, SHEHUIZHUYI JINGII SHILUN
[TEN ISSUES OF SOCIALIST ECONOMY] (Hunan People's Publishing House 1982) and LI ZEZHONG,
SHEHUIZHUYI SUOYOUZHI GUANXI JIQI FAZHAN GUILUXINO WENTI [SOCIALIST OWNERSHIP AND ITS LAWS
OF DEVELOPMENT] (Shanghai People's Publishing House 1988)).
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Moreover, in China different types and degrees of rights may be enjoyed by
such diverse "public" entities as the nation as a whole, individual govern-
ment bureaus or organs, or state-owned enterprises, in addition to private
individuals. 6 Finally, property rights have important implications for eco-
nomic activity which might be missed by focusing on form alone. Thus,
while "privatization" may capture the direction of reform in its broadest
sense, it does not in itself go very far in describing and relating the actual
goals, content and effects of the current or past system of property rights.
The purpose of this paper is to begin to evaluate the reforms now
underway in light of the developments in urban real property rights since
Liberation in 1949. It will proceed by providing an integrated analysis of
the problems faced by Chinese leaders, their goals and objectives, some of
the major legal-institutional systems of rights and duties which they fash-
ioned to attain their ends, and the actual results of their efforts. An
economic theory of property rights will be utilized to relate the form and
substance of property rights to the leaders' goals and the results of their
work.
The remainder of this paper is divided into four parts. Part II briefly
outlines a model and theory of property rights with which to analyze the
past and current systems of property rights in urban housing. Part III will
analyze urban housing rights in the pre-reform period, from 1949 until the
late 1970s. Part IV will examine the modem reforms in light of past prece-
dent and experience, and in terms of their ability to overcome the
difficulties of the past and establish an economically more rational and
efficient set of rights in urban housing. Part V offers some concluding
thoughts on the future of urban housing reform in China.
II. A MODEL AND THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
Economic theories of property rights provide a particularly useful
vehicle with which to relate the content and results of property rights
regimes. Moreover, these theories generate useful hypotheses about the
form and substance of a set of efficient rights which will result in the
socially optimal utilization of property resources. Because the motivation
behind the current housing reforms is fundamentally economic, these
theories provide an excellent basis for evaluating both the failure of past
property rights regimes and the likely success of the current rationalizing
6 All of these legal entities have had and do have rights in urban real property in the P.R.C.
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reforms. However, a definition and model of property rights is also
required in order to begin to apply this theory.
An economic analysis of property rights has two basic elements: a
model of property rights as legal-institutional phenomena; and a theory
identifying the economic functions of property rights and generating
hypotheses about optimal property rights for desired economic outcomes.
These two tools work together to reveal the economic consequences of
specific property rights configurations in different systems. This section
will lay out a model and theory, and the following sections will apply the
theory to analyze the system of urban real property rights in China.
A. A Legal-Institutional Model of Property Rights
The concept of a right in property has three fundamental elements:
identifiable tangible or intangible property objects; legal or economic
actors; and rights relationships between actors and property. Objects and
rights merge when the term "property" is used to mean a particular right or
interest.
The element of rights relationships is perhaps most elusive. Most
broadly, a right can be defined as an "individual advantage secured by law
- where advantage includes both choices and benefits." 7 On the other
hand, rights can also be characterized negatively in terms of detriments or
burdens, for to be constrained or bear some burden is also definitive of
relations to property and persons. These reciprocal advantages and burdens
may be born both by natural persons and legal persons,8 and may vary
widely in content, format, and enforcement mechanisms.
Hohfeld identified eight "fundamental legal conceptions" as constitu-
tive of rights relations. His analytical vocabulary consists of four positive
benefits (claim-right, privilege, power, and immunity), which correlate with
four negative burdens (duty, no-right, liability, and disability) in legal rela-
tions.9 While these categories may be neither all-inclusive nor mutually
7 STEPHEN R. MUNZER, AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 20 n.8 (1990). Much of the
following rights model is a synthesis of Munzer, who in turn relies heavily on Hohfeld and Honor. See
generally WESLEY NEWCOMB HOHFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS AS APPLIED IN JUDICIAL
REASONING AND OTHER LEGAL ESSAYS (Walter W. Cook ed., 1919); A.M. Honord, Ownership, in OXFORD
ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107, 107.-47 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961).
8 Legal persons include a range of enterprises, organizations, and entities empowered to carry out
civil acts.
9 Hohfeld seeks to develop a "scheme of 'opposites' and 'correlatives' ... and then.., to exem-
plify their individual scope and application in concrete cases." HOHFELD, supra note 7, at 36. For
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exclusive, they at least partially illustrate the fundamental structure of
complex property relations.10 They also illustrate the fundamental
economic function of property rights: to structure the legal-institutional
costs and benefits associated with property use between economic actors. It
remains, however, to put into use Hohfeld's categories in specific contexts.
Legal-institutional structures shape property relations by specifying
which types of actors (natural or legal persons) are competent to enter these
rights relations, the substance of the rights and duties of the actors, and the
procedural institutional means for specifying, recognizing, exercising and
enforcing rights. 1
As to the substance of rights in things, legal scholars often speak of
property in terms of "bundles of sticks" or "incidents" of ownership which
vary according the things and actors at issue. Honor6 identified several
incidents of relations to real property common in Western legal systems:
the claim-rights to possess, use, manage, and receive income; the powers to
transfer, waive, exclude, and abandon; the liberties to consume or destroy;
immunity from expropriation; the duty not to use harmfully; and liability for
execution to satisfy a court judgment.12
Whether or not the possession of any one or a combination of these
incidents amounts to "ownership" is beside the point, for correlative powers
and duties are involved in any given claim right or liberty. Indeed, this is
precisely the point of western property law: to assure, in doctrine and
through legal-institutional means, the enforcement of not only the mutual
example, "if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former's land, the correlative (and equivalent)
is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place." l at 38. On the other hand, if in this case X
himself has a privilege to enter the land, the necessary correlative is Y's "no-right" to prevent him from
doing so. Id Hohfeld's other categorical couplings of powers, disabilities, liabilities and immunities ex-
hibit the same tension between potential affirmative and negative relationships to property and persons.
10 Munzer, for one, notes the limitations in Hohfeld's terminology. Categorical overlap may exist
between "no-right" and disability, liability and duty, and power and right. However, even if this termi-
nology is not exhaustive or its categories exclusive, it does help to illuminate the contours of reciprocal
benefits and burdens characteristic of rights relationships. See MUNZER, supra note 7, at 19-20.
Another benefit of Hohfeld's analysis is its general applicability, regardless of the context-specific
forms that property relations take. Because of its generic character, a definition of property along these
lines "applies to all or almost all societies. It enables one to clarify these relations in widely different social
settings." Id at 25-26.
I Note, however, that no real attempt is made here to distinguish between procedure and substance,
for any procedure is at bottom merely a constellation of substantive rights, and vice versa. Note also that
this is the broadest of all possible definitions of the object of property rights analysis. It includes the range
of economic actors in society, and any type of property object and relation they can imagine. It includes all
types of institutional configurations, rules, powers and practices, whether formal or informal.
12 These incidents were initially defined by Honord and are summarized in MUNZER, supra note 7, at
22.
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rights, but the mutual duties that are equally important to autonomous,
profit-maximizing market exchange. The economic theory of property
rights teaches that the failure of rights regimes is highly correlated with the
failure of markets.
B. An Economic Theory of Property Rights
Western institutional economic theories of property rights concern
themselves with the implications of these incidents and institutions for
economic behavior. In the barest terms, they are concerned with how rights
and institutions structure the costs and benefits of resource utilization, and
hence the incentives for both investment and conservation.
This innocent-sounding yet complex idea is easily illustrated by an
example from apartment lease relations. Rent relations are comprised of
myriad elements: statutory or common law powers of landlord-lessors
(presumptively, but not necessarily, the "owner" of the building and/or
land) and tenant-lessees to enter contracts at more or less controlled rates
and terms; reciprocal substantive duties on the part of the tenant to pay rent
and the landlord and tenant to maintain the property; the tenant's right to
exclude the landlord, and the tenant's inability to sell (or sublease) the
property; the power of the landlord to evict the tenant or obtain restitution if
the tenant damages the property; and the power or right of the state or its
agents to interfere in or prohibit these relations altogether.13
Clearly, several layers of benefits are generated in these transactions
to structure economic activity. Some substantive benefits, such as the
landlord's right to receive and power to demand rent, represent an entitle-
ment to immediate economic value in the form of current cash payments.
The landlord's power to sell the property also represents potentially imme-
diate economic value. The importance of these exchanges is quite clear. If
the landlord does not receive his claim right (rental payments), he will most
likely have no incentive whatsoever to incur the costs of upholding his side
of the bargain (maintaining the property). If landlords cannot exercise their
claim rights and powers to recoup their investments in the future, they will
not construct apartments today or tomorrow.
13 If this last proposition sounds outrageous, read on. The Chinese experience is more complex than
this: instead of abolishing rent relations altogether, the state subsumed them within the organs and agents
of the state itself, with perverse and disastrous results.
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Modem economic theories of property rights analyze legal-
institutional rights structures in terms of the way they structure the
incentives of property resource use. Their simple but powerful insight is
that legal institutions structure the costs and benefits of property use, and
that optimal resource use requires the optimization of the benefits and
minimization of costs.
Costs have critical roles to play in neo-classical institutional
economic theory. First, transaction costs are directly detrimental to individ-
ual and societal benefit maximization. The cost of enforcing or exercising
rights, whether through registration, licensing, adjudication, administrative
appeal, or self help represents constant friction and a disincentive at the
margin of value maximizing transactions. The concepts of information,
discovery, and policing costs are all imbedded in the broader concept of
transaction costs.
Clearly, transaction costs are always positive and may also vary to
infinity. Where statutes or other authorities explicitly prohibit some
activity, transaction costs increase dramatically - this is why crime still
pays. Where no formal rights are recognized, or where rights are unclear or
are only weakly protected, both risk and the transaction costs of discovering
and securing these benefits increases. The less valuable are claim rights, the
less valuable is the property itself as an income producing tool, and the less
likely that it will attract voluntary investment. If the cost of vindicating or
exercising rights exceeds their marginal returns, the claim will not be exer-
cised, and socially useful activity will be foregone.
Another more slippery concept of neo-classical economics embracing
both costs and benefits is the concept of externalities. Put most simply, an
externality is any cost or benefit of resource use that is not born by the
actors.14 The concept of positive externalities is essentially captured by the
example of the landlord's claim rights to rent described above. Neoclassical
economics simply posits that the costlier it is to internalize benefits from
property resources, the less likely it is that the economy will produce opti-
mal investment in those resources. On the cost side of externalities, the
archetypical example of a negative externality is pollution - where, for
example, a factory freely pumps effluent into a river causing sickness and
blight downstream. Here, neoclassical economics merely counsels that
14 See LANCE E. DAVIS & DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND AMERICAN
ECONOMIC GROWTH 15 (1971).
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individuals should be made to pay the costs of their externalities in order to
encourage the internalizing, and hence minimizing, of costly activities.
Costs also enter into more general conservation arguments via the
concept of the soft budget constraint. This concept captures the idea that if
enterprises do not pay the costs of their inputs, they will have no incentive
to conserve on use or maximize outputs, and will have a basically unlimited
demand for inputs. 15 Insofar as renters, for example, do not pay the actual
costs of their apartments, they will want to procure as much space as possi-
ble regardless of marginal utility to the individual or loss to society. The
inability to impose costs on resource users also encourages rent-seeking
behavior whereby, instead of investing in wealth maximization by control-
ling costs and increasing output, actors spend resources in petitioning
responsible authorities for favorable treatment vis-a-vis other actors in the
economy.16
It is possible to specify some general ideal conditions for property
rights institutions from these propositions.
First, insofar as property rights represent potential economic value,
they should be recognized in as many different forms, "things," and actors
as feasible. Thus, as more rights are recognized and mutually beneficial
transactions allowed to take place, the more individual and social value is
created. 17
Second, transaction and enforcement costs should be decreased in
order to maximize returns on investments. Property rights should be
defined in as clear a manner possible in order to reduce information costs.
For the same reason, rights should be public, predictable, discoverable, and
rather more than less stable. Enforcement and policing costs should also be
minimized as much as possible. Effective definition and enforcement of
duties, as opposed to rights, also serves to decrease the ability of actors to
externalize their own costs and arbitrarily impose them on others.
Modem Western law offers several solutions for these economic
rights requirements. Contracts are preferred over direct administrative con-
trol, not only because they allow for profit maximizing autonomy, but also
15 For an analysis of soft budget constraints in state-owned enterprises in China, see Donald C.
Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It? Legal Institutions and Economic Reform in China, 10 U.C.L.A.
PAC. BASIN L. J. 1, 9-10 (1991) [hereinafter Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It?].
16 See NORTH Er AL., GROWTH AND WELFARE IN THE AMERICAN PAST: A NEW ECONOMIC HISTORY
18 (1983).
17 This proposition, like most others here, depends at least in part on the ability to control (and the
cost of controlling) negative externalities through the use of regulatory, investigative, recordation, and en-
forcement systems.
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because they generally decrease individual actors' information costs. 18 The
same function is served by generally applicable laws, regulations and regu-
latory procedures, which aid in the discovery of rights boundaries and the
equitable enforcement of rights and duties as defined.
Enforcement costs should also be minimized. Responsible institu-
tions of the state should have sufficient powers, duties, liabilities, and
resources (institutional, fiscal, etc.) necessary to facilitate the neutral vali-
dation and enforcement of property rights and duties at the least possible
cost. Insofar as they are empowered and enabled to enforce relevant land
use or other laws, regulatory institutions also provide a means - again, at
more or less transactional and information costs - for reducing externali-
ties. And of course, a system of criminal, administrative law or other
incentive structures should also hold public actors responsible for faithfully
enforcing these generally applicable laws. In sum, what is implied is the
rule of law itself, as applied to society through the law and institutions of
the state, and also as applied to the state itself and its institutions.
Although it may not be possible to specify the marginal individual or
social utility of any given change in rules or administrative resources, it is
possible to test the hypothesis that weak rights produce irrational use and
allocation by observing patterns of legal-institutional change and correlating
these with indicators of economic performance. While subtle variations in
rights may be beyond this model, extreme cases of deviation from these
standards for rights validation are easily identified.
China's experience presents just such an extreme case, and its experi-
ence largely conforms with the theory's most negative implications. The
urban housing system in China throughout the Maoist period offers an
example of extremely weak property rights, and the results of its policies
were precisely as predicted by this theory: weak, volatile property rights
and extremely low rent rates throughout the Maoist period led to serious
disincentives to investment and conservation, which in turn led to massive
housing shortages, disrepair, misuse, and misallocation.
While it is clear that China has changed directions in property rights
policy by enacting some laws and reforms, it is much less clear how much
real progress has been made in implementing these newly recognized rights.
At best, China has made much progress and needs to continue its reforms.
At worst, its reform policies may fail if they do not overcome the inertial
force of existing institutional resource allocations and rights configurations.
18 See Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It?, supra note 15, at 16.
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III. URBAN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE MAOIST PERIOD
The P.R.C. urban real property system only gradually evolved into
the generalized system of weak, decentralized public ownership rights exist-
ing at the end of the Maoist period. Far from mandating the nationalization
of all urban real property after Liberation, the leadership's early policies
sanctioned and established a mixed system recognizing property rights in
private as well as public entities in order to conserve and focus all available
resources to solve the significant tasks of urban reconstruction and gov-
ernance. In urban areas, individual real property ownership actually
predominated, but nevertheless coexisted uneasily with increasingly exten-
sive yet poorly defined powers of agents of the state - local government
organs, local branches of state industrial-bureaucratic organs, and state-
owned enterprises ("SOEs") - over all types of property.
While pursuing this policy of mixed ownership, the P.R.C. continued
to experience problems in efforts to spur reconstruction and curb waste and
misuse of all types of property resources. In the turbulent political climate
of the late 1950s, calls increased for the destruction of the system of
exploitative capitalist ownership and the socialization of urban land and
housing along with that in the countryside. Socialization entailed efforts to
increase the scope of public ownership by bringing more property under the
control of local government, as well as efforts to strengthen governmental
control over current public property resources. While socialization did
result in an increase in the scope of formal public ownership at the expense
of private rights, it only exacerbated the original problems by increasing the
amount of property in the already fragmented and unaccountable public
property system. The sections below will analyze the early policy princi-
ples regarding urban real property rights, specific public and private rights
in urban housing, difficulties in implementing these rights regimes, and the
process of socialization which ultimately only aggravated these problems.
A. Fundamental Principles: The Mixed Ownership System
While public ownership was sacred in Chinese Communist Party
revolutionary doctrine, some of the earliest policy documents from the post-
Liberation period announced a strong predisposition toward the protection
of private rights in urban real property. The 1949 document Urban Housing
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Rent Policy 19 drew a distinction between urban and rural ownership. It
argued that while agrarian private land ownership was backward and feudal
because landlords merely exploited peasant labor,2 0 urban housing was
capitalist in that it represented an investment of productive capital, and rent,
the return on that capital.21 On the basis of these distinctions, the article
argued that while ownership of rural land could be eliminated, rights in
urban housing, at least, should remain during the period of Democratic
Socialist development in which it was expected that capitalist elements
would persist.22
Thus, the Chinese revolutionaries drew an early distinction between
urban and rural land, and expressed an intent to protect, within limits, the
formal rights in urban housing. The Urban Housing Rent Policy document,
for example, calls for the "confirmation of ownership rights in all housing
of most private owners and the protection of their right of proper and legal
management." 23 Moreover, "protection" was clearly intended to mean pro-
tection from the intrusions of public officials as well as other individuals. 24
19 Chengshi fangwu fangzu de zhengce [Urban Housing Rent Policy], reprinted in JIEFANG HOU DE
SHANGHAI FANGWU ZULIN WENTI [POST-LIBERATION SHANGHAI HOUSING RENTAL PROBLEMS] 3 (Shanghai
Times Publishing Editorial Dep't ed., 1949) [hereinafter SHANGHAI RENT POLICY]. This document stands
out among early policy pronouncements for the clarity, force, and lasting appeal of its reasoning. The ar-
ticle's concept of"using rent to develop housing" yizuyangfang), for example, remained persuasive well
into the 1950s. See, e.g., Chengshi fiuwu bu [Urban Service Bureau], Guanyu jiaqiang chengshi fangwu
guanli gongzuo de yijian [Opinion Concerning the Work of Strengthening Urban Housing Management]
[hereinafter 1957 Urban Housing Opinion], reprinted in MINFA CANKAO ZILIAO: FANGDICHAN FENCE
[CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS: REAL PROPERTY] 21, 26 (Beijing Univ. Law Dep't, Civil Law
Studies Office and Information Office eds., 1980) [hereinafter 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS].
20 SHANGHAI RENT POLICY, supra note 19, at 4.
21 The article cites Marx's Das Kapital for the proposition that "rent is interest and return from
capital investment in housing." Id. at 4-5.
22 Id. This same policy is reflected vividly in the title of a contemporary article, which declared
"Feudal Village Land and Urban Housing are Different: The [Idea of] Redistribution of Urban Housing is
Mistaken." JIEFANG RIBAO [LIBERATION DAILY], Sept. 11, 1949, reprinted in SHANGHAI RENT POLICY,
supra note 19, at 12.
23 SHANGHAI RENT POLICY, supra note 18, at 7. The Chinese word jingying is translated here as
"management," but may also be translated as operation or "to operate" in its verb form. The distinction
between the right to use or control land and formal ownership is similar in some respects to that maintained
under the use rights model adopted in the current reforms. For a discussion of modem land use rights, see
infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text.
24 A phrase in the 1950 Zhongnan District provisions closely mirrors language in the Urban Housing
Rent Policy document: "The People's Government protects the lawfully obtained ownership and legal
management rights of all citizens ... no organ, military unit, group, or individual may compel the sale,
rental, lending, or possession" of privately owned property. Zhongnan qu guanyu chengshi fangchanquan
de jixiang yuanze jueding [Decisions in Principle of Zhongnan District on Urban Housing Rights], ch. 1,
art. I (Dec. 15, 1950, amended Jan. 12, 1953) [hereinafter Zhongnan Provisional Decisions], reprinted in 1
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINFA ZILIAO HUIBIAN [A COLLECTION OF CIVIL LAW MATERIALS OF THE
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This general policy of protecting private rights in and ownership of urban
real property continued up until the Great Leap Forward.25
The first Constitution26 also provided some qualified recognition and
protection for the system of private property ownership. While the official
policy called for the control and gradual replacement of capitalist with
socialist ownership,27 the 1954 Constitution did recognize the existence of
the "capitalist ownership system. ' 28 This Constitution also expressly pro-
vided for the protection of citizens' ownership rights in personal and real
property, including housing,29 and further stipulated that the government
would protect citizens' rights to devise their private assets.30 Nevertheless,
private property was subject to confiscation, according to law, in further-
ance of national interests.3 1 Private property rights were also enjoyed
subject to the condition that they not harm the national interest.32 Thus,
while officially protected, private property rights were not unconditionally
recognized as fundamental rights superior to the state's rights.
Most of the authority of the day was silent on the issue of urban land,
but private rights ;.n urban land appear to have persisted along with those in
urban housing. Because of the complex relationships involved and the inte-
gral connection between housing and land, the issue of urban land was not
resolved in favor of either private or public ownership.33 Since there was
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] 386 (Beijing Political-Legal Research Institute ed., 1956) [hereinafter 1956
CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (I)1.
25 See 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 27.
26 P.R.C. CONST. OF 1954, translated in 1 THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, 1949-1979: A
DOCUMENTARY SURVEY 20 (Harold C. Hinton ed., 1980).
27 The Constitution provided that "The nation adopts the policy of using, controlling and reforming
capitalist industry," and called for "the gradual substitution of the system of capitalist ownership with the
system of ownership by the whole people." P.R.C. CONST. of 1954 art. X.
The language referring to policy here brings to light the place of constitutions in the P.R.C. political-
legal system. Commentators have long noted that constitutions in the P.R.C. do not serve as statements of
inviolable rights but merely as "statement[s] of policy .... When the policy changes, the law ipso facto
changes." William C. Jones, The Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 63 WASH. U. L.Q. 707,
713 (1985). Another difficulty with the use of Chinese constitutions as a basis for rights in actual practice
is the fact that the constitution has never served as a basis for invalidating law. See Clarke, What's Law
Got to Do with It?, supra note 15, at 33 n.129.
28 P.R.C. CONST. of 1954 art. V.
29 "The state protects the right of citizens to ownership of lawful income, of savings, houses and the
means of life." Id. art. Xl.
30 Id. art. XII.
31 Id. art. XIII. This article allows confiscation with and without compensation. See infra note 37
discussion of confiscation and accompanying text.
32 P.R.C. CONST. of 1954 art. XIV.
33 "The character of urban land is more complicated [than urban housing] because it embodies
investments. It also comprises an intractable component of capitalist housing, so is different from agricul-
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no active policy to abolish urban private land holdings and separate them
from housing, de facto private ownership in land seems to have simply con-
tinued under the guise of private ownership of housing. Furthermore, this
phenomenon appears to have persisted at least into the Great Leap period,
and probably beyond.34
B. Public and Private Rights in Real Property
Because it wanted to maintain a mixed ownership system, the P.R.C.
leadership sought to define and enforce the rights and duties of actors in
possession of both public and private property. It largely failed on both
counts. Individual owners had significant possessory, registration, and
transaction rights, but the administrative and judicial systems necessary to
enforce these rights were hardly formed yet. Government enterprises and
organs were initially mere caretakers without the power to transfer or con-
vert public property; but they had significant autonomous operation rights
in property in their possession, and significant legal and de facto confisca-
tion powers vis-A-vis owners. Because of the weak position of individual
owners relative to the state and its agents, and of the state relative to its own
agents, no actor in the system had a sufficient right or duty interest in pre-
serving or increasing the value of public or private housing. This situation
led to significant disfunction in the area of property allocation and utiliza-
tion.
tural land. For these reasons, for now [urban land] should temporarily be left alone." Urban Housing Rent
Policy, supra note 19, at 4.
34 This inference is suggested by a comment in a 1958 policy document on the socialization of urban
housing. The document suggests that:
While implementing housing reform, if the house and land belong to a single person, the land should
be included with the house and should not be handled separately. If the land and the house belong to two
different individuals, the house owner should give a portion of his compensation to the land owner.
Zai di yi ci quan guo fangchan gongzuo huiyi shang de zongjie baogao [Final Report of the First National
Conference on Housing Work] (Feb. 2, 1958), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS,
supra note 19, at 93, 101 [hereinafter First Housing Conference Report]. This implies not only that land
was subject to private ownership, but that land could yield benefits in and of itself, independently of any
right of private ownership in housing. Id
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1. The Confiscation of Private Real Property
Although most private citizens theoretically enjoyed the rights of pri-
vate property ownership and management, these rights were granted
selectively. The confiscation of urban land and housing was a major coun-
terpart to the early policy of protecting private property rights, serving as
the primary early source for publicly owned property. Nevertheless,
because it was to be carried out only under limited circumstances and by
prescribed means, the policy of confiscation still served, in theory at least,
to indirectly confirm private property rights. In fact, the confiscatory
powers of local state agents soon became a threat to private property rights.
Only a limited range of private property was initially subject to con-
fiscation. Real property belonging to the former Kuomintang ("KMT")
officials and abandoned land,35 in particular, was subject to government
confiscation. In Shanghai, all real property that was abandoned by KMT
officials, all land belonging to "Kuomintang government representative
traitors," and all land belonging to absent overseas Chinese was to come
under the management of the municipal government. 36 The same theme is
echoed in Zhongnan District, where all housing belonging to the "counter-
revolutionary Kuomintang government," war criminals, KMT counterrevo-
lutionaries, and to "counter-revolutionary bureaucrats" was to be
35 Fairly detailed provisions were promulgated for the confiscation of abandoned land, and not all
such land was confiscated permanently. Measures promulgated in Shanghai indicate that unregistered land
or that for which an absent owner failed to properly appoint an agent was to be considered abandoned
(wuzhu). Shanghaishi renmin zhengfu chuli wuzhu tudi zhanxing banfa [Provisional Measures of Shanghai
Municipality on Handling Abandoned Land], art. 2 (Dec. 12, 1949), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW
MATERIALS (1), supra note 24, at 356. Such land was to come under government substituted management
(daiguan) for a period of three years, and could be recovered if the owner presented proper proofs of
ownership. Id. art. 4. If it was not claimed after this time, such land was to revert to public ownership. Id
art. 5.
36 Shanghaishi fangwu dichan guanli zhanxing tiaoli [Provisional Regulations for the Management
of Real Property in Shanghai] art. 3 (June 13, 1949), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (1), supra
note 24, at 382. "National management" provided for here does imply complete control over resources, so
it would seem to result in at least de facto temporary government ownership of managed resources.
Nevertheless, the Chinese developed a rich vocabulary describing government property takings in the early
post-Liberation period. In addition to government substituted management (daiguan) of abandoned
property mentioned above, the term zhengyong is used for coerced but compensated confiscation, and mu-
oshou is generally used to indicate coerced and uncompensated confiscation. In addition, methods of
compulsory sale (zhenggou), compulsory rental (zhengzu), negotiated purchase (qiagou), negotiated rental
(qiazu) and exchange were also used to acquire needed property. See Zhongnanqu chengshi jianshe shi-
yong tudi zhanxing banfa [Provisional Measures of Zhongnan District for the Use of Land in Urban
Construction] ch. 3, art. 10 (Dec. 18, 1951), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (I), supra note 24, at
347 [hereinafter Zhongnan Urban Construction Measures]. These regulations were less clear as to the
details of authority and control over property resources under confiscation.
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confiscated without compensation. 37 In national legislation, important
KMT leaders were named individually as targets for confiscation. 38
Besides being subject to confiscation for political reasons or because
of abandonment, private land of all sorts could also be confiscated for
"national construction." 39  Because of the great range of public organiza-
tions empowered to confiscate land for national construction and the variety
of circumstances under which it could be carried out, this represented both a
significant governmental threat to private property rights and important
source of "public property" in the early history of the P.R.C.40
The process of national construction was both a reflection of existing
institutional weakness and a cause further weakening the state's ability to
effectively control the public property which it formally claimed. National
construction projects included construction for "defense, industrial produc-
tion facilities, railroads, transportation, hydroelectric projects, urban
construction and other economic and cultural" purposes.41 Moreover, under
the National Confiscation Measures, the primary initiative for this type of
land acquisition came from the "confiscating units" themselves rather than
from the government, although confiscation was to be conducted according
to plan and in consultation with responsible government organs.42 Hence,
37 Zhongnan Provisional Decisions, supra note 24, ch. 1, art. 2.
38 The property of the Jiang, Song, Kong, and Chen families, for example, was singled out for con-
fiscation in one central government opinion. See Zhongyang renmin zhengfi zui gao renmin jiancha shu
[Central People's Government Supreme People's Procuratorate], Guanyu chuli zhanzui, hanjian, guanliao
ziben jiaji fangeming fenzi caichan de chubu yijian [Preliminary Opinion Concerning the Handling of the
Assets of War Criminals, Traitors, Bureaucratic Capitalists and Counterrevolutionaries] art. 2 (Oct. 18,
1952), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (I), supra note 24, at 374.
39 The primary regulations governing this type of governmental property acquisition was a set of
national measures promulgated in 1953. See Zhongyang renmin zhengfi zhengwu yuan guanyu guojia
jianshe guiyong tudi banfa [Central People's Government Ministry of Governmental Affairs Measures
Concerning the (Compensated) Confiscation of Land for National Construction] (Nov. 5, 1953), reprinted
in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (I), supra note 24, at 337 [hereinafter National Confiscation Measures].
These national regulations superseded earlier local legislation regulating the use of land for "urban con-
struction" alone. Id. art. 20. Urban construction was substantially similar to national construction except
that it was narrower, being carried out by units under the authority of the municipal as opposed to the na-
tional government. See generally Zhongnan Urban Construction Measures, supra note 36, art. 2.
40 All land confiscated for national construction came under the ownership of the national govern-
ment. National Confiscation Measures, supra note 39, art. 18. Some land, however, such as that occupied
only during construction, was only taken temporarily until it was returned to the owner, and was not to
come under state ownership. Id. art. 11.
41 Id. art. 2.
42 Confiscating units were to submit a land confiscation plan to, and abide by the standards of,
"higher level leading organs" (shangfi lingdao jiguan) in obtaining land for national construction. The
responsible supervisory organ varied depending on whether the project was national, local, or defense ori-
ented. The confiscation plan was to include provisions related to the scope of the confiscation, the location
and quantity of land taken, the number of households and residences affected, methods of compensation,
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diverse governmental organizations at different levels were empowered to
confiscate land under the guise of national construction. 43 Even more
strikingly, they could often exercise independent management over their
land resources, making their independence from central control even more
complete. 44
Although the locus of national confiscation was in lower-level enter-
prises and government organs, individual rights in private property were at
least formally protected by the recognition of private rights in the confisca-
tion process. First, private property rights were implicitly recognized in that
proofs of ownership were respected in the taking of land, and the original
owners had the residual rights in portions of their land not confiscated. 45 In
addition, owners were also to receive compensation for their land, even if its
use represented only a partial loss for the owner.46 The amount of compen-
sation was to be arrived at through discussions between the original
owner/user and the local people's government and land management bureau
so as to give a "fair and reasonable" price to cover both houses and other
and the disposition of other fixtures affected. National Confiscation Measures, supra note 39, art. 4.
Confiscation could be undertaken on a large scale, but the regulations did provide that the taking of a
whole village had to be approved by the local People's Congress. Id art. 5.
43 The regulations do not specify exactly who could confiscate land for national construction. The
regulations merely indicate that confiscating units (yongdi danwet) should follow the prescribed procedures
in consultation with superior units. Id. art. 4 Nevertheless, the variety of units empowered to confiscate
land for national construction is suggested by the purposes for which land could be confiscated. Judging
from the variety of national construction projects, it appears that military units, state-owned enterprises,
municipal government construction departments, schools, and state-run utilities, among others could all
acquire land in this manner. See id art. 2. In addition, earlier regulations provided for a number of
different methods of taking land depending on the type of unit involved. In Zhongnan, for example, only
military, transportation, water projects and state-owned enterprises could compel the use, sale, lease,
exchange or outright confiscation of land, whereas other units had to bargain directly with landowners.
Zhongnan Urban Construction Measures, supra note 36, art. 10.
5Some organs identified as exercising independent management (zixing guanli) over land resources
included, among others, military units, enterprises, banks, railroads, and large schools. 1957 Urban
Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 25. Nevertheless, as indicated earlier, all confiscated land was
formally owned by the state, could not be transferred by the unit in possession, and was to be returned to
the government after the unit was finished using it. National Confiscation Measures, supra note 39, art. 18.
45 If the taking was complete, the local people's government would invalidate the owner's original
proofs (zhengzhuang) after giving compensation. If only a partial taking was effected, the government
would either alter the existing documents or issue new proofs for the portion remaining in the original
owner. National Confiscation Measures, supra note 39, art. 15.
46 If the owner suffered a loss as a result of surveying and measurement activities in the early stages
of a project before formal confiscation, for example, he was to receive appropriate compensation. Id. art.
6. In the case of temporary use in connection with repair or maintenance work, the relevant organs were
also authorized to either borrow land from the owner or, more significantly, enter into a contract to tem-
porarily lease the land. Id art. 11.
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fixtures on the land.47 There were, however, significant limits even where
compensated confiscation was provided. Consistent with the ambivalent
attitude toward urban land ownership, only the taking of urban housing, and
not land, was to be compensated. 48 Likewise, no compensation was pro-
vided for land alone or for land not occupied by housing, and where the
land and housing were separately owned, landowners were only to receive
compensation according to their needs. 49 Neither was compensation pro-
vided for the taking of agricultural lands owned by urban landlords. 50 Thus,
while private rights in real property continued to be formally recognized
under the system of compensated confiscation, not all property rights
received protection to the same degree.
In spite of the great number of organizations that could confiscate
private land and the variety of purposes for which it could be confiscated,
the taking of land for national construction and for political reasons did not
result in a rapid or widespread decline in the relative amount of urban pri-
vate housing. As of 1952, some three years after Liberation, private
holdings still accounted for the majority of urban property in large cities.
At that time, it was estimated that public land constituted only 15% of the
total in Beijing, 10% in Shanghai, 17% in Jinan, 40% in Nanjing, 45% in
Taiyuan, and as much as 64% in Dalian.51 A few years later, statistics indi-
cated that private housing accounted for from 60% to more than 80% of the
total in larger cities, and generally over 90% in medium and smaller cities. 52
Though the proportion of public property steadily increased under these
47 Id art. 17. Although this is a very ambiguous standard, the provision of a "fair and reasonable"
price does at least evidence respect for the proposition that urban private property owners should generally
be free from unilateral uncompensated governmental confiscation.
48 Id.
49 Id
50 Id
51 Nei wu bu [Interior Ministry], Guanyu jiaqiang chengshi gongyou fangdichan guanli de yijian
(caogao) [Opinion on Strengthening the Management of Urban Public Real Property (draft)] (May 24,
1952), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 17, 18-19 [hereinafter Draft
Urban Public Property Opinion]. While Chinese statistics are notoriously unreliable, the utility of these
figures is not dependent upon their great accuracy. Even allowing for a significant margin of error, the
data suggest that private property constituted a substantial portion of the stock of real property in most
large cities in the early post-Liberation period.
52 In 1954, it was estimated that private housing constituted 66% of the total in Beijing, 72% in
Tianjin, 77% in Shanghai, 88% in Wuhan, and 81% of the total stock in Jinan. In medium and small cities,
the ratio of private housing was generally larger, standing at about 95%. Nei wu bu [Interior Ministry],
Chengshi siren fangwu qingkuang jijinhou yijian [Opinion on the Condition of and Future Policy Toward
Private Housing] (Aug. 14, 1954), reprinted in 2 ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO MINFA ZILIAO HUIBIAN
(SHANG) [A COLLECTION OF CIVIL LAW MATERIALS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, PART 1] 438-39
(Beijing Political-Legal Research Institute ed., 1956) [hereinafter 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (II)].
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policies, even as late as 1957 public housing still accounted for only 54% of
the total in Beijing.53 In fact, though, private rather than public house own-
ership still predominated in all but a few large cities even at this late date.
54
Although confiscation gradually resulted in the growth of the amount
of property in the system of public ownership and control, it is not the fact
but the method that is most important. Under the confiscatory policies of
national construction and urban construction, the locus of "public" owner-
ship rested not only in the abstract nation or even primarily in national or
local governments, but most immediately in diverse individual bureaus,
military and work units, enterprises, schools and mass organizations which
could all acquire and manage real property on their own behalf. The result
was to begin weakening the state vis-A-vis both citizens and its agents, and
to weaken individuals vis-A-vis agents of the state.
As will be seen below, this diversity and decentralization made it
very difficult for the leadership to exercise control over the use and disposi-
tion of land in either the public or private property systems. Hence, the
leadership struggled throughout the early period to formulate and enforce an
optimal set of property rights to meet their goals for the rational develop-
ment and utilization of housing resources.
2. Transfer Rights and Registration
There is a significant amount of detailed early authority governing the
rights of parties to both public and private urban real property relations.
Consonant with the distinct nature of these two types of property, different
bundles of rights applied to each. The rights under these two systems
diverged to the greatest extent in the area of real property transfers (which
are critical to profit-maximizing exchanges), while there was substantial
similarity in the registration necessary to validate and police those rights.
To begin, it is clear that private landowners, unlike public property,
enjoyed significant transfer and use rights, including the ability to rent
housing. In Zhongnan, the government was to protect all citizens' lawfully
obtained rights of ownership and legal operation rights, including the right
to repair, buy and sell, transfer, use, and rent housing. 55 In addition, early
housing regulations also gave private owners the right to independently
53 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 22.
54 Id
55 Zhongnan Provisional Decisions, supra note 24, ch. 1, art. 1.
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mortgage their property. 56 On the other hand, consistent with its public
ownership, units occupying public property could not in general transfer
their rights to property in their possession.57
Although they were permitted, private transactions in real property
were not conducted completely independently of government supervision.
Registration, in particular, was intended to give the government a measure
of control over land ownership and transfer validation.5 8 Detailed regula-
tions provided that the parties to a transfer should submit their ownership
proofs and transfer contracts to complete registration within a specified time
of the transaction.59 The regulations also provided for public notice
56 The phrase used in the Dongbei regulations is dianya. See Dongbei chengshi fangchan guanli
zhanxing tiaoli [Dongbei Provisional Regulations on the Management of Urban Housing], ch. 2, art. II
(Mar. 28, 1950) [hereinafter Dongbei Provisional Housing Regulations], reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW
MATERIALS (I), supra note 24, at 389. Dianya is a practice of giving property as security or guaranty for a
loan, and in which the mortgagor frequently remains in possession of the property during the duration of
the mortgage period, but cannot sell it. This is to be distinguished from the practice ofdiandang, wherein
the owner gives over possession or beneficial use of the property (including the right to rent) for the dura-
tion of the mortgage period in exchange for an up-front payment, and redeems the property at the end of
the period by returning this sum without interest. See FANGDICHANFA CIDIAN [DICTIONARY OF REAL
PROPERTY LAW] 250 (Bin Jinfeng ed., 1992).
57 The Zhongnan provisions stipulated that "if they do not need to use [the property], organs, mili-
tary units, groups and individuals using public housing should return it to the public housing management
bureau, and cannot transfer or lease [this property]." Zhongnan Provisional Decisions, supra note 24, ch.
2, art. 6. To the same effect are the Dongbei Public Housing Regulations, which prohibited an even greater
range of transfers: "Units having use rights in public housing... are strictly forbidden from independently
exchanging, transferring, lending, leasing, converting for cash, or [using property for] business
investments." Dongbeiqu chengshi gongyou fangchan guanli zhanxing tiaoli [Provisional Regulation of
Dongbei District on Public Housing Management], art. 6 (Aug. 21, 1950), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW
MATERIALS (I), supra note 24, at 393 [hereinafter Dongbei Public Housing Regulations].
For slightly more detailed regulations governing transfers of real property, see, e.g., Wuhanshi
fangdichan jiaoyi xize [Detailed Regulations of Wuhan Municipality on Real Property Exchange] (July 14,
1951), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (1I), supra note 52, at 136.
58 The Dongbei housing regulations, for example, provided that owners of "all private housing
should maintain all of their ownership proofs and apply for registration with the local people's govem-
ment" in order to receive ownership certificates confirming housing rights. Dongbei Provisional Housing
Regulations, supra note 56, art. 3. State organs using public land and housing were also generally required
to register the property in their possession. See, e.g., Guangdongsheng renmin weiyuanhui [Guangdong
Provincial People's Congress], Banfa Guangdongsheng fangdichan dengji zhanxing banfa [Provisional
Measures of Guangdong Province for the Registration of Real Property], art. 6 (Aug. 26, 1958), reprinted
in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 169.
59 The Dongbei regulations originally provided for registration within one month after the transac-
tion. Dongbei Provisional Housing Regulations, supra note 56, art. 12. The Xian regulations required
registration applications to be submitted within three months after the transaction. Xianshi fangdichan
yizhuan dengji zhanxing banfa [Provisional Measures of Xian Municipality for the Registration of Real
Property Transfers], art. 4 (Dec. 28, 1950), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (I), supra note 24, at
384 [hereinafter Xian Provisional Registration Measures]. The Xian regulations also provide for a nominal
registration fee of.004 of the transfer price in the case of sale, mortgage, or gift, and also for the payment
of a contract tax in an unspecified amount. Id. arts. 6, 8. Registration after tiransfer was sufficient because
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periods, during which time others could dispute the transfer.60 Among other
matters, provisions were also made for investigation and notice periods to
carry out registration where ownership documents were lacking.61
In spite of these fairly detailed procedures, as with the policy of
collecting rents for public housing, even the bare policy requiring registra-
tion of rights in real property only spread gradually from large cities.62
Indeed, even the most advanced cities in China have only recently begun to
develop modem land title registration'systems. 63 Given the lack of a func-
tioning real property registration system, it is doubtful that the registration
requirements alone served to give local governments significant control
over housing transactions, either as to individuals or as to government units
in possession of property.
3. Lease Relations: Using Rents to Develop Housing
The early recognition of lease rights was intimately related to the
problems experienced in the early period after Liberation. The chaos con-
sequent to the war against Japan and the civil war against the Kuomintang
appears to have led to serious degradation and disrepair in urban housing.64
The leadership sanctioned rental relations in private property largely as a
method of encouraging private owners to improve the quality of the housing
stock in their possession.
This strategy was primarily put into operation through the policy of
"using rent to develop housing. '65 Under this policy, rent relations were
sanctioned and rental income was allowed as a means of encouraging
the certificate of ownership itself, and not recordation as in the U.S., served as the ultimate proof of
ownership.
60 This period ran for one month in Xian. Xian Provisional Registration Measures, supra note 59,
art. 5.
61 Id. art. 8.
62 See, eg., Zhongnan Provisional Decisions, supra note 24, ch. 5, art. 1. Under the early Zhongnan
regulations, for example, small cities could decide for themselves whether or not to require registration of
propert rights. Id6 See infra notes 289-292 and accompanying text on registration difficulties today.
64 One early report from Hubei indicated that 29% of the housing in the province (10,455 units out
of 35,833 total units) was in such a serious state of disrepair as to be uninhabitable. Nei wu bu di zheng si
[Interior Ministry Land Policy Dep't], Dui muqian chengshi fangchan wenti de yijian [Opinion on Current
Issues in Urban Housing] (Aug. 1950), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note
19, at 15.
65 The Chinese term translated here is yi zu yangfang. The word yang is usually translated as 'to
cultivate' or 'to foster,' but the word 'develop' has been chosen for its better conceptual fit for Western
ears. See 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 18, at 27.
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private capitalist investment in the reconstruction of urban housing.66 Lease
relations were to be structured on the basis of mutually agreeable exchange
between individuals, and the parties were to respect and fulfill their duties
under freely created lease contracts. 67 The government's role in these trans-
actions was limited to assuring that landlords applied rents to necessary
housing repairs, protecting urban land resources generally, mediating
disputes, and collecting taxes. 68 Also, over time the government spent sub-
stantial resources in attempts to control rental rates so as to spur needed
investments in housing without placing undue burdens on workers. 69
The same considerations that led the leadership to sanction rent rela-
tions in the private sector also formed the basis for their decision to collect
rents from occupants of publicly owned housing.70 However, there was
considerably more initial confusion as to the necessity for public units and
residents occupying public housing to pay rent.
There was significant ambivalence on the issue of whether all indi-
viduals and public organizations should pay rent for the use of public
housing. Early regulations clearly provided that government organs,
collective organizations, schools, and individual residents should enter and
respect bi-lateral contracts with the local people's government for the use of
public housing.71 However, often the same regulations also stipulated that
some enterprises and other departments with "specialized housing facilities"
66 "In order to make private capitalists willing to invest in the reconstruction of housing, it is neces-
sary to protect housing rights and allow them [to collect] appropriate legal rents." Id at 8. This analysis
showed a prescient grasp of economic dynamics, for it predicted that if rent rates were suppressed and
property was recklessly confiscated "no one would manage [the property], no one would repair [it], and it
will even be recklessly sold or demolished, resulting in there not being enough housing for the people." Id
67 Id. at 7.
68 Id
69 See discussion of rent control infra at notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
70 "The People's Govemment leases this public housing at low rates and uses the proceeds for
maintenance and for repair funds. When there are excess funds, these can be used in expanding urban
construction." Urban Housing Rent Policy, supra note 19, at 9.
71 Dongbei Public Housing Regulations, supra note 56, art. 5. Consonant with the idea that these
properties ultimately belonged to the state, the regulations also provided that units should return facilities if
they were not being used. Id. art. 8.
In addition to requiring the payment of rents by governmental and quasi-governmental units occupy-
ing public housing, contemporary regulations also provided that individuals living in state housing were to
pay rents. This rule and the general policy is enunciated perhaps most forcefully in the Shanghai
regulations on public housing: "All those using publicly owned land, whether government organs, social
groups, schools, public-private enterprises, shops, or individuals should all enter lease contracts with the
housing administration bureau, and such contracts are to be respected by both parties." Shanghaishi
gonggong fangchan zulin zhanxing banfa [Provisional Measures of Shanghai Municipality for the Rental
of Public Housing] art. 3 (Sept. 7, 1950) [hereinafter Shanghai Public Rental Measures], reprinted in 1956
CIVIL LAW MATERIAL (11), supra note 52, at 365.
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could be excepted from this rule and receive housing free of charge as an
"investment" from the state.72 Units with the right of "self-operation" or
"self-management" were also exempted from the general requirement of
paying rent for the use of public real property. 73
Nevertheless, by the mid-1950s the policy of collecting rents for the
use of public housing was established as the standard, even if it was not
always realized.74 In addition to policy confusion and the decentralization
of "public ownership" to lower level units, the scarcity of administrative
resources also contributed significantly to difficulties in enforcing the
policy of "using rent to develop housing" throughout the early period.75
Hence, even the policy of charging rent for the use of public housing by
clearly included units was not universally implemented many years later.76
a. Rent relations
Because of the gradual pace of the nationalization of private holdings
in urban housing property, there were significant levels of private leasing
72 The regulations give no further guidance for determining which types of property and enterprises
qualified for this special dispensation. Dongbei Public Housing Regulations, supra note 57, art. 12.
73 Although it argues that rent could prevent waste and help develop housing yizuyangfang), one
1952 policy document maintains the distinction between enterprise and military units controlling real
property individually and other units, and excepts the former from rent payments. See Draft Urban Public
Property Opinion, supra note 51, at 20.
The 1953 Zhongnan Provisional Decisions, on the other hand, provided that "all organs, military
units, collective organizations and public schools should ... obtain set amounts of (yiding de) housing
from the housing management organ and pay rents according to regulations." The inclusion of military
units in these regulations indicates continuing confusion over the basic question of exactly which units
were to pay rents. Zhongnan Provisional Decisions, supra note 24, ch. 2, art. 7.
74 Both the continued salience of the goal of collecting rent for public housing and the lack of suc-
cess in realizing this goal are evident in a post-Great Leap Forward State Council opinion which asserted
that "all housing, service departments and facilities belonging to enterprises, organs of the state, and
schools, should ... gradually be transferred to the unified management and operation of the People's
Congress and these units should pay fixed rental and government management charges." Zhonggong
zhongyang guowuyuan [Central State Council of the P.R.C.], Guanyu dangqian chengshi gongzuo ruogan
wenti de zhishi [Instructions on Some Issues Concerning the Current Work in Urban Areas] (Oct. 6, 1962),
reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 29.
75 The Draft Urban Public Property Opinion indicated that the policy of collecting rents for public
housing could not be implemented nationally at that time (1952) for lack of the necessary municipal ad-
ministrative structures. Neiwu Bu [Interior Ministry], Guanyu jiaqiang chengshi gongyou fangdichan
guanli de yijian [Opinion Concerning the Strengthening of Urban Public Housing Management], reprinted
in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 21.
76 Even as late as 1957, official policy circulars were still calling for the implementation of the pol-
icy of "using rents to develop housing". See, e.g., 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 22.
Indeed, this policy formulation was even revived as a solution to low rental rates on the eve of the modem
reforms. See infra note 341 and accompanying text.
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activity in urban areas throughout the earliest period of P.R.C. history.
Indeed, until the socialization of urban property in the late 1950s ownership
was still quite concentrated, and there were still individual landlords who
owned and controlled more than one thousand (1000) units of urban hous-
ing. 77 Nevertheless, given the increasing amounts of public housing, the
municipal housing management bureaus soon became the single largest
"landlords" in urban areas. Thus, it was essential for the leadership to
maintain an optimal balance of rights in both public and private lease rela-
tions in order to achieve its goal of using rents to foster investments in and
assure the preservation of housing resources. This they accomplished at the
level of formal legislation, but utterly failed to achieve in practice.
The basic goal of early regulations governing private leasehold rela-
tions was the protection of the respective interests of the two parties, and
thus the assured protection of the subject property. The detailed rights and
duties spelled out in the regulations served to implement this principal.
Most fundamentally, private leasehold relations were to be based upon mu-
tually agreeable contracts78 between the parties in accordance with the
principles of mutual benefit, fairness, and reasonableness. 79
Both lessor and lessee had statutorily specified rights and duties
under the lease contract. The lessee, for example, had a duty to pay rent and
refrain from damaging the property, and could not transfer the property
without the permission of the owner.80 Neither could the tenant unilaterally
77 In Beijing, there were five individuals who owned over one thousand units of housing in 1957.
The individual with the largest holdings owned more than two thousand five hundred units. Zai di er ci
quanguo tingjuzhang huiyi shang guanyu chengshi fangchan guanli gongzuo de fayan [Communiqu6 of the
Second National Conference of Department Heads Concerning the Work of Urban Housing Management]
(Oct. 28, 1957), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 76, 88 [hereinafter
Second Housing Management Conference Report].
78 A great deal of detail was provided about the content of such contracts. Regulations specified the
elements to be included in contracts, and the localities also published form contracts. See, e.g., Tianjinshi
siren fangchan zulin zuyue zhiyang [Tianjin Municipality Sample Private Housing Lease Contract],
reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (I!), supra note 52, at 381. See also Fangwu zulin qiyueshu shi-
yang [Sample Housing Lease Contract], reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS, supra note 52, at 413
(providing an example from the city of Changchun).
79 The Dongbei regulations provided that all terms of the contract, including the rental period and
rate, could be decided by the parties. Dongbei Provisional Housing Regulations, supra note 56, art. 13.
However, other regulations included a rough standard for rental rates in the form of language to the effect
that rental rates should not be "too high or too low." See, eg., Xiuzheng beijingshi siyou fangchan zulin
zhanxing guize [Amended Provisional Regulations of Beijing Municipality on Private Housing Rental] art.
3 (Aug. 17, 1951), reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (II), supra note 52, at 370.
t Dongbei Provisional Housing Regulations, supra note 56, art. 15. It is clear from other sources,
however, that subleases were highly disfavored. The Tianjin regulations, among others, retroactively
invalidated all sublease relations. Tianjinshi renmin zhengfu siren fangwu zulin zhanxing tiaoli
[Provisional Regulations of Tianjin Municipality on Private Housing Rental] art. 14 (March 6, 1951),
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modify or alter the property.8 ' Furthermore, the landlord had the right to
retake the property if the tenant failed to pay rent or used the property
illegally. 82 The landlord on the other hand, had the primary duty of keeping
the property in reasonable repair,83 and was obligated to give the lessee a
right of first refusal if the owner wished to sell or otherwise transfer the
land.84 All of these principals, it should be noted, are compatible with the
basic goal of protecting and encouraging investments, by landlord or tenant,
in private rental property.
As indicated earlier, the general rule was that all units and individual
using publicly owned housing had to pay rent. Leasehold relations in the
public realm were for the most part structured quite similarly to those in the
private sector, except that the tenant's duties ran to the local land manage-
ment bureau or work unit instead of to private individuals. Also, as
expected, more of the terms of public leasehold contracts were subject to
governmental control.
The regulations on public leaseholds created a fairly comprehensive,
if still incomplete, framework for lease relations. As in the private realm,
these relations were to be based on contracts which spelled out the rights
and duties of both parties.85 However, both the length of the term86 and
rental amount87 of public lease contracts could be determined by statute or
by the local land management bureau. The tenant's rights under these con-
tracts could be terminated and the property retaken if he used the property
illegally, failed to pay rent, damaged the property and failed to make
repairs, or breached any other terms of the contract.88 Neither could the
reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW MATERIALS (11), supra note 52, at 373 [hereinafter Tianjin Provisional Rental
Regulations].
81 Changchunshi siren fangwu zulin guanli zhanxing banfa [Provisional Measures of Changehun
Municipality on the Management of Private Housing Rental] app., art. 9, reprinted in 1956 CIVIL LAW
MATERIALS (II), supra note 52, at 410.
82 Dongbei Provisional Housing Regulations, supra note 56, art. 18.
83 See, e.g., Tianjin Provisional Rental Regulations, supra note 80, art. 18. If the tenant instead
undertook the repair of the premises, he was entitled to deduct his expenses from future rental payments.
Id art. 19.
84 Id art. 27.
85 See, e.g., Shanghai Public Rental Measures, supra note 71, art. 3.
86 In Shanghai, the statutory lease term for covered properties was one year. Id. art. 8. In addition,
rent payments were to be made before the 15th of each month. Id. art. 13.
87 The rental amount in Dongbei was to vary according to the type and use of the property and the
area included, and might also be calculated on the basis of the unit's revenues. Dongbei Public Housing
Regulations, supra note 57, art. 14.
88 Shanghai Public Rental Measures, supra note 71, art. 14.
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lessee transfer leased property in any manner.89 Also, the government could
retake the property for the purpose of making necessary repairs, in which
case the original tenant had priority to rent the unit once the repairs were
finished. 90 .The burden of paying for repairs generally varied according to
the scale of the work and the allocation of fault for damage to the property,
among other factors. 91 Finally, the occupant was to obtain permission
before making major alterations to the property. 92
Again, these formal provisions for public leases are quite similar to
those for private rent relations, the primary distinctions between the two
being the amount of formal government control over lease terms and the
absolute prohibition against transfers of public property. However, with the
locus of public ownership largely in diverse work units and in light of the
weakness of local government property administrations, it is questionable
whether "public" rent relations were in fact substantially more subject to
unified government control. The experience with rent control suggests that
they were not.
b. Rent control
One area of continuing difficulty in the administration of rent rela-
tions was rent control. Although the private leasehold regulations provided
that individuals should fix lease terms through mutual agreement, municipal
governments maintained formal rights to determine contract price terms
through provisions in the regulations stipulating that rental rates should not
be "too high or too low" and should accord with municipal government
standards. 93 The government had this right over public properties both by
89 Id. art. 5. The Zhongnan regulations also reinforce the presumption that the prohibition against
transfer of public land applied to individuals as well as governmental organs: "Private individuals using
public land do so on the basis of leaseholds, they cannot modify any rights in the property." Zhongnan
Urban Construction Measures, supra note 36, art. 7.90 Dongbei Public Housing Regulations, supra note 56, art. 17.
91 If the tenant was responsible for damage to the property, he had to bear the expense of repairing it.
Shanghai Public Rental Measures, supra note 71, arts. 16, 17. All major structural repairs were the re-
sponsibility of the local land management bureau. Dongbei Provisional Public Housing Regulations, supra
note 56, art. 20. However, the tenant might also be responsible for expenses related to major internal
repairs undertaken at his own initiative. Id. art. 21.
92 Units or enterprises initiating larger additions or modifications also had to pay for their own work
after obtaining permission from the local land management bureau. Dongbei Public Housing Regulations,
supra note 56, at 22.
93 See, e.g., Beijingshi siyou fangchan zhanxing guanli banfa [Provisional Measures of Beijing
Municipality on the Management of Private Urban Housing] art. 9 (1958), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW
REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 166-67.
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definition and by fiat. Nevertheless, significant contradictions and tensions
in the urban housing system prevented the government from being able to
effectively use its formal control over rental rates to foster the preservation
and growth of housing stocks.
The central dilemma with respect to rental rates arose from the need
to balance the interests of housing owners and managers, on one hand,
against those of tenant workers and staff members on the other. If rental
rates were too low, there would not be sufficient returns to assure the main-
tenance and repair of current facilities, much less to build new ones.94 If
rents were set too high, however, workers and staff members in industry and
government would be excessively burdened. This dilemma may only have
been aggravated over time by the low, stagnant wages of workers in urban
areas. 95
The basic formula for calculating appropriate rental rates was laid out
quite early, and evidences both aspects of the tension between lessees and
lessors. On the investment side, the 1949 Urban Housing Rent Policy
document indicated that an appropriate rent should include a component for
depreciation and repair costs, and that the lessor should receive a fair return
on his property.96 On the other hand, the owner's income was not to exceed
an average social return, speculation was forbidden, and the rental rate was
not to be too high or too low. 97
Later, it became obvious that, relative to workers' and staff salaries,
rents could be either too high and too low, but that for the most part they
were too low. In some areas, private rental rates were as much as 30% of
worker and staff wages, a ratio considered too high.98 Private rental rates
94 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 23.
95 "Real" annual wages (presumably adjusted for inflation) of workers and staff in state owned
enterprises were 15% higher in 1978 than in 1952. However, using 1952 as a base, wages actually
increased 30% over 1952 during the Great Leap Forward, decreased 1.3% below 1952 levels in the subse-
quent retrenchment (1962), increased by 21% over 1952 during the height of the Cultural Revolution
(1965), and then dropped offto 14% above the 1952 base in 1970 and 13% above the 1952 base in 1975.
ZHONGGUO SHEHUI TONGII ZILIAO [CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION] 67 (State Statistical
Bureau, Social Statistics Dep't ed., 1985) [hereinafter 1983 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS]. These patterns
suggest that wages were used as a significant mobilizational tool during these radical periods. This fact
makes it highly unlikely that, even if workers and staff had more disposable income, property managers
would in practice have been able or inclined to raise rents in step with wages during these periods.
96 Urban Housing Rent Policy, supra note 19, at 7. Later formulations also included elements such
as management expenses and land tax. See, e.g., Opinion on Current Issues in Urban Housing, supra note
64, at 15.
97 Opinion on Current Issues in Urban Housing, supra note 64, at 15.
98 The 30% figure is from Guangzhou. Chengshi fuwubu [Urban Service Bureau], Guanyu zhaoji
chengshi fangehan gongzuo zuotanhui gei guowuyuan diwu bangongshi de baogao [Report to the Fifth
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were generally higher in rapidly developing urban areas, and were higher
for new renters than for old.99 However, private rental rates were often set
too low, as in Xian where they were decreased by 40% after adjustments by
the municipal government. 100 In some areas, private rents amounted to only
3% of worker and staff wages after rent reform. 101 The results of these
changes are not surprising in retrospect. In the face of artificially depressed
rental rates, private landowners often simply refused to rent their prop-
ertyI02 or sold it altogether,103 and neglected to undertake needed repairs on
housing they retained. 104
Although there are some reports of public rental rates being too
high,105 most of the statistics confirm that public rents were too low by far.
In some areas, where rents were collected at all they were set as low as only
2.5 to 5% of worker and staff wages. 106 These low rates were caused by
both popular pressure107 and by property managers' overemphasis on not
burdening workers.108 As a result of these tensions, even in cities where
public rents were highest they often were not sufficient even to cover the
estimated cost of repairs.109
C. Implementation Difficulties and Economic Irrationality
In spite of the fairly detailed provisions intended to foster harmonious
rent and transfer relations and aid the creation of a revenues for investment
in housing, the government had great difficulty in administering both the
public and private real property systems. After the Great Leap Forward,
there was still widespread disrepair in housing, significant housing short-
Office of the State Council on the Conference on the Work of Collectivizing Urban Housing] (1957),
reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 66, 70 [hereinafter 1957
Collectivization Conference Report].
99 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 23.100 1957 Collectivization Conference Report, supra note 98, at 70.
101 The 3% figure is from Guangzhou. Id.
102 Id.
103 Even before the downward rent adjustments ofthe mid-1950s, owners were giving up or selling
housing because rent rates were too low. See, e.g., Opinion on Current Issues in Urban Housing, supra
note 64, at 15.
104 Id.
105 1957 Collectivization Conference Report, supra note 98, at 70.
106 Id. at69.
107 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 26.
108 1957 Collectivization Conference Report, supra note 98, at 70.
109 Id at 69-70.
VOL. 3 No. 2
URBAN REAL PROPERTYRIGHTS IN CHINA
ages, and the land administration systems in many cities were in disarray." 10
All of these problems were symptoms of the failure to assert government
control over public property or assure sufficient rights in private real prop-
erty resources.
The most fundamental problem in the public realm was that large
amounts of publicly owned housing effectively remained outside of the
control of local land management organs. One aspect of this problem was
the fact that a great deal of ostensibly public property was subject to "self-
management" by the units in possession."'1 Likewise, state-owned enter-
prises, work units, and organizations at all levels could confiscate property
and construct housing: indeed, it was they, not state land administration
bureaus, who had the resources to do so.
Likewise the central and even local land management organs of the
state lacked legal or institutional means to effectively enforce public owner-
ship rights. A host of problems were reported before the Great Leap
Forward. One report issued in the mid-1950s outlined some of the main
problems, which included: uncertainty as to policy principals and the scope
of management; lack of unified management and clarity in administrative
relations; lack of national legislation, regulations, and systems; lack of uni-
fied standards for housing use; lack of specialized publications and systems
for reporting statistics; and a lack of training departments. 1' 2 This situation
weakened or even crippled the management of both public and private
housing resources in many areas. 113 By virtue of their de facto independ-
ence, those using both public and private housing were apparently able to
avoid compliance with the leasehold, transfer, and registration regulations
outlined above.'14
110 See generally Guojia fangchan guanli ju [National Housing Management Dep't], Guanyu
jiaqiang quanmin suoyouzhi fangchan guanli gongzuo de baogao [Report on the Work of Strengthening the
Management of the Public Housing System] 34 (July 13, 1964), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE
MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 33 [hereinafter 1964 Public Housing Management Report].
I11 One report indicated that most urban publicly owned housing was in fact self-managed.
Zhonggong Zhongyang, Guowuyuan [State Council], Di er ci chengshi gongzuo huiyi jiyao [Summary of
the Proceedings of the Second Conference on Urban Work] (Oct. 12, 1963), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW
REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 32 [hereinafter Second Urban Work Conference Summary].
112 1957 Collectivization Conference Report, supra note 98, at 74.
113 One late report indicated that management was so chaotic as to be almost non-existent in
smaller cities. 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 23, 24.
114 In 1964 the Second Urban Work Conference Summary noted that the administrative work of
self-administered units was for the most part very weak. It also exhorted those independently managing
public property to obey local regulations and accept the leadership and supervision of the municipal gov-
emments. Second Urban Work Conference Summary, supra note 11, at 32.
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These weak legal-institutional structures led to a host of perverse ir-
regularities in the system of housing administration. The most important
result of these problems was the failure to assure the collection of rents. As
noted earlier, rent control did not proceed smoothly in the public housing
sector, and units and individuals often did not pay rents as required by
law.115 In spite of contracts and regulations to the contrary, lessees of pri-
vate housing were also often able to avoid paying adequate rents.
According to one early report, fully 58% of the households in Tangshan
City did not pay any rent whatsoever; and where rents were paid at all, it
was often only at significantly depressed rates. 116 Insofar as the non-
payment or underpayment of rents deprived lessors (both public and
private) of funds necessary for reinvestment, this situation probably con-
tributed significantly to the disrepair and collapse reported in the housing
stock.
A host of other economic difficulties were also encountered in the
systems of both public and private ownership. The "irrational use," waste
and misuse of housing resources were reported to be serious problems
flowing from unit selfishness and disregard for regulations.'1 7 Also, even
where rents were collected by government units, these units often misap-
propriated rental receipts and failed to apply them to needed repairs.ll8
There were also irregularities in the rental, transfer, and mortgage of private
property, as well as "exploitation" and speculation in the system of private
housing.119 Finally, private property also suffered at the hands of the public
The autonomy and defiance of public property occupants was not merely a result of the Great Leap
Forward, as might be assumed from these later reports. As early as 1952, policy documents derided the
selfishness of units who exercised de facto ownership over public property and resisted government man-
agement procedures. See Draft Urban Public Property Opinion, supra note 51, at 18.
115 The frequent exhortations to bring property into the urban rental system indicate that a great
many units and publicly owned properties existed outside of the public rental system altogether. See, e.g.,
1964 Public Housing Management Report, supra note 110, at 36.
116 Opinion on Current Issues in Urban Housing, supra note 64, at 15-16.
117 See, e.g., Draft Urban Public Property Opinion, supra note 51, at 17. One example of waste
was the destruction of housing by enterprises and other units for urban construction, which could result in a
net loss of urban housing. Another example of waste and irrational use was the inequitable distribution of
housing among different units. Small but politically influential units could control large amounts of
housing while large units might have little. Thus, some workers and staff members had inadequate housing
while there was in fact excess capacity in other units. Second Housing Management Conference Report,
supra note 77, at 79.
118 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 27. See also 1964 Housing Management
Report, supra note 110, at 37 (noting that most units had failed to apply rental receipts to housing main-
tenance, and that in the future they should pay costs to housing management bureaus and not retain rental
receipts).
119 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 23.
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sector. Government units which were not willing to pay high prices for the
use of private property instead illegally coerced owners into selling or rent-
ing, presumably at lower than the prescribed rates.120
In terms of our model of property rights, this situation represents the
extreme breakdown of the legal-institutional means of property rights
definition and enforcement. This is a classic agency problem of Socialist
economies, wherein no one - individuals or state agents in possession of
property, the state generally, or state regulatory or supervisory agents - has
sufficient rights or duties necessary to be held accountable for the value of
public or private property resources. Our economic theory of property
rights predicts market allocation breakdown amid such problems, and this is
precisely what happened. The leaders' solution, however, only aggravated
the uncertainty and weak rights causing these difficulties.
D. The Socialization of Urban Housing Property
Frustrated with the slow pace of economic reform and troubled by
growing disaffection within the Party and society, the top C.C.P. leadership
launched the Great Leap Forward ("G.L.F.") in 1958.121 The G.L.F. was
Mao's attempt to bypass the capitalist stage of development altogether and
move directly from China's "backward" production system to establish an
advanced socialist economic system in the P.R.C. This movement was
characterized by the radicalization of politics and production generally, but
the most ambitious policy of the G.L.F. was the consolidation of diffuse
individual peasant producers into first cooperatives and then larger collec-
tives and communes. 122 In the rush to socialization, the system of private
peasant land holding established after land reform was largely eradicated as
labor and then land were concentrated in ever larger administrative struc-
tures in the countryside and agricultural suburbs of urban areas. 123
120 See, e.g., Draft Urban Public Property Opinion, supra note 50, at 18.
121 See FRANZ SCHURMANN, IDEOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION IN COMMUNIST CHINA 464, 465 n.107
(1966). The Great Leap Forward was formally initiated at the Second Session of the Eighth Party Congress
in May of 1958, but the major elements of the policy were already in place by this time. Mao was by then
already dissatisfied with progress in agriculture under the First Five Year Plan, and his dissatisfaction with
the bureaucratism and elitism implied by rational planning had already manifest itself in the formulation of
the principal policies of the G.L.F.: decentralization of decision making to regions and localities, on one
hand, and to Party Committees, on the other; accelerated collectivization of agriculture; and political
mobilization and the purge of opponents in the anti-rightist campaigns. Id
122 See id at 474,485-86.
123 See generally ALAN P. L. Liu, How CHINA IS RULED 116-29 (1986).
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The socialization of urban private real property had much more
modest goals than that of agricultural land. Socialization in urban areas
seems to have consisted largely of attempts to solve existing problems in
the systems of public and private ownership by increasing the range of
urban real property subject to public ownership. However, the further
decentralization of control, mass mobilization, and political radicalization
which characterized this movement undoubtedly only exacerbated the
situation of weak property rights in urban areas.
Calls for the socialization of urban real property in early policy
documents were often accompanied by mention of "contradictions" in the
early system of urban real property.124 The contradiction between private
property ownership and socialist construction, for example, was said to
make it difficult to foster and rationalize housing utilization, and to cause
irregularities in rent relations.125 The contradiction between private owner-
ship and socialism was also said to allow selfishness among private
landlords, continued disrepair in housing, excessive private rents, and rental
conditions harmful to workers and staff.126 The contradiction between rapid
urban population growth and slow expansion of housing caused shortages in
urban housing.127 Finally, the housing authorities also perceived a contra-
diction between the backward housing management system and the
requirements of socialist construction. 128
Although these phenomena largely correspond with the problems
encountered in implementing effective systems of public and private prop-
erty administration, the conceptualization of these problems in terms of
"contradictions" is significant. On one level, this turn of phrase reflects the
politicization of property policy dialogue in the context of overall political-
ideological radicalization.129 However, at a more concrete level, the charac-
124 See, e.g., 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 24.
125 Id. at24.
126 Second Housing Management Conference Report, supra note 77, at 88-89.
127 1957 Urban Housing Opinion, supra note 19, at 24.
128 Id.
129 The radicalization of political discourse, ideology and policy leading up to the Great Leap
Forward centered around Mao Zedong's conception of contradictions in politics, society and production.
Mao's dialectical ideology of contradictions and their resolution was primarily embodied in two speeches:
"The Ten Great Relationships," delivered in April of 1956, and "On the Question of Correctly Resolving
Contradictions among the People," delivered on February 27, 1957. Schurmann explains that "[W]hen a
relationship turns into a contradiction, struggle between the two elements of the duality begins. Struggle
demands resolution so that a 'unity of opposites' can be produced, as indicated in the prevalent slogan of
the Great Leap Forward: Solidarity-Struggle-Solidarity." SCHURMANN, supra note 121, at 102.
Schurmann explains that "by 1957 and 1958, when Mao Tse-tung's vision of Chinese society began to un-
fold, relationships turned into contradictions." Id at 101.
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terization of urban property relations in terms of contradictions also
indicates growing frustration over the continuing problem' in the system of
urban real property, along with a tendency to ascribe these problems to the
continued existence of the system, of private ownership. These attitudinal
changes among elements of the P.R.C. leadership provided the background
for increasingly strenuous attacks on the system of urban private property
ownership.
The socialization of private urban housing was carried out in two
basic stages, each having different objects and scope. First, as early as 1956
some private housing resources were socialized along with the nation-
alization of private industry.130 The inaptly named public-private joint
management (gongsi heying) movement was directed at capitalist industries,
private handicraft industries, and shipping and transportation enterprises, as
well as at small vendors, peddlers, and traders. 131 Early directives on
nationalization provided that the government should purchase the produc-
tive assets of private capitalist enterprises and bring them under public
control. 132
Depending on their scale and connection with production, the housing
resources owned by capitalists could be nationalized along with the enter-
prise. Where the housing and shop were one and the same, or where
property directly connected with the enterprise owner's household were
concerned, the entrepreneur was to retain ownership. 133 On the other hand,
all other productive property connected with the enterprise as well as rental
properties of the entrepreneur were to be turned over to the management
and use of the newly nationalized enterprise.134
The second stage of housing reform, the socialist reform of urban
housing proper, had a much broader impact on private real property owner-
ship than did enterprise nationalization. Under private housing reform
policies first announced in 1955, the government sought to both increase
administrative controls and accelerate the transition from private to public
130 See Zai diyici chuanguo fangchan gongzuo huiyishang de zongjie baogao [Summary Report of
the First National Real Property Work Conference], reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS,
supra note 18, at 93-94.
131 ZHONGGUO FANGDICHAN ZHENGCI FAGUI YU SHIT [CHINESE REAL PROPERTY POLICY, LAW AND
PRACTICE] 23 (Ji Min ed., 1990).
132 Id (citing the 1956 Opinion on Issues Concerning the Socialization of Capitalist Industrial
Enterprises).
33 it at 27.
134 1d
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ownership of urban housing resources. 135 Nevertheless, these goals were
only partially satisfied, as the reforms still left considerable scope for
private property ownership and failed to significantly improve existing
deficiencies in the administration of housing resources.
The basic element of these socialist reforms was government pro-
curement of all private rental housing above specified limits for individual
property owners. Although owners were to retain some property in order to
provide for their needs, 136 there was significant variation in the base level
(qidian) for property subject to reform. No single authoritative national
legislation specified the reform floor, so local governments claimed all
rental housing of individuals in excess of as little as 100 meters in some
areas, and as much as 500 square meters in others, with most using 150,
200, or 300 square meters as the floor for reform. 137 The basic policy
calling for governmental acquisition of private rental property in excess of
these limits continued until the beginning of the modem housing reforms in
1982.138
All property above these levels entered the system of public owner-
ship and was to come under control of local governments who were then to
take responsibility for rentals, repairs, etc. under existing laws governing
rent relations in public property.I39 On the other hand, in theory at least,
135 The seminal policy document setting out the basic rationale and contours of this policy is a very
brief document, stating: "The principal requirement for the socialist reform of urban private housing is the
strengthening of national control by first making private housing rentals fully comply with national policy
and then gradually reforming [the private] ownership system." See Zhonggong zhongyang shujichu dier
bangongshi guanyu muqian chengshi siyou fangchan jiben qingkuang ji jinxing shehuizhuyi gaizao de
yijian [Opinion of the Communist Central Secretariat Concerning the Current Basic Situation in Urban
Private Housing and the Commencement of Socialist Reform] (1955), reprinted in 1980 CIVIL LAW
REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 63.
136 Some documents indicated that, at least in the early stages of reform, landlords with only small
holdings should be excluded from reform. See id. at 63-64. Nevertheless, at minimum, landlords were to
have the right to retain a house for their own use (zi zhufang). See DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW,
supra note 56, at 414.
137 First Housing Conference Report, supra note 34, at 98. Later policy documents suggested that
the floor for small cities could be lowered even further to 50 square meters. See Guojia fangchan guanli ju
[National Housing Management Dep't], Guanyu siyou chuzu fangwu shehui zhuyi gaizao wenti de baogao
[Report Concerning Issues in the Socialist Reform of Private Rental Housing] (Dec. 30, 1963), reprinted in
1980 CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 119, 120.
138 See DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 56, at 411.
139 This system is referred to asfingzu. Rare exceptions to the policy of full government control
underfingzu existed for very. large landlords whose property might instead be placed under joint public-
private operation (gongsi heying). See Report Concerning Issues in the Socialist Reform of Private Rental
Housing, supra note 137, at 120.
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private ownership rights in the remaining property were protected, 140 and
owners retained the right to lease, sell and mortgage this property subject to
substantially the same conditions as those adhering before the reforms.
141
Thus, urban real property rights were formally protected under socialization
at least to the extent of property below the reform threshold.
While private property was subject to widespread assimilation into
the system of public ownetship for the first time under these reforms, social-
ized property was not to be merely confiscated. Rather than purchasing
private rental property outright or offering lump-sum compensation for its
confiscation, under the reform policy of "using rent to set rent" (yi zu ding
zu) the government actually paid regular rent-like payments to former
landlords.142 These rental payments were based on a percentage of total
rental returns calculated to approximate the owner's pre-reform net returns
on aggregate rental properties. 4 3 As with the base level for reform, there
was no national standard for rental payments, but most authorities suggested
that these payments should be set at from 20% to 40% of the initial pre-
reform rental charges. 144
This remunerative policy was generous if short-lived. Far from
working an uncompensated taking of property, this policy could actually
represent a windfall of sorts to owners by providing them with a fixed risk-
and effort-free income. However, apart from difficulties in implementation
to be discussed below, this policy also probably ended too soon to fully
compensate many owners. The leadership suspended the policy of paying
rent to landlords for socialized rental properties, as well as for properties
140 See, e.g, Kou MENGLIANG, FANGDICHAN SHIYONG FALO ZHISHI SHOUCI [PRACTICAL
HANDBOOK OF REAL PROPERTY LEGAL KNOWLEDGE] 53 (1988).
141 Report Concerning Issues in the Socialist Reform of Private Rental Housing, supra note 136, at
124.
142 DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 56, at 413.
143 It is perhaps indicative of the turmoil in policy making of the day that the first authoritative
statement on the adoption of this remunerative policy came in a People's Daily interview with an unnamed
central government official rather than from a formal regulation or policy document. See Zhongyang
zhuguan jiguan fuze ren jiu siyou chuzufangwu de shehui zhuyi gaizao wenti dui xinhua shejizhefabiao de
tanhua [Conversation with a Responsible Central Government Official Concerning Issues in the Socialist
Reform of Private Rental Housing], RENMIN RIBAO [PEOPLE'S DAILY], Aug. 6, 1958, reprinted in 1980
CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19, at 109. A competing policy that was superseded by the
adoption of "using rent to set rent" was that of "using property values to set interest' (yi chanzhi ding xi).
Although initially used in some areas, this method of remuneration was disfavored because of the
administrative difficulties that it presented. See Summary Report of the First National Real Property Work
Conference, supra note, at 100.
144 See, e.g., Report Concerning Issues in the Socialist Reform of Private Rental Housing, supra
note 137, at 120.
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nationalized along with enterprises, in September 1966.145 Hence, owners
who were under compensated under the policy of "using rent to set rent"
could only make claims for sums owing up to October 1966.146
The underpayment of remuneration was only one of many problems
of socialization which persisted into the modem period. First, it is clear that
progress in the reforms was uneven, for by 1964 some cities had still not
undertaken housing reform.147 Thus, substantial amounts of privately
owned rental housing remained outside of public ownership even after
socialization. 148 Second, reform was often. carried out in a very haphazard
manner where it was implemented. In some places base levels were set too
low, and in others they were done away with altogether so that any and all
rental property could be subject to reform.149 Also, in direct contravention
of the clear policy prescription that private housing should be unaffected,
many local governments also reformed the private-use housing of landlords
and left landlords with too little housing. 150
Several factors conspired to cause these continuing problems with
housing reform. First and foremost, socialization placed greatly increased
demands on local public land management organs that were ill-prepared to
handle even the minimal pre-socialization levels of public property. The
lack of precision in specifying standards for base levels and remuneration
undoubtedly created significant uncertainty as to what was to be reformed
and in what manner. The use of mobilization campaigns instead of normal
policy making channels in a situation of continuing policy fluctuation also
destabilized the early system of property rights.' 5 ' Decentralization of
145 CHINESE REAL PROPERTY POLICY, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 13 1, at 44.
146 Id Modem regulations addressing problems left over from the socialization of urban real
property fixed the compensation period at five years for owners who received no compensation whatsoever
or whose property was only reformed a short while before 1966. Id
147 One report from 1963 (during the period of retrenchment following the Great Leap Forward)
admitted that there were no clear rules on the issue of whether currently unreformed cities should proceed
with the acquisition of rental properties. The same report did indicate, however, that resistance from
landlords was impeding reform in some areas. See Report Concerning Issues in the Socialist Reform of
Private Rental Housing, supra note 137, at 121.
148 One report issued in 1964 (some 6 years after the commencement of socialization) estimated
that approximately 70% of private housing had come under the reforms by that time. Guojia fangchan
guanli ju [National Housing Management Bureau], Dui guowuyuan pizhuan de "guanyu siyou chuzu
fangwu shehuizhuyi gaizao wenti de baogao" de shuo ming [Explanation of the State Council's "Report
Concerning Issues in the Socialist Reform of Private Rental Housing"] (July 15, 1964), reprinted in 1980
CIVIL LAW REFERENCE MATERIALS, supra note 19 at 125, 126.
149 Id. at 127.
150 Id.
151 SCHURMANN, supra note 121, at 464. Mobilization campaigns also had a significant direct im-
pact on the power of municipal administrations ostensibly responsible for housing management. In
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control and the concentration of resources in production units through the
urban commune movement also probably undermined the leadership's early
efforts to establish a system of unified housing rights and management
under local government control. 152 Hence, already weak individual prop-
erty rights were eroded even further in this process.
Although the basic policies of housing socialization continued in
effect throughout the Cultural Revolution, most problems encountered dur-
ing that time were related to the extra-legal acts of rampaging Red Guard
factions rather than to attempts at reform. 153 During these political strug-
gles intellectuals, overseas Chinese, and individuals belonging to other
disfavored groups were publicly humiliated, had their houses raided for
"bourgeois" possessions, and were forced out of their private houses and
had them confiscated.154 Modem regulations dealing with problems left
over from housing reform call for the return of and compensation for hous-
ing taken illegally throughout the early period.
Socialization and the chaos of the Cultural Revolution had disastrous
results for China's urban housing system, and the task of the reformers has
particular, the hsiafang (sending down) movement of sending cadres to the countryside undoubtedly de-
creased the power of the already inadequate housing administrations vis-A-vis occupying units. These
movements of intellectuals and cadres to lower levels occurred on a very large scale between both 1957-
1958 and 1963-1964.
152 Administrative decentralization in urban areas during the Great Leap Forward was often carried
out through urban communes which, ironically, were apparently first called for by none other than the
modem champion of privatization, Deng Xiaoping, in September 1958. Id at 382. Although urban
communization did not progress as rapidly or thoroughly as that in rural areas, where they were estab-
lished, large factory-centered urban communes took over most of the functions previously exercised by the
city administration. Id at 387-92. Presumably this included housing administration, in which enterprises
were already largely independent as to their own facilities; but newly-established communes could also
include members beyond the original factory workforce, and could therefore probably serve to remove
even more property from the public management system.
153 For one diplomat's account of the political intrigues and "revolutionary" activities of the Red
Guard groups during this time, see generally JEAN ESMEIN, THE CHINESE CULTURAL REVOLUTION (W. J. F.
Jenner trans., 1973).
154 See CHINESE REAL PROPERTY POLICY, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 131, at 58, 59
(acknowledging Cultural Revolution-era housing confiscations). One foreign diplomat who witnessed this
activity describes how it transpired in Beijing:
All private houses were... seized. In practice, this meant that the owner had to hand over his title
deed to the police, who informed him then whether he was allowed to stay in the house or not. If he was
lucky he was permitted to stay and assigned one room for every person in the household. The 'rooms' of a
Chinese house are in general smaller than in Western Europe. Moreover they do not need to be separated
by a wall, but a visible beam may serve as the partition between two rooms. In such a case we would speak
of one room.
D.W. FOKKEMA, REPORT FROM PEKING 21 (1972).
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been to reverse the situation of extremely weak property rights which these
events exacerbated. In attempting to do this, the leadership has repudiated
the policies of socialization, and instead innovated on the basis of the rights
policies enunciated in the early post-Liberation period. Nevertheless, the
thirty years of intervening property rights decentralization and degradation
has made the reformers' task a formidable one.
IV. THE REFORM ERA: PAST IS PRESENT
Chinese experience through the Maoist period proved the negative
hypothetical expression of our theory: extremely weak property rights
resulted, as predicted, in significant under investment in and misallocation
of housing resources. The modem reforms provide an opportunity to test
the affirmative hypothesis of Western economic theories of property rights:
that the strengthening of property rights and duties should encourage
exchange, investment, and conservation.
The following sections will examine a sample (admittedly incom-
plete) of legal-institutional reforms and ask to what extent the P.R.C. has
succeeded through these means in increasing the variety, depth, and clarity
of property rights in urban housing. Section A. examines the problems of
the old system and perceived merits of the new. Section B. examines
overall property rights reforms at the level of general principles of constitu-
tional and civil law, as well as some basic structures of civil rights and
liabilities particularly germane to property rights. Section C. addresses the
housing reforms in detail and with reference to the variety of actors and
rights in the urban environment.
This analysis leads to the conclusion that, although significant pro-
gress has been made in housing rights reform, the current system still
engenders significant irrationality, inequity, and instability with regard to
property rights. Furthermore, there is significant interdependence between
housing rights reforms and others in the legal-institutional environment, and
further progress will require the continued application of significant politi-
cal and economic resources to overcome the inertia of existing rights
configurations in all of these areas.
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A. Market Problems and Rights Solutions
1. Market Problems
The modem reforms in the housing system have been intimately
related to failures in the early system of urban real property rights.155 Under
the old system of weak lease rights, land was allocated free to units, and
house property was uniformly allocated at extremely low rental rates to
individuals. These low rental rates meant that rental returns did not cover
even the costs of building or maintaining the property. This factor, in turn,
discouraged investment in house property by either local governments,
individuals, or SOEs. Also, housing allocation decisions were made accord-
ing to one's place in a given administrative hierarchy rather than actual
consumption, need or ability to pay. The socialization and expropriation of
private property assured that the vast majoity of all urban housing in China
would be plagued by these difficulties.156 Finally the size of this inefficient
sector meant that the direct costs of subsidizing housing property were a
significant burden on government budgets, even with low levels of govern-
ment investment in housing resources generally. 157
The fruits of this system were bitter indeed. Due to the significant
disincentives to investment, China faced a huge urban housing shortage on
the eve of the reforms. Early in the reform period it was generally estimated
that around 30% of urban households had insufficient housing, but esti-
mates in some areas went much higher than this.158 In the early 1980s,
155 For an excellent example of official Chinese thought on the problems of the old system and
merits of the new, see generally 'People's Daily' Article Favours Commercialisation of Urban Housing,
BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 21, 1985, at FE17905/B I/I, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, CHINA File.
156 Chinese statistics from 1983 indicate that public housing constituted 88.44%, private-use
housing 9.36%, and private rental housing 2.2% of total housing at the time. See 1983 CHINESE SOCIAL
STATISTICS, supra note 95, at 97 tbl.2.
157 "The state's burden keeps on growing at a rate of 40 billion yuan a year or four times the
amount of [total] investment used in Shenzhen's construction." Wang Qingxian & Wang Xiaotong,
Housing Reform a 'Historical Necessity which Cannot be Evaded, in BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts,
Nov. 22, 1991, at FE/1236/CI/l, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
158 See, e.g., 'People's Daily' Article Favours Commercialization of Urban Housing'supra note
155 ("At present about one third of urban households are short of housing"). An earlier report published
by the State Council estimated the percentage of households facing shortages to be much lower (only
17%), but also illuminated the perverse results of this shortage for the individuals involved. Just over a
million households had no housing at all, with husbands and wives living separately or together in dormi-
tories, workshops, warehouses and offices. An even greater number of households (1.3 million), had to
share housing with other families and/or had several generations, including grown children, living together.
Guowu yuan pizhun guojian wei guanyu jiakuai chengshi zhuzhai jianshe de baogao [State Council
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Shanghai reported that 59% of the families in the city were looking for
housing, and significant numbers of people in some areas even within
Shanghai itself were reported to be living in extremely distressed condi-
tions.159 Shortage is also reflected in the fact that the floor space per capita
for urban residents stood at just over four square meters in the late 1970s.160
2. Rights Solutions
The Chinese leadership has self-consciously embraced market prin-
ciples as a means of remedying the defects of the planned allocation of
economic factors. The number of products subject to planned allocation has
decreased drastically, and in housing, "commoditization" is the buzzword
for market allocation - of both public and private resources - by autono-
mous, profit-driven exchange. The transformation from plan to market
necessarily implies the devolution of control rights over housing to essen-
tially autonomous and profit-oriented, yet regulated, economic users.
Because the Chinese leadership have grasped this connection between
market outcomes and market legal-institutional structures, the list of reform
policies reads like an institutional economist's wish list. In the broadest
sense, the legal-institutional reforms in housing and in general have had
four basic objectives: 1) to increase the total quanta of powers or rights, as
well as duties, in actors utilizing economic resources; 2) to increase the
range of actors with the capacity to undertake rights and duties in property
relations; 3) to increase the range of property objects subject to such rights,
and; 4) to assure effective enforcement of rights as constituted in order to
reduce enforcement costs and prevent abuse, waste, negative externalities
and other market failures.
With respect to housing, each of these goals has been addressed by
numerous policies across a wide range of relevant issue areas. Quite
Approval and Publication of the National Construction Committee Report on Speeding Urban Residential
Construction] (Oct. 19, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Report on Speeding Urban Construction], reprinted in
ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO FANGDICHAN FAGUI HUIBIAN [COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY
LAw] 354, 355 (Ministry of Justice Lawyers' Dep't & Construction Ministry Structural Reform Law Dep't,
eds., 1992).
159 In Shanghai alone, at least 900 families were said to live in "subhuman" conditions, and as
many as 80,000 people lived in "miserable" conditions. CHINA NEWS ANALYSIS, No. 1212, July 3 1, 198 1,
at 3-4. Perhaps this represents some improvement, for in 1977 almost a million individuals in Shanghai
were reported to have an average living area of under 2 square meters - surely a "miserable" condition.
1978 Report on Speeding Urban Construction, supra note 158, at 355.
I6OUrban residents had an average of only 4.4 square meters of space in 1979, compared with 8.4
for peasants. 1983 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 95, at 97 tbl.1.
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clearly, the restoration of property rights has implications across almost
every legal field, from administrative to zoning law. Thus, the reform poli-
cies have been defined and embodied in the reform-era Constitution,
16
'
General Principles of Civil Law ("G.P.C.L.") i62 and innumerable narrower
national, provincial and municipal enactments.
B. Overall Property Rights Reforms
The property law reforms have proceeded along two broad paths.
First, these new laws grant enhanced individual substantive and procedural
rights with respect to real property through generally applicable constitu-
tional, regulatory, administrative and contract law. While the issue of
"ownership" under this system has been muddled pitifully in the process,
the increase of substantive rights is itself significant. 163 Merely by clarify-
ing contract and statutory rights, this legislation helps increase security and
decrease information costs related to ascertaining and enforcing property
rights. These reforms may make it possible to vest individual economic
actors with the duty and powers necessary to control and benefit from their
use of property. By increasingly providing the powers and duties associated
with the transfer of property rights, the leaders also hope to encourage
cheaper and more rational exchanges of these enhanced housing resources.
This is seen as the chief benefit of commoditization.
This point leads to the second major prong of the property rights
reforms. In addition to recognizing enhanced property rights, the govern-
ment has facilitated the vesting of property rights in increasingly autono-
mous profit-motivated economic actors. This has been accomplished by
recognizing and defining legal personhood and civil capacity in- diverse
public and quasi-public organizations in society. Both public and private
actors are thereby increasingly able to take advantage of the new substan-
tive rights in property.
All of these general policies come together in the area of housing
reform, which will be considered in the next part.
161 P.R.C. CoNST. (adopted Dec. 4, 1982, and as amended Apr. 12, 1988 and Mar. 29, 1993),
translated in I China L. for Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) 4-500 (1993).
162 The General Principles of Civil Law of the People's Republic of China (adopted Apr. 12, 1986,
effective Jan. 1, 1987), translated in 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27 (Whitmore Gray & Henry Ruiheng
Zheng trans., Spring 1989) [hereinafter G.P.C.L.].
163 On the debate over ownership in state-owned enterprises, see infra notes 206-09 and accompa-
nying text.
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1. Fundamental Principles: The Mixed Ownership System
The national leadership, as the chief beneficiary of the socialist
system, has an understandable preference for public ownership. On the
other hand, the leadership has also sought to foster marketization by recog-
nizing increasing rights to possess and control public and private property.
Thus, the reform era Constitution and General Principles of Civil Law
("G.P.C.L.") define in broad strokes a mixed system of public and private
ownership.
The most general description of the system of ownership in the
Constitution gives the impression that public ownership by the whole
people is the dominant form of property ownership. The Constitution
asserts that the socialist system is the basic system of the People's Republic
of China, and that this economic system is in turn based on "socialist public
ownership" of the means of production. 164 In keeping with the elevated
status of public property, Article 12 of the Constitution provides that "the
state protects socialist public property."165
Perhaps understandably given the continued emphasis on public own-
ership, the 1982 Constitution limits protection of the private economy in
much the same way as did earlier constitutions. First, the private economy
is characterized as merely a "complement to the socialist public economy"
which the state permits to exist but which must "develop in the limits pre-
scribed by law."16 6  Private rights appear vulnerable because, while
"socialist public property is sacred and inviolable,"' 67 the Constitution pro-
vides that "the state may in the public interest take over land for its use in
accordance with the law." 6 8 Finally, while private property is protected in
the Constitution, the provision that the state "protects the right of citizens to
own lawfully earned income, savings, houses and other lawful property" is
familiar to even the 1954 Constitution. 169 This phrase does not convey
164 P.R.C. CONST. art. VI.
165 Id art. XII.
166 P.R.C. CONST. art. XI (amended 1988).
167 P.R.C. CONST. art. XII.
168 Id art. X. Presumably, private land and collective land in rural areas, and all land in the pos-
session of state-owned enterprises and administrative units, is subject to confiscation under this provision.
169 P.R.C. CONST. of 1954 art. XI.
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anything like an inviolable right to ownership in property, but then neither
does the U.S. Constitution.170
The reform Constitution is unkind to private property rights in much
more stark ways as well. One provision of the reform Constitution wipes
out a whole category of private rights in a single, brief phrase. For the first
time, the 1982 Constitution provided formal recognition of the established
fact that "land in the cities is owned by the state." 171 Hence, private owner-
ship can only vest in urban housing, not land. Whereas this could be
inferred from the early lack of protection for urban land, it was not explicit
in earlier law. This factor creates significant difficulties with property
interests over the long term. 172
Public ownership also implies the empowerment of public economic
production and actors to utilize this property for public benefit. The
Constitution as amended in 1993 provides that "the state-owned economy..
. is the leading force in the national economy."' 173 Two actors in the state-
owned economy are recognized in the Constitution. State-owned enter-
prises now have the formal right "to operate independently, within the limits
prescribed by law."174 Collectives, likewise formally public organiza-
tions,175 have "decision-making power in conducting independent economic
activities, on condition that they abide by the relevant laws."'176 Also, the
state is said to "protect the lawful rights and interests of the urban and rural
economic collectives .... " 177
The constitutional status of individual branch organizations or work
units of the government is much hazier. 178 We know only that "all state
170 The U.S. Constitution does not declare any substantive property right to property but, rather,
assumes them by merely providing that existing property rights should not be taken for public benefit
without compensation, U.S. CONsT. amend V., or due process, U.S. CONST. amend XIV. At any rate, the
P.R.C.provides neither of these protections.
I7 PC. CONST. of 1954 art. X.
172 See infra notes 334-37 and accompanying text on confusion in mortgage rights in land and
housing. P.R.C. CONST. art. VII. (amended 1993).
174 P.R.C. CONST. art. XVI.
175 Collectives appear to be public organs by implication from Article VI, which provides that
"socialist public ownership" is equivalent to "collective ownership by the working people." P.R.C. CoNsT.
art. VI. In fact, though, collectives are really quasi-public enterprises established and controlled by local
govemment organs with state resources.
176 P.R.C. CONST. art. XVII (amended 1993).
177 P.R.C. CONST. art. VIII.
178 The failure to account for the existence of administrative agencies is not unique to the P.R.C.
Constitution. Neither does the U.S. Constitution account for the "fourth branch of government!' and its
sometimes massive bureaucracies, complete with legislative, adjudicative, and prosecutorial functions.
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organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations...
must abide by the Constitution and the law."179 Nowhere does the
Constitution specify the rights of these organs in the significant urban real
property resources under their operative management. In fact, though, the
Constitution gives no significant guidance as to the rights of private or
state-owned enterprises beyond the general statements indicated above. The
rights of the various actors in the mixed economy are only specified in
detail in more narrow special legislation.
2. Civil Status and Operation Rights of Economic Actors
Civil capacity is a fundamental prerequisite to the enjoyment of prop-
erty rights and subjection to property obligations. Only individuals or
organizations that have civil capacity may, in accordance with law, "enjoy
civil rights and be obligated to perform civil duties."U80 Thus, the extension
of civil capacity is essential to the extension of rights and duties generally.
The G.P.C.L. recognizes civil rights in private natural persons (citizens) and
both private and "public" legal persons.18 1
On the other hand, the ability to control property "in accordance with
law" begs the question of what the law is and how it is applied. In China,
even private enterprises are subject not primarily to law, but to control by
local supervisory organs of the state. Unfortunately, these "responsible
organs" have both the will and the means to shield client units from gener-
ally applicable regulatory enforcement. Thus, while the extension of civil
capacity and formal civil rights is commendable, property rights laws are
still subject to veto both by actors in possession of property and their
supervisors.
a. Civil status; private and public
Though the distinction between public and private property is ulti-
mately too simplistic for most purposes, a focus on public and private actors
does serve as a convenient tool with which to begin illuminating the diverse
loci of property rights in reform-era China.
179 P.R.C. CONST. art. V.
180 G.P.C.L. supra note 161, art. 9.
181 The G.P.C.L. regulates "property relations... between subjects of equal status - between citi-
zens, between legal persons, and between citizens and legal persons." G.P.C.L. supra note 161, art. 2.
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(1) Private actors
Individual natural persons (citizens, or gongmin), and a variety of
organizational legal persons are recognized and protected in the G.P.C.L.
All citizens, by definition, have civil capacity from the time of birth, and
hence enjoy civil rights in their individual capacity. 82 In addition, citizens
may join together to share civil rights and duties as common or joint rights
holders, 8 3 or as "partnerships of individuals" for purposes of conducting
business.18 4
Another form of private civilian economic entity is the Individual
Industrial/Commercial Household ("ICH"), businesses formed mainly in
urban areas by individuals and families.185 Neither ICHs nor small private
enterprises are provided legal person status in the G.P.C.L., but both never-
theless do have civil capacity.186
While small private enterprises and households are not given legal
person status under the G.P.C.L., this law does recognize enterprise legal-
person status in several types of larger-scale enterprises. In particular, the
G.P.C.L. provides for legal person status for foreign-invested enterprises
such as "Sino-foreign equity joint venture enterprises," "Sino-foreign
contractual joint ventures," and "wholly foreign-owned enterprises" estab-
lished within the P.R.C.187
More recent local laws have further enabled the formation of large-
scale private enterprise legal persons in the form of the limited liability
company (gufen youxian gongsi). Limited liability companies are essen-
tially promoter-sponsored or floated share corporations having legal person
status by definition. 188 This is the recommended form of organization for
182 I art. 9.
183 1ad art. 78 (co-ownership).
184 The G.P.C.L. art. 30 provides for the establishment of partnerships. This necessarily implies
co-ownership of partnership assets, which is provided for in the G.P.C.L. art. 31.
185 See generally G.P.C.L., supra note 161, arts. 26-29; see also Gray & Zheng, supra note 161, at
32 n.12.
186 Donald C. Clarke, Regulation and its Discontents: Economic Law in China, 28 STAN. J. INT'L
L. 283, 304-05 (1992) [hereinafter Clarke, Economic Law in China]. Professor Clarke has argued that the
principle problem with the lack of legal person status is the exposure to enterprise investor/owners to un-
limited liability. However, for purposes of merely illuminating potential loci of property rights, it is
immaterial whether private enterprises and ICHs have formal legal status so long as they are able to exer-
cise proerty rights by virtue of having civil capacity. This they do.18  G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 41.
188 See Provisional Regulations of Shanghai Municipality on Limited Liability Companies, art. 2
(1992), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Special Zones & Cities (CCH Austl.) 91-090 (1993)
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Shanghai-organized foreign-invested enterprises. As the name suggests,
sponsors and shareholders enjoy limited liability for enterprise debts and
acts, thereby solving some of the problems associated with the unlimited
liability of small-scale private enterprises.189 Just as importantly, this form
of private enterprise is also a convenient method of vesting public economic
resources in autonomous, independent economic actors.
(2) Public actors
State-owned enterprises ("SOEs"), collective enterprises, government
agencies and state-sponsored institutions and associations can all have legal
personhood, and hence civil capacity. State-owned and collective enter-
prises which satisfy certain capital, registration, and asset requirements, and
who have civil capacity may become enterprise legal persons.190 In addi-
tion, various public and quasi-public institutions and associations can enjoy
legal person status. 191 More generally still, all government units with inde-
pendent funds "enjoy the status of legal person from the day [they are]
established." 192 Thus, potentially all self-financed agents of the government
have the ability to contract and hold property rights on their own behalf.
One particularly important type of organizational civil transaction is
the ability of enterprises (or government organs) to invest resources in the
formation of a new economic entity: to reproduce. The G.P.C.L. allows
institutions and state-owned enterprises, themselves legal persons, to com-
bine resources to form a "new economic entity that independently assumes
[hereinafter Shanghai Limited Liability Regulations]. These companies must also satisfy threshold tests in
areas such as capitalization, (Rmb 5,000,000 for Chinese companies; Rmb 30,000,000 for foreign-invested
companies), and establishment requirements. Id arts. 17, 19-29 (covering application procedures, content
of promoters' agreement and articles of association, registration procedures, and a variety of other
substantive issues).
189 Specifically, "shareholders assume an amount of liability equivalent to the amount of shares
purchased." Id art. 2.
190 G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 50. These requirements are not detailed in the G.P.C.L.
Rudimentary establishment criteria are set forth in national corporate registration provisions. See generally
Administrative Regulations of the P.R.C. Governing the Registration of Legal Corporations (promulgated
by State Council on June 3, 1988), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) 13-
542 (1993).
191 Clarke, Economic Law in China, supra note 186, at 303 n.67. Professor Clarke gives as ex-
amples of article 50 legal persons "formal governmental units, hospitals, universities, [and] writers'
associations."
192 G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 50. The phrase "independent funds" is not defined in the
G.P.C.L.
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civil liabilities and satisfies the requirements for legal persons."' 93 In fact,
agents of the government throughout China have participated in (and
precipitated) the economic boom by setting up new enterprises with gov-
ernment funds: what could be labeled "state-invested enterprises"
("S.I.E.s"). This is an important innovation, because S.I.E.s allow at least
the possibility of vesting property rights in increasingly independent
organizations.
Recent innovative company laws have blurred the lines between
public and private enterprises even further. Of particular importance is the
increasing ability of agents of the state to establish, invest in and own
private "limited liability" companies.
The recent Shanghai limited liability company regulations provide
that "at least one" of the limited liability company promoters be "an enter-
prise with legal person status registered in Shanghai Municipality."'194
Thus, the class of potential promoters includes, in addition to all foreign-
invested enterprises, the vast majority of SOEs as well as the S.I.E.s (joint-
venture and purely domestic) set up by SOEs, government units, and public
institutions alike. The necessary result of this process is the privatization of
the loci of rights in public property as resources are shifted to increasingly
private enterprises. Whether such private enterprises are truly autonomous
or even simply more autonomous than SOEs, however, is not at all clear.
b. Enterprise operational autonomy
Although SOEs may enjoy the rights of ownership and contract as
legal persons, their ability to exercise these rights is still largely defined
indirectly through their administrative relationships with organs of the state.
These relationships are characterized by varying degrees of both adminis-
trative patronage and administrative control, which may result in either
excessively weak or strong operation and property rights. In particular, if
administrative control extends to issues of real property use and disposition,
then formal real property rights granted elsewhere may be circumscribed
other than "according to law" as promised by the G.P.C.L. On the other
hand, if administrative superiors are able to protect enterprises from the
necessity of compliance with generally applicable real property registration
or other regulations, then it is possible that enterprises will be able to ignore
193 a art. 5 1.194 Shanghai Limited Liability Regulations, supra note 188, art. 14.
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these ostensibly generally applicable real property rights provisions and
receive enhanced de facto rights: possibly at the expense of other, less
politically favored, actors, but certainly at the expense of general applica-
bility, equity, and certainty.
Recent regulations implementing the G.P.C.L.'s right of operative
management in SOEs evidence both the administrative patronage and
control characteristic of relationships between the state and enterprises. 195
Of central importance in this relationship is the "department in charge"
("DIC") which may, along with other unspecified government organs,
supervise enterprise construction plans, appoint and remove factory direc-
tors and deputy directors, coordinate relationships with other units, and
guide enterprise development planning.t96 On the other hand, local gov-
ernments and DICs are also to provide these enterprises with various forms
of managerial "assistance", and also with fiscal and material resources
which are "subject to local planning and control." 197
As will be seen below, land and housing are in general subject to
local planning and control, so that DICs have formal permission to assist in
their supply to SOEs. DICs may also interfere in real property use and dis-
position by virtue of the DIC's control over planning and personnel. Given
the community of interest between DICs and their enterprises, however, it is
most likely that the former will act to maximize enterprise resources and
minimize the impact of laws on the enterprise. As Clarke puts the matter,
"[W]hile the DIC has the practical power to enforce state policy, it often
lacks the will to do so" because of the bureaucratic identity between DIC
and enterprise interests and personnel and the importance of enterprises as a
source of income for local government.198 This situation is aggravated by
the fact that no administrative, criminal, or civil law really constrains the
DIC itself.199 Thus, the patronage function of DICs with respect to state-
owned enterprises probably predominates.
Other government units in the local milieu generally have the same
wide autonomy characteristic of DICs, but just the opposite interests and
behavior. Various local government units, armed with the power to with-
195 Law of the People's Republic of China on Industrial Enterprises Owned by the Whole People
(Apr. 13, 1988), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) at 13-543 (1993)
[hereinafter S.O.E. Law].
196 1d. arts. 55, 56.
197 ld arts. 56, 57.
198 Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It?. supra note 15, at 70.
199 Idat7O,71.
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hold necessary resources or licenses and motivated by the desire or
necessity to raise revenues, can and do subject enterprises to an astonishing
array of illegal and arbitrary exactions.200 While these exactions may be
significant in and of themselves in terms of enterprise costs, they also have
the more general effect of eroding any property rights granted elsewhere in
statutory law. Not only do exactions increase the direct monetary costs of
exercising property rights, but their unpredictability also undermines the
stability and certainty of these property rights, and hence increases associ-
ated information and transaction costs.
Although reform-era laws generally grant DICs fewer formal rights of
control over various forms of private enterprise and continue to call for the
protection of autonomous operation rights in these enterprises, it is doubtful
whether the dynamic of patronage and interference has been broken.201 On
one hand, DICs are still relied upon to supervise and guide even newly-
recognized private enterprises. 202 The same is apparently true even of the
new "share-formulated enterprises '2 03 intended to privatize state owned
enterprises, as well of all other forms of domestic and foreign-invested
enterprise.204 No matter the form of organization, the DIC's basic interests
in protecting the enterprise remain the same and, indeed, may even be
200 See generally id at 37-43.
201 Two prominent Chinese scholars in the area of enterprise law are adamant about this point:
The actual experience of the reform in recent years shows that though enactments have defined
the enterprise's rights, those rights have been curtailed by various levels of local government and supervi-
sory administrative organs. "Loosening control of enterprises in public, tightening control in private"
became a commonplace phenomenon. Every government department and "administrative company" has
excuses for interfering with and levying exactions on enterprises. The enterprises' property rights have not
been realized in practice, nor has their status as legal persons been guaranteed.
Wang Liming & Liu Zhaonian, On the Property Rights System of the State Enterprises in China LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS, Summer 1989, at 19,26 (Fu Xiaoshuang & Wu Yanlei trans.).
202 The new regulations on private enterprises provide that "the various departments in charge of
related trades and industries shall guide, assist and administer the production and business activities of
private enterprises." Provisional Regulations of the People's Republic of China on Private Enterprises art.
40 (promulgated by State Council on June 25, 1988, effective July 1, 1988), translated in 2 China L. for
Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) 13-546 (1993).
203 Recent trial regulations provide that during examination and approval of these entities, "an in-
dustry administration authority shall be decided upon which shall be based on the main operations and
business scope of the enterprise, and the authority shall ... provide services, implement supervision and be
responsible for the issuance of documents, [and] organization of meetings ... according to regulations."
Trial Measures on Share-Formulated Enterprises (May 15, 1992), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign
Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) at 13-570 (1993). The "industry administration authority" in these
Measures appears to be nothing more than a DIC by another name.
204 See Clarke, Economic Law in China, supra note 186, at 306 n.79 (noting that even wholly
foreign-owned enterprises have DICs).
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enhanced insofar as the success of their institutional experiments, as well as
business results, will come under scrutiny by superiors and peers. On the
other hand, other local governments still hold control over licenses and
other resources needed by local enterprises, and still undoubtedly covet
enterprise exaction revenues. In the absence of any significant overall local
administrative reforms, it is doubtful that exactions will cease altogether;
although they may be moderated somewhat in the case of "outsider"
foreign-invested enterprises more willing and able to resist.
In the final analysis, administrative interference and patronage still
present the possibility of significant direct costs and rent-seeking behavior
in the exercise of enterprise property rights. This will continue to be true
until progress is made in comprehensive administrative reform that will
subject DICs to the rule of law they are supposed to uphold.
3. Some Basic Structures of Civil Rights and Liabilities
Civil rights and liabilities are legal-institutional means by which civil
actors are at once allowed to benefit from their actions and, on the other
hand, made to pay the perceived costs of their actions to society. Because
other authors have covered the substantive civil rights and liabilities of
small individual and family private enterprises in some detail,205 the
discussion below will focus on the rights of larger-scale enterprise legal
persons.
a. Ownership of land via use rights
Ownership is defined in the G.P.C.L. as "an owner's right in accor-
dance with law to possess, use, benefit from, and dispose of his own
property."206 However, the G.P.C.L. and other real property implementing
legislation also maintain the fundamental constitutional distinction between
urban land and housing ownership. Because land ownership and housing
ownership are treated under different systems, extremely complex rights
relations develop according to the different types of actors and properties
involved. Hence, in China as elsewhere, ownership is necessarily a com-
posite of a range of potentially discrete and severable rights in property.
Although the G.P.C.L. falls far short of providing for the complete transfer
205 Id at 303-05.
206 G.P.C.L.,supra note 161, arL 71.
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of ownership in most public resources, it and other laws make a significant
break with the past by sanctioning substantial bundles of rights to real prop-
erty in different public and private economic actors.
On the face of the G.P.C.L., state-owned enterprises appear to have
no independent ownership rights in real property. The state only protects
SOEs' right to "operate according to law state property given to it to operate
and manage." 207 While this formula appears to fall short of recognizing
formal ownership rights in property held by state-owned enterprises, there is
great debate in China about the meaning of this term. Some have argued
that "operation and management" in fact amount to a property right, while
others have maintained that it is merely a conditional right to use public
property.208
In fact, other laws according to which the right of operation in land is
exercised effectively render this debate moot. Any actor "owns" property
only to the extent they hold a bundle of specific substantive and procedural
rights to utilize and benefit from tangible or intangible goods. In fact, what
the G.P.C.L. protects is not the right of state-owned and other enterprise
legal persons to own public land in their possession, but to use, benefit from
and, increasingly, to transfer that public property.209
Today, the "operation and management" of public land resources by a
variety of public legal persons is increasingly moderated through a system
of contractual, fee-based, transferable land use rights.210 In the land use
rights system developed the past decade, contractual relations have increas-
ingly been allowed to substitute for ill-defined and cumbersome planned
207 Id art. 82.
208 Some Chinese authors have even gone so far as to argue for "converting state ownership to en-
terprise ownership." For an excellent synopsis of this debate see Edward J. Epstein, The Theoretical
System of Property Rights in China's General Principles of Civil Law:. Theoretical Controversy in the
Drafting Process and Beyond, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1989, at 177, 193-211. See generally
Zhao Zhongfiu, Enterprise Legal Persons: Their Important Status in Chinese Civil Law, in LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989, at 1, 26 (Winston J.S. Zhao trans.).
209 With respect to use rights in land, the G.P.C.L. provides:
State-owned land may be used in accordance with law by state-owned units, or may in accordance
with the law be allocated for use by collective units; the state protects the rights of such units to use and
benefit from the land; the units which use [the land] are under a duty to manage, protect, and make rea-
sonable use [of the land].
G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 80. Note that this use right seems to be potentially extended to all "state-
owned units," a wider concept than merely state-owned enterprise legal persons. Thus, it appears that legal
personhood is not in fact necessary for state organs to have civil capacity and enjoy rights in public land.
210 See generally David S. Kerzner, The Commercial Real Estate Laws of the People's Republic of
China andShenzhen: An Overview, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 581 (1993).
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administrative control over land. In this system, applied first to new joint
venture enterprises in the Special Economic Zones, local governments give
individuals and legal person the right to use land for specified periods of
time contingent upon the payment of fees and adherence to contract and
statutory conditions on the use right.2 11 Because of the limited nature of
this privilege, the use right is analogous to a leasehold interest granted by
lessor to lessee in the West.
Shortly after this basic rights system was developed, legislation was
passed in many areas providing for the transferability of these new use
rights in land.2 12  Likewise, both the Constitution and the Land
Management Law were amended in 1988 to recognize land use rights and
use rights transfers.2 13
This use rights system is of the utmost importance for several
reasons. First the transferability of use rights means that real property users
should be able to more cheaply allocate land to its highest use, especially if
that use lies with another economic actor. In essence, transferable use rights
create value where there was before only surplus land. Although negotia-
tion and bargaining may still be required to secure use rights,214 as
211 One of the earliest such laws was that from the Dalian S.E.Z. in coastal Liaoning Province. See
generally Measures of the Dalian Economic and Technological Development Zone for the Administration
of Land Use (1984), Chinalaw Database, No. 227, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINAL File.
One of the earliest local laws dealing with land use by Sino-foreign joint ventures in particular came from
Ningbo Municipality. See Implementation Measures of Ningbo Municipality for the Administration of
Land Use for Sino-Foreign Joint Equity Ventures (1985), Chinalaw Database, No. 291, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINAL File.
212 See generally Kerzner, Commercial Real Estate Laws, supra note 210, at 594-95. One of the
first- if not the first - local regulations allowing both the right to use land and to transfer use rights was
the 1983 Shenzhen housing regulations. These regulations identified the "house property right" as
including the land use right, and provided that the house property right (and hence the land use right) could
be transferred. See Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone Concerning the Management of
Commodity House Property, art. 2 (Nov. 15, 1983), Chinalaw Database, No. 175, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, CHINAL File [hereinafter Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations]. The Shenzhen
regulations were also extremely innovative in the area of housing rights, and much will be said about them
later.
213 P.R.C. CONST. art. 10 (amended 1988). The Constitution was amended in 1988 to state that
"the right to use land may be assigned in accordance with the provisions of the law." The Land
Management Law was amended in 1988 to read: "the right to use state-owned land may be assigned, pur-
suant to law." Law of the People's Republic of China on Land Management, art. 10 (amended 1988),
translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) 14-715 (1993).
214 Land use rights and transfer regulations initially provided for the grant of use rights only
through negotiation with the local land management bureau, but increasingly provided for both tender of-
fers and public auction throughout the 1980s. National legislation now sanctions all three methods of use
rights allocation, but "specific processes and procedures for granting land use rights" are to be promulgated
by local governments. See Interim Regulations on Urban Land-Use Rights, art. 13 (1990), translated in E.
ASIAN EXEC. REP., Aug. 15, 1990, at 23.
URBAN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
compared to administrative allocation according to the plan, independent
contract rights at least provide the hope of increased autonomy in decision
making and legal grounds for compelling actors to pay for their resource
use. Generally applicable regulations and procedures governing city
planning, contract approval, fee and other conditions on use rights, registra-
tion requirements, and taxation of use rights transfers should also help to
increase stability and minimize enforcement, transaction, and information
costs to a much greater extent than possible under decentralized and disag-
gregated direct administrative control. Finally, transferable use rights
provide a unique legal mechanism facilitating the passage of control over
state-owned real property to increasingly private actors. Hence, the separa-
tion of the rights of use and ownership represents a unique opportunity to
bring efficiencies to the use of public property, while at the same time satis-
fying the ideological and practical imperatives of de jure state ownership
and control. 215
A particularly important feature of these new use rights is the ability
of public economic actors to alienate public property. In addition to enjoy-
ing increasingly alienable contractual and statutory use rights in public land,
state-owned enterprises in some areas are now also authorized to alienate
their ownership and use rights in enterprise assets altogether.216 In order to
facilitate the formation of joint ventures with foreign-invested private enter-
prises, Guangzhou now enables "state industrial enterprises" to sell off state
property rights "in full or in part. '217 Consistent with the distinction
between ownership and use of land, state industrial enterprises may sell land
use rights according to local use rights transfer laws, but ownership of the
land remains in the state.218 The use of land resources as a commodity is
aided by the fact that these use rights are inherently transferable under local
215 See Tung-Pi Chen, Emerging Real Estate Markets in Urban China, 8 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW.
78, 103 (1990).217 Other authors have failed to find a formal right to alienate state-owned enterprise property in the
G.P.C.L. See Clarke, Economic Law in China, supra note 186, at 313-14.
217 See Regulations of Guangzhou Municipality on the Sale by Transfer of a Portion of State
Industrial Enterprise Property Rights to Foreign Parties, art. 11 (1989), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign
Bus.: Special Zones & Cities (CCH Austl.) 85-041 (1993). The term "state industrial enterprise" is not
defined in these regulations, so it is unclear whether they apply only to S.O.E.s, or also apply to S.I.E.s
established by S.O.E.s and government organs. However, it is clear that the regulations are meant to
govern transfers of public property by collective enterprises.
This method of transferring of property rights to foreigners is seen as "a means of using foreign capi-
tal to introduce advanced technology and equipment and scientific management practices, accelerate the
technical transformation of existing enterprises and develop an export-oriented economy." Id art. 2.
218 Id art. 5.
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law, but the Guangzhou Enterprise Property Measures also provide explic-
itly for the transferability of land use rights sold under these regulations. 219
Ultimately, then, the ability to transfer public property to private
enterprises should result simultaneously in the validation of increasingly
secure substantive use rights and the vesting of those rights in increasingly
autonomous economic actors, and hence in the enhanced ability of possess-
ing units to capture potential external revenues from urban land.
b. Contract rights
Contracts and generally applicable substantive and procedural laws
have been adopted as fundamental structural means of increasing the
economic rationality of the system of property rights in China. Contracts, in
particular, are intended to provide economic actors with the ability to make
independent and binding profit-maximizing decisions with respect to
resource use and allocation as required for market production and alloca-
tion.220 This ability, however, also depends on the rights structures govern-
ing economic actors' establishment and operation, as well as on narrower
rights defined with respect to specific types of property. While enterprise
operation rights have been considered above and a discussion of rights in
housing property will have to wait for later, it is worthwhile at this point to
illuminate the basic structure of contract obligations through which those
relations are to be carried out.
Although contracts between SOEs existed in planned production prior
to the reform period, these were not enforceable independent agreements
between autonomous parties, but were "the continuation of the [State
production] plan by other means." 221 Because the plan could not specify all
of the details of production and allocation, guided contracts between
production units were used to specify the details of the inter-enterprise
transfers required to implement the plan. Hence, these contracts were not
really freely entered into and, because they existed only in service of the
state plan, could not be enforced if to do so would not serve'the plan. As a
219 Id art. 11. The Measures provide that subsequent transfers of land use rights are to be handled
according to the Trial Measures of Guangzhou Municipality on the Sale by Transfer and Assignment of
Urban State-owned Land.
220 For an analysis of the market facilitating functions of the new Chinese contract law and insti-
tutions, see Lucie Cheng & Arthur Rosett, Contract with a Chinese Face: Socially Embedded Factors in
the Transformation to Market, 1978-1989, 5 J. CHINESE LAW 143 (1991).
221 See Clarke, Economic Law in China, supra note 186, at 309.
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result, these were not really contracts at all in the Western legal sense, but
were merely the embodiment of administrative planning decisions.
While early planning contracts were not "designed to make it easier
for the parties to enter into secure and predictable economic relationships of
their own choosing," this is precisely the goal of reform-era innovations in
contract law.222 It is less certain whether or to what extent this goal has in
fact been achieved merely through the adoption of contract law.
The drafters of the G.P.C.L. viewed the ability to contract as an
essential element of the new commodity economy of independent produc-
tion and exchange according to value.223 As one Western scholar put it,
"the conceptual framework for managing the new system's independent
entities is obligation law... Once the decision making function is shifted
from the planning authority to the independent entity, the basic legal device
that will be used will be a contract, not an order."224 The contract system is
intended "to supply effective legal protection to the process of developing
horizontal economic ties" throughout the economy. 225 Hence, "contracts
with consideration" are the preferred mechanism for exchange between
actors even in the different ownership systems.226
The general provisions related to contracting in the G.P.C.L. attempt
to implement the principles of reciprocity and mutual benefit by providing
for binding legal contracts. Toward this end, the G.P.C.L. provides that:
"[A] contract is an agreement whereby parties establish, modify, or termi-
nate civil legal relations. Contracts formed in accordance with law are
222 Id
223 The principle evils of the old system of planned production and state ownership are adequately
illuminated by one drafter of the G.P.C.L. Under the former system, "state ownership ... led to the state
using administrative methods to interfere willfully in the enterprises' horizontal economic activities, sub-
stituting the desires of senior officials or administrative orders for the law of value in commodities
exchange." Tong Rou, The General Principles of Civil Law of the P.RC.: It's Birth, Characteristics, and
Role, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., spring 1989, at 151, 171 (Jonathan K. Ocko trans.). The G.P.C.L.'s
solution is "to cause [enterprises] to become relatively independent objects, to achieve self control, and to
become socialist commodities producers and operators that take responsibilities for gains and losses, that
is, in the final analysis to become legal persons that have fixed rights and duties." Id Clearly contracts are
one means of fixing rights and duties, but so too are company laws and laws with respect to particular
property resources.
224 William Jones, Sources of Chinese Obligation Law, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1989,
at 70, 73.
225 Tong Rou, supra note 223, at 165.
226 Id. Note also that compulsory planned contracts between S.O.E.s continue in some reas. Tong
Rou argues that the new civil law system should also govern these contracts, although it is not clear how
compulsion and freedom can be squared in this context. la at 160.
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protected by law."227 The G.P.C.L's provision recognizing the equal status
of parties to civil activities is also particularly important, as it provides the
condition necessary to the enforcement of freely entered contracts with
regard only to lawful contractual, as opposed to administrative or political,
criteria. 228 The G.P.C.L. itself provides some of these criteria for enforce-
ment: breach or failure to perform a contract gives rise to civil liability;229
obligations for debts must be satisfied, and payment may be compelled by
the People's Court;230 the victim of breach may demand performance or
compensation of the breaching party;231 contracts may provide for liqui-
dated damages in case of breach;232 and parties have a duty to mitigate in
case the other party breaches. 233
The G.P.C.L. also upholds the principles of freedom of contract. An
important example of this principle is found in the provision for defaults in
case of ambiguity in contract terms. Article 88 provides that "where the
terms of a contract . .. are not clear and definite, and these cannot be
determined from the content of the agreement through consultations, the
following provisions apply .... "234 These defaults make reference to state
and enterprise standards for quality and state or market price terms.
Freedom of contract in different transactions is also facilitated by the
G.P.C.L.'s recognition of the right to enter guarantees 235 and to assign
contracts. 236 On the other hand, it is also true that contracts may be voided
if they violate state laws or policies.
227 G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 85. A contract is a specific form of an "obligation", which is any
rights relationship arising either by contract or by operation of law:
An obligation is a relationship of specific rights and duties between parties, arising either from terms
of a contract or from a provision of law. The one that enjoys a right is the obligee and the one that bears
the duty is the obligor. The obligee has the right to demand that the obligor perform his duty according to
the terms of the contract or the provision of law.
Id. art. 84.
228 In discussing equal status of parties, Tong Rou notes: "[Enterprises] ought to regard their op-
posite as an equal owner or exchanger of commodities, and in obtaining the opposite's commodities, labor,
capital, or technology pay the actual value in money or in other forms of compensation permitted by law."
Tong Rou, supra note 223, at 173-74.
229 G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 106.
230 Id art. 108.
231 Id. art. 11I.
232 Id art. 112.
233 Id. art. 114.
234 Id. art. 88.
235 Id. art. 89.
236 Id art. 91.
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In spite of these lofty goals and ambitious provisions, there are
several problems with this contract law regime beyond technical questions
of formation or liability for breach. First, the G.P.C.L. contains only the
most general provisions, leaving a great deal of leeway and uncertainty for
the parties.237 Second, while the G.P.C.L. applies to both natural and legal
persons, the Economic Contract Law is also applicable to relations between
legal persons. The Economic Contract Law also contains conflicting provi-
sions calling for contract approval and adherence to state plans which are
lacking in the G.P.C.L.238 Third, and even more importantly, it is simply
not clear that parties generally conform to the requirements of these laws in
practice.239
This last point highlights a final and important difficulty with the
implementation of these ideals: contract enforcement. There is ample
support for the proposition that "[a]ny incentive structure premised on pro-
tection of rights and enforcement of law by Chinese courts as currently
constituted is problematic."2 40  The people's courts are burdened with
poorly educated and often corrupt cadres, and even their legally correct
decisions are still subject to arbitrary reversal by superiors and local Party
committees. In addition, the courts have little power to enforce their judg-
ments, and are especially inadequate where those judgments are adverse to
powerful local economic or political interests. 241 All of this makes the
courts particularly inapt as a tool for championing the values of voluntari-
ness, equality, and mutual benefit embodied in the G.P.C.L. Indeed, the
continued politicization of local economic institutions may render these
values themselves largely irrelevant in practice, because no contract could
even be formed outside of the context of extra-legal bureaucratic bargaining
and manipulation between enterprises, their DICs, and other concerned local
government units.
237 This is perhaps most true of the catchall provisions that contracts must be in accordance with
"social morality" and must not "harm the public interest, undermine the state plan, or disrupt the economic
order," and must be in conformity with "state policy" where there is no applicable law. Id. art. 6, 7.
238 Economic Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (Dec. 13, 1981), translated in I
China L. for Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH Austl.) 5-500 (1993). For a discussion of this law's coercive
provisions and some areas of conflict between the G.P.C.L. and the Economic Contract Law, see generally
Jones, supra note 224, at 79-86.
239 See Jones, supra note 224, at 87-88, 90-91.
240 See Clarke, What's Law Got to Do with It?, supra note 15, at 57.
241 ldat57,58.
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c. Civil liability in bankruptcy
Debt satisfaction and bankruptcy are singularly important in an
economic analysis of property rights, because they in part determine the
availability of real property resources for the satisfaction of debts, and
hence the ability of shift economic costs to those who cause them.242 All
private natural and enterprise legal persons, state-owned enterprises and
collectives may assume debts243 and hold property rights, and all may also
go bankrupt. 244 They do not, however, all go bankrupt equally.
One very basic question in bankruptcy and creditor-debtor law
generally is: what assets are available for the satisfaction of debts? This
question is important for at least two reasons. First, it determines the
amount of property in the bankruptcy estate available to satisfy debts, and
hence the degree to which the enterprise can ultimately be made to pay the
cost of its borrowing. Secondly, this question is particularly important in
China because liquidation may serve as one more means of shifting the
locus of state property to privately-owned economic actors.
SOEs and collectives are in theory both potentially subject to liqui-
dation to virtually the same extent. SOEs are liable for civil debts "to the
extent of the property the state has given [them] to operate and manage," 245
and collectives and various foreign-invested enterprises "bear civil liability
to the extent of the property the enterprise owns."246 This formula hardly
solves the question of what property is subject to liquidation.
There has been considerable debate as to whether all property in the
possession of SOEs is subject to liquidation under the "operation and
management" theory. Generally, the debate has focused on whether
property generally, not any particular property, under the management of
SOEs is subject to liquidation. Some have argued that it is.247 However, in
242 The ability to mortgage or otherwise use real property as security/collateral for loans is a closely
related topic. See infia notes 320-325 and accompanying text.243 Article 90 of the G.P.C.L. provides that "a lawful loan relationship is protected by law". Article
I of the G.P.C.L. stipulates that parties are liable for breach of contract to the extent of loss caused by the
breach. G.P.C.L., supra note 161, arts. 90.
244 Id. art. 47.
245 Id. art. 48.
246 Id Keep in mind the fact that the local partners of these foreign-invested ventures are almost
sure to be S.O.E.s, S.I.E.s, or collective enterprise.
247 Clarke, Economic Law in China, supra note 186, at 315-16. Professor Clarke contrasts the
traditional view, limiting liquidation to liquid assets, with a variety of other views evidencing a willingness
to subject incrementally more enterprise assets to liquidation. However, even these more progressive
views do not consider the special attributes of real property in bankruptcy.
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theory, a system of land use rights coupled with enterprise ownership of
structures could answer this question with a definitive "yes". This could be
made possible by defining the liquidation status of these new classes of
inherently transferable rights and avoiding the question of broader
management rights altogether. Other factors permitting, there is no reason
why, in a functioning use rights system, SOEs and other enterprises could
not be liable for both wholly-owned separate housing property and real
property "owned" in the form of long-term use rights.
The practical problem with the proposition that land use rights are
available to satisfy debts is simply that a number of "other factors" are at
work in China. One important factor is the willingness of the local land
management bureaus to write use rights contracts which do not rule out
altogether the transfer of use rights in case of liquidation. It is extremely
difficult to insulate enterprise property from liquidation by contract in the
U.S., but this surely poses almost no problems in China where the state
generally, and powerful local officials in particular, claim ultimate control
over the use and disposition of the property.
Where the treatment of SOEs differs to the greatest extent from all
other actors (except, perhaps administrative organs) is in the opportunity to
avoid liquidation altogether. However, even the difference here is one of
degree rather than kind. The trial Enterprise Bankruptcy Law248 governs
bankruptcy of state-owned enterprises, and provides a number of mammoth
exceptions for state-owned enterprises facing the prospect of liquidation. in
general, all SOEs which are unable to pay their debts because of poor
performance and losses should be declared bankrupt upon application of the
creditors.249 However, the SOEs exempted from this rule include those that,
inter alia, are public enterprises, impact on national interests or people's
livelihoods, have guarantees, or whose DIC prefers reorganization to bank-
ruptcy.250 Clearly, these exceptions swallow the rule in one gulp by
potentially allowing responsible authorities to exclude from bankruptcy
every state-owned enterprise in China.
A close reading of recent bankruptcy law in Shanghai reveals a simi-
lar, although much less generous, discretionary loophole in bankruptcies
involving Sino-foreign joint ventures and wholly foreign owned enterprises.
248 Law of the People's Republic of China on Enterprise Bankruptcy (Trial Implementation)
(adopted Dec. 2, 1986, effective Nov. 1, 1988), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Bus. Reg. (CCH
Austl. 13-522 (1993) [hereinafter Trial Bankruptcy Law].
240 d ar. 3.250 Id.
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The. Shanghai liquidation provisions provide for "ordinary liquidation"
implemented by the "board of directors or management body" when enter-
prise assets exceed liabilities.251 "Special liquidation," on the other hand,
applies when assets fail to cover debts - presumably the usual case. More
important is how special liquidation is initiated. Although creditors can
petition for special liquidation, it is not the creditors, courts, or the enter-
prise, but the "original application and approving authority" which "may
determine that the enterprise is subject to special liquidation proceed-
ings." 252 As with SOEs, here too agents of the state at different levels have
discretion in deciding whether to declare firms in their charge bankrupt.253
It is generally unlikely that the benefits of liquidation would
outweigh the costs for these agents. Liquidation raises the possibility of
having to stop production, distribute enterprise assets, and deal with the
problem of displaced workers. 254 Also, in the short term at least, bank-
ruptcy may look especially unattractive in light of the fact that it can be
avoided by simply withholding permission. Finally, and more broadly,
bankruptcy itself will not be rational if it is applied to firms which them-
selves operate under price controls and other irrationalities. 255 As to the
first two factors at least, there does not seem to be much difference in the
incentives of local government leaders/DICs when facing the liquidation of
private or public firms. As a matter of fact, almost none of either have gone
bankrupt in China.256
251 Rules of Shanghai Municipality on Liquidation Procedures for Foreign Investment Enterprises
art. 4 (1991), translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Special Zones & Cities (CCH Austl.) 91-065
(19932 Id.
253 For an examination of the difficulties of declaring enterprises bankrupt under the Shenzhen
rules, see generally Note, Bankruptcy of Foreign Enterprises in the PRC: An Interpretation of the "Rules
Concerning Bankruptcy of Foreign Related Companies in the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone", 4 J.
CHINESE L. 277, 289 (1990).
254 On employee welfare in bankruptcy, the national Trial Bankruptcy Law provides that: "The
State will use various channels to make appropriate arrangements for the re-employment of the staff and
workers of the bankrupt enterprise and will guarantee their basic living requirements in the period prior to
their obtaining new employment." Trial Bankruptcy Law, supra note 248, art. 4.
255 "In a society of controlled prices, profits do not mean efficiency and losses do not mean ineffi-
ciency" because product prices may be artificially depressed and losses magnified. Clarke, What's Law
Got to Do with I?, supra note 15, at 52.
256 By late 1990, only one collective and three state-owned enterprises had been declared bankrupt
in China. Interpretation of Shenzhen Bankruptcy Rules, supra note 253, at 292 n.95. By 1994, it was es-
timated that almost one half of SOEs were operating at a loss, yet it was reported that only 52 had been
declared bankrupt, "a tiny number." See The 'Bankruptcy Law" Is Having a Hard Time Taking Even One
Single Step, BBC - Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 17, 1994, at FE/2155/S1, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
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C. Housing Rights Reforms
Early in the history of the P.R.C., private ownership of housing was
ostensibly permitted and protected subject to compliance with generally
applicable government regulatory and administrative controls over use and
disposition. While these legal and regulatory structures were for the most
part destroyed before they were fully implemented, the same basic formula
of private property rights is being resurrected to structure housing rights
today.. An array of new statutes define a growing web of urban house prop-
erty rights possessed by diverse economic and political actors. Whether this
process amounts to "privatization" is debatable, but privatization is not
really the goal of these reforms. Rather, it is the value-driven use and
exchange through commoditization and marketization of housing that is the
goal of reform. The P.R.C. is attempting to prove, with some success, that
this is possible without fully alienating ownership in public property.
1. The "new" definition of ownership
Deng Xiaoping put his mark on housing reform very early. In 1980,
Deng set the general direction of future housing rights policy with a simple
phrase: "urban individual residents can (keyi) purchase houses, they can
sell them, and they can also benefit from them. '257 This definition of urban
private housing ownership rights has been implemented (and limited) by a
number of laws and policies.
The basic structure of the "new" private individual housing rights was
set forth in a rudimentary but broad form in the 1983 Urban Private Housing
Management Regulations issued by the State Council.258 This law, as did
those immediately after Liberation, has sections covering general principles,
ownership rights registration, housing sales, leasing, and agency.
Housing ownership is defined in the 1983 Urban Private Housing
Management Regulations, somewhat obtusely, in terms of persons and
property. The regulations apply to private housing (siyoufangwu) which, it
is said, "refers to individually owned or commonly owned private-use or
257 Deng Xiaoping, speech delivered Apr. 2, 1980, reprinted in 7 ZHONGGUO GAIGE QUANSHU
[ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, PART 3: REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REFoRmt] 85-86 (Zhang Yuanduan &
ZhangYueqing gen. eds., 1992).
25 8 Chengshi siyou fangwu guanli tiaoli [Urban Private Housing Management Regulations] (State
Council, Dec. 17, 1983), reprinted in COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 689.
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rental residences and non-residential property."259 The state protects own-
ership rights in private housing property within the bounds of the law, and
all units and individuals are prohibited from infringing or harming urban
private housing rights.260 Although this formula nimbly avoids defining its
terms, we learn elsewhere that the right of "ownership" to be protected
includes the right, as defined by law, to possess, use, benefit from and
alienate housing property. 261 Furthermore, these and other regulations
make it clear that government units in possession of public property, natural
persons, and the range of legal persons may enjoy to varying degrees the
rights constituent of housing ownership. 262
The right of ownership as outlined above is defined through the enu-
meration of duties and privileges in narrower substantive provisions of a
variety of laws. As under earlier law, more limited rights relations are also
possible, chief among which are the predominant form of urban residential
housing right: leasehold interests in public property. Also as under early
law, one of the most basic limitations on the housing leasehold and owner-
259 Id. art. 2.
260 Id. art. 3.
261 See G.P.C.L., supra note 161, art. 71 (mentioning all four rights). But c.f. Guanyu chengshi
(zhen) fangdichan chanquan chanji guanli zhanxing guiding [Provisional Regulations Concerning the
Management of Urban (Township) Real Property Rights and Recordation Management] (National Urban
Construction Bureau, March 27, 1982), reprinted in COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra
note 158, at 681, 683 [hereinafter 1982 Provisional Recordation Measures] (omitting the right to benefit
from property).
On the other hand, at least one official authority recognizes that these rights may be enjoyed inde-
pendently, and for differing, limited durations. If they are, even their separate enjoyment may still be a
species of protected "ownership." See Chengshi siyou fangwu jianzaoji guanli wenti jieda [Explanation of
Some Issues in Urban Private Housing Construction and Management] 18 (Urban-Rural Construction and
Environment Protection Ministry, Urban Residential Housing Department ed., 1984) [hereinafter
Explanation of Housing Issues].
262 The most important early example of this policy with respect to public housing stated that "state
organs, state-owned enterprise and work units exercise (xingsht) the rights to possess, use, and alienate
(chufen) state-owned housing, but at the same time they have the duty to protect state-owned housing from
harm." 1982 Provisional Recordation Measures, supra note 261, at 682-83.
Regulations promulgated in Tianjin offer a good example of more recent efforts to define units' rights
over public housing resources, and they do so expansively. The purpose of the regulations is to
"strengthen urban housing management [and] protect the lawful rights and interests of units in housing,"
and they stipulate that units may sell, transfer, rent or otherwise exchange their property subject to regis-
tration requirements and penalties for failure to fulfill those requirements. See Tianjinshi danwei ziyou
fangchan guanli banfa de tongzhi [Measures of Tianjin Municipality on the Management of Individual Unit
Housing] (Published by the Urban-Rural Construction and Environment Protection Ministry, Nov. 1, 1986)
arts. 1, 4, reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra note 257, at 133 [hereinafter Tianjin Unit
Housing Measures].
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ship right is the ability of the state or its agents to confiscate housing
property. 263
While confiscation is still a common condition on all property rights,
it is also true that many more actors enjoy broader and generally more
secure property rights than previously. The following sections will examine
the rights to purchase, register, and mortgage urban real property. These
rights will be analyzed with respect to diverse governmental units and
natural and legal persons in the urban economy.
2. New Entities: Property Development Companies
Although property development companies were probably already
active in some areas, in 1984 they were formally sanctioned by the central
government. Their task has been to acquire land use rights, develop and
construct housing, and then either sell or rent the property to consumers.
The 1984 Development Company Regulations called for the establishment
of "more than two" development companies in all medium and large cities
in order to encourage competition.264
The range of actors allowed to develop and.sell real property include
authorized individual SOEs, foreign-invested enterprises and contractual or
equity joint ventures - and foreigners and overseas Chinese are particu-
larly encouraged to invest in these projects. 265 Ownership of the resulting
housing property varies according to who provides the necessary invest-
ments.266 Property development companies (development companies) are
an important link in the progression toward the privatization of investment
and ownership in newly constructed urban housing. Whether they really
function as autonomous, profit-driven actors is, however, doubtful.
263 1983 Urban Private Housing Management Regulations, supra note 258, art. 4. This law's re-
quirement of compensation is consistent with narrower, if only slightly more detailed, legislation
concerning the confiscation of urban land. See, e.g., Guojia jianshe zhengyong tudi tiaoli [Regulations
Governing the Confiscation of Land for National Construction] (State Council, May 15, 1982), reprinted in
Explanation of Housing Issues, supra note 261. Localities also have narrower legislation dealing with the
confiscation of urban housing and land.
264 Chengshi jianshe zonghe kaifa gongsi zhanxing banfa [Provisional Measures for Urban
Construction and Development Companies] art. 5 (State Planning Commission and Urban-Rural
Construction and Environment Protection Ministry, 1984), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra
note 257 at 121 [hereinafter 1984 Development Company Measures].
2 63 1983 Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations, supra note 212, art. 2.
266 Id. art. 5. (houses built with "exclusive investment" belongs to the investor; housing built by
joint ventures or cooperatives are shared by the parties; housing purchased by natural or legal persons be-
longs to the person).
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The 1984 Development Company Regulations imparted development
companies with significant, if conditional, formal autonomy. These regula-
tions defined development companies as "enterprises or units with
independent legal person status which exercise independent management,
independent accounting, and independent responsibility for profits and
losses, and which are economically responsible to the state. '267 As for
limits on autonomy, it is also true that development company managers are
to be appointed by their department in charge, and managers themselves
have limited appointment powers within the organization.268
Whether or not there is too much administrative control over land
development companies may not be the point. As long as land development
companies are encouraged to make profits, the real problem will not be one
of stifling administrative control over land development companies. On the
contrary, the chief danger may be that departments (or organs) in charge
will undertake rent-seeking behavior to protect and benefit the company
unfairly instead of playing as equals in the market. That is to say, develop-
ment companies, through their DICs, may become so autonomous that they
are able to evade strict administrative controls on licensing, pricing, opera-
tion or land use. On the other hand, it is likely that property development
companies will to some extent also be subject to arbitrary administrative
exactions along with other SOEs in the locality.
There is some evidence of difficulty in subjecting development
companies to administrative and fiscal control. A 1987 notice on financial
management of development companies is illuminating. This notice indi-
cated, somewhat redundantly, that development companies should be
subject to the management of local DICs with respect to profits.269 It also
267 Id. art. 1. Early regulations in Beihai described development in more general, but similar,
terms:
[Commercial property development enterprises in compliance with relevant laws have] independent,
autonomous operating rights and policy determination rights. The forms of their operation may be flexible
and varied, in that agreements may be signed with units or individuals, pooled capital may be used to carry
out construction or the enterprise's own finds may be used to undertake construction ... of buildings for
sale or lease.
Provisional Measures on Commercial Property Development and Property Administration in Beihal
Municipality, June 12, 1985, art. 12, translated in 2 China L. for Foreign Bus.: Special Zones & Cities
(CCH Austl.) 82-022 (1993) [hereinafter Beihai Property Measures].
268 1984 Development Company Measures, supra note 264, art. 16.
269 Guanyujiaqiang chengshi jianshe zonghe kaifa gongse zizhi guanli gongzuo de tongzhi [Notice
on Strengthening the Work of Managing the Capitalization of Urban Construction and Development
Companies] (Urban-Rural Construction and Environment Protection Ministry, State Industrial
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called for immediate investigations into the fitness of all development
companies, as indicated by their institutional resources (administrative rela-
tions should be definite and complete), capital resources, and technical
personnel.270 Governments from the province on down were to both set the
standards for and carry out these investigations.271 One can only presume
that these exhortations were necessitated by circumstances.
At any rate, whatever the level of irregularity in this system, it is at
least quite clear that innovative property development companies are fully
empowered and able to purchase, operate and sell land and housing
property, and hence to carry out their primary tasks. These companies also
appear to be flourishing in the newly liberalized institutional environment
created by the reforms. 272 Substantive rights in housing are another impor-
tant aspect of that environment, and will be considered next.
3. New and Old Rights in Urban Housing
Three areas of legislation and administration are particularly impor-
tant from an economic perspective. First, registration and recording
measures decrease information and enforcement costs, and therefore
preserve resources and investments by aiding in the recognition and
exercise of rights and duties. Second, autonomous sale and transfer rights,
coupled with reciprocal duties, are particularly important; they allow actors
to maximize mutual benefits through the exchange of property. Finally,
mortgage rights are another type of rights relationship that are also critical
for housing finance and investment. The alienation of contingent rights in
housing property the use of the house as collateral to reduce lenders' risks
on the loan for the purchase or construction of the property.
The importance of all of these functional relationships has been
recognized by the P.R.C. leadership, who have attempted to put in place the
legal-institutional structures necessary to their cultivation. Their success has
Administration Management Dep't, Aug. 24, 1987), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra note
257, at 147.
270 Id
271 Id
272 If number is any indication of success, property development companies appear to be faring
well. In 1988, Shanghai alone had 62 property development companies. See Housing Put on Sale at
Shanghai Fair, Xinhua, No. 0128173, Jan. 28, 1988, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
Nationwide, it was reported that there were 3500 real property development companies in 1991. Reforms
Spur Investment in Real Estate Industry, Xinhua, No. 1215038, Dec. 15, 1991, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, CHINA File..
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been admirable, yet uneven. The following section will address each of
these three areas in turn.
a. Housing registration
From an economic perspective, registration or recordation of property
titles can be extremely valuable as a means of increasing certainty and
decreasing transaction and enforcement costs. 273 It also is an essential
means of governmental supervision over real property resources; an espe-
cially important issue for the P.R.C. government which claims ownership of
all urban land and a great deal of public housing as well as a high degree of
control over diverse transactions in both land and housing. The P.R.C.
leadership have thus vigorously sought to expand the legal-institutional
systems of real property registration.
At the doctrinal level, the 1983 Urban Private Housing Management
Regulations are ambitious. They require all housing owners to register their
property as a threshold condition to the recognition of ownership rights, and
that any transfer of rights be registered.274 These early national reform
regulations did not provide that rights will be void if registration is not
carried out, but instead denied the registration required for future transfers
or other transactions if property rights are unclear or if any illegality (such
as the failure to register) is subsequently discovered.275 Still, other local
regulations make it clear that the range of public institutional actors may all
register ownership interests in land and housing.276
The same basic rights structure is expressed in more detail in
narrower national legislation dealing with housing registration. The 1987
Provisional Housing Ownership Rights Registration Measures apply to
urban housing owned by public factories, administrative, military and
enterprise units owned by the whole people, as well as to collective, private,
and religious groups' housing property.277 The regulations require all
273 For the arguments of two prominent Chinese scholars to this effect, see Lu Yimin & Wang
Jincai, Reforming the Property Title System in China, 1992 JINGJi YANJIU [ECONOMIC STUDIES] No. 29 at
60, translated in JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE: CHINA, No. 29, May 6, 1993, at 14, 15.
274 1983 Urban Private Housing Management Regulations, supra note 258, art. 6.
275 Id art. 7.
276 See, e.g., Tianjin Unit Housing Measures, supra note 262, arts. 2,3.
277 Chengzhen fangwu suoyouquan dengji zhanxing banfa [Provisional Urban Housing Ownership
Right Registration Measures] art. I (State Council, Apr. 21, 1987) [hereinafter 1987 Provisional
Registration Measures], reprinted in COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 706.
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natural and legal persons to apply, within a limited but unspecified time, to
the local land registration organ for an ownership rights certificate. 278 All
subsequent transactions in or alterations of housing rights - by inheritance,
sale, exchange, purchase, division, construction, demolition or otherwise -
are to be registered.279  As under the 1983 Urban Private Housing
Management Regulations, after the production of appropriate proofs and
satisfactory conclusion of an investigation, the local registration organ
(dengfijiguan) is to issue ownership or rights certificates appropriate to the
type of rights acquired.280
Later national and local legislation has clarified some areas of ambi-
guity in the registration system and increased its reach. For example, the
national 1991 Housing Recordation Measures attempt to clarify the effect of
registration by providing that the failure to apply for registration where
required (original and transactional) will render the rights in question
void.281 These regulations also reaffirm and encourage the registration of
public house property by allowing the "comprehensive registration" (zong
dengfi) of property administered by housing management bureaus above the
county level.282
Later policy opinions have continued to encourage registration of housing rights by public entities in
particular. One Ministry of Construction opinion urged the resolution of rights disputes and registration of
rights in units, local housing management bureaus, and individuals in government housing. It may also be
notable - if only for the confusion it engenders - that this opinion does not limit registration to natural or
legal persons as did the 1983 Regulations. See Guanyu chengzhen fangwu suoyouquan dengii zhong jige
buji zhengcixing wenti de yuanze yijian [Opinion in Principle on Some Policy Questions Concerning
Urban Housing Rights Registration] (Ministry of Construction, Nov. 1, 1989), reprinted in COLLECTION OF
P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 719-20.
278 1987 Provisional Registration Measures, supra note 277, art. 3.
279 Id art. 9. Note, however, that the delay of registration may be permissible if there are unde-
fined "special circumstances." Id art. 13.
28u See generally id. art. 7 (documents required), art. 6 (investigation and requirement of clear title
for registration).
281 Chengshi fangwu chanquan chanji guanli zhanxing banfa [Provisional Urban Housing Rights
Recordation Measures], art. 18 (Ministry of Construction, Jan. 1, 1991), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
REFORM, supra note 257, at 185 [hereinafter 1991 Housing Recordation Measures]. This provision ap-
pears to contradict and reverse a 1984 Supreme People's Court decision and the rule under the 1983
Private Housing Management Regulations that the failure to complete transfer registration procedures
should not void, but only suspend, the transaction. See DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note
56, at 265 (private housing purchase and sale procedures).
282 1991 Housing Recordation Measures, supra note 281, art. 11. It is not at all clear from the
regulations exactly what this means, beyond the fact that individuals in the object housing must also regis-
ter their individual rights. There is, however, no innate conflict in this multiplication of rights, because
rights - whether as renter, owner, pledgee, etc. - can be specified in detailed contracts for each individ-
ual or unit. See DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 56, at 316 (for a very vague definition
of comprehensive registration). This need to police a diversity of non-standard contracts rights may, how-
ever, increase enforcement and information costs for both owners and housing administration officials.
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
Also potentially significant and useful (although not novel) is the
1991 Housing Recordation Measures' explanation of the relationship
between land and housing. In particular, the regulations provide that the
underlying land use right should (yingdang) be transferred at the same time
as the housing right.283 As put into operation in Shenzhen, this should mean
that apartment house owners also own a proportionate interest in the use
right to the land under their buildings.284
To the extent that it is actually practiced by developers who own the
land use rights in question, this coupling of land and housing rights could
serve to ameliorate somewhat the inherent uncertainty introduced by the
separation of ownership in land and housing. It could also provide
increased value for long-term investors who are concerned about the
disposition of their equity interest if the building is destroyed before expi-
ration of the land use contract. But it would achieve these benefits at the
cost of flexibility to property rights owners who may wish to alienate their
fractional interest in the land use right.
The 1991 Housing Recordation Measures also contain enhanced en-
forcement provisions. The regulations provide for administrative penalties
for failure to register housing, which were omitted from the 1987
Provisional Registration Regulations, but it is left to municipalities to
specify the penalties to be assessed by the local housing administrations. 285
283 1991 Housing Recordation Measures, supra note 281, art. 6 (transfer generally). See also arts.
7 (division), and 8 (mortgage).
284 See Guanyu jiaqiang shenzhen jingji tequ fangdichan shichang guanli de shixing guiding [Trial
Regulations of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone on Strengthening the Management of the Real
Property Market], art. 26 (Shenzhen Municipal People's Government, July 13, 1989), in 3 CHINA L. &
PRAC. 51 (author's translation, Dec. 11, 1989) [hereinafter 1989 Shenzhen Real Property Regulations].
Paradoxically, these regulations offer a definition of this relationship both more precise and more
confusing than that in the 1991 Housing Recordation Measures. Article 26 of the 1989 Shenzhen Real
Property Regulations states: "if a building is subdivided and rights assigned (fenge zhuanrang), each real
property owner possesses (zhanyou) a proportionate percentage of the land use right." This seems clear
enough on its face, and could be easily implemented by granting fractional interests in the land use right.
On the whole, however, this section raises more problems than it solves, because it immediately follows
with a provision stating that "the use right to the land occupied by the building cannot as a whole be di-
vided" (suo zhanyong de tudi shiyongquan zhengti bu kefenge). Id If this means that the land use right
cannot be subdivided, it contradicts the immediately preceding passage, and if it means that the land use
right cannot be separated from the building ownership right, it is redundant.
285 1991 Housing Recordation Measures, supra note 281, art. 19. Local housing administrators are
empowered to assess penalties for registering unregisterable housing, for the failure to register where
required, for forgery of rights certification documents, or for infringement of the provision on compre-
hensive registration by housing administrations. Id
In Shenzhen, article 48 of the Commercial Premises Administration Regulations provides for fines of
up to Rmb 5000 for the unauthorized use of commodity housing. See 1989 Shenzhen Real Property
Regulations, supra note 284, at 66. See also Tianjin Unit Housing Measures, supra note 262, art. 12
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The 1991 Housing Recordation Measures also provide that housing rights
disputes may either be arbitrated before the local housing arbitration organ
or submitted for decision to the People's Court.2 86 Even more significantly,
these regulations provide that individuals dissatisfied with administrative
decisions may request reconsideration in accordance with the
Administrative Procedure Law or file suit in the People's Court.287
Unfortunately, this whole system still has a weak foundation, most
obviously because in the area of recordation itself the 1991 Housing
Recordation Measures can do little more than specify who has jurisdiction
and encourage them to implement the necessary reforms. 2 88 In fact, most
municipalities responsible for registration have never had a functioning
modem registration system, and hence lack the expertise and infrastructure
necessary for recordation.289 As recently as 1987 Shenzhen was reported to
be beginning a comprehensive land and housing survey.290 A more general
deficiency is apparent in the fact that China's first 130 official real estate
appraisers were commissioned in 1993, yet over U.S. $12 billion was
invested in Chinese real estate development in 1992.291 Even more com-
pelling proof of the backwardness of registration is provided by a recent
official estimate that more than 80% of all cities had not met plans for real
property rights registration and certification. 292
One result of the underdevelopment of registration law and admini-
stration is that registration may often be extremely costly. In many places it
(providing for a fine of 1% of the housing value per month beyond the initial 30-day grace period for reg-
istration following the law's promulgation).
286 1991 Housing Recordation Measures, supra note 281, art. 20.
287 Id
288 ld art. 13.
289 The central government, at least, has been acutely aware of this deficiency for some time. A
1986 report from the ministry responsible for housing reform stated that "since the country's founding,
except for a small number of cities, the vast majority of urban areas have not carried out property rights
registration and issued [approved] rights certificates." Guanyu kaizhan chengzhen fangchan chanquan
dengji, hefa chanquanzheng gongzuo de tongzhi [Notice Concerning the Work of Developing Urban
Housing Rights Registration and Issuing [Approved] Property Rights Certificates] (Urban-Rural
Construction and Environment Protection Bureau, Feb. 5, 1986), reprinted in CHINESE REAL PROPERTY
POLICY, LAW & PRAcTicE, supra note 13 1, at 258.
290 Shenzhen to Register Land and Housing, Xinhua, no. 0922042, Sept. 22, 1987, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. It was reported that the housing survey "will involve registering
offices and housing of administrative bureaus and enterprises and their funds for housing," and expected
that "the survey ... will lead to a complete commercialization of housing and offices."
291 China to Appoint First Batch of Real Estate Appraisers, Xinhua, no. 0426131, Apr. 26, 1993,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
292 See COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 725. The same notice also
urged local leading organs to implement comprehensive registration as soon as possible.
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may be very difficult and impossible to effectively and securely register and
value housing rights, even if owners wish to do so. 293 Registrants must deal
with often corrupt and unresponsive bureaucrats,294 and the denial of regis-
tration could potentially mean the complete invalidation of property rights.
Thus, where these cost factors do not actually make registration superfluous
to the owner(s), it will only be because the perceived benefits of registration
are correspondingly greater.
It is possible to specify with confidence some of the factors which
may make registration more valuable to both individual owners of all types
and to local governments. First, the opportunity cost of registration to
individuals, will increase, and transaction costs and enforcement costs will
decrease, as administrative recordation and investigative capacity increases.
Registration also creates value for owners as ann's length secondary market
transactions increase, and buyers seek a sure, public means of verifying
property rights. Finally, insofar as registration is a major point at which
local governments extract value from property rights transactions, it will be
particularly beneficial when pursued by jurisdictions undertaking the
privatization and commoditization of substantive rights which are pre-
requisites to such transactions.
293 This difficulty may be felt most acutely by foreigners. A study by the Economist Intelligence
Unit stated: "Lack of public access to transaction records creates uncertainties in verifying ownership
rights. Lack of access to zoning plans, town planning reports and plot ratios are frequent complaints of
foreign investors." Economist Intelligence Unit: Business China, Property Law: Ground Rules, Oct. 4,
1993, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
The transaction costs of rights verification could be significant. Among the assorted documents used
to establish ownership rights are maps and descriptions of the property, old property rights transfer con-
tracts and registration certificates, new construction licenses, proof of inheritance, or any other material
valuable in establishing ownership rights. See DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 56, at 314
(chanji, property recordation). This diversity, as with administrative difficulties generally, is inevitable
because China has not had effective registration in the past, and the new system is still in transition and
some confusion.
294 Official corruption is widely recognized as a pervasive phenomenon in reform-era China. For a
good examination of its manifestations and causes, see generally Helena Kolenda, One Party, Two
Systems: Corruption in the People's Republic of China and Attempts to Control It, 4 J. CHINESE L 187
(1990). Corruption is no less prevalent in the area of housing and land use, reflecting the weakness of the
basic institutional structures at the local level and continuing ability of cadres to undertake rent-seeking
behavior. In the field of housing, corruption is most often reported when officials use their positions and
influence with local enterprises and administrations to build housing illegally. One exemplary report noted
that "local cadres who build private houses seldom pay land use fees or follow the procedures laid down by
state lawmakers for construction and development," and that the large number of cadres (7 out of 10 in one
area) building homes at preferential prices "has resulted in entire mansion villages springing up in some
places." Officials Accused of Building Houses with Public Funds, Xinhua, Nov. 16, 1988, available in
LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
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All of these conditions hold most strongly in the most advanced areas
with the fullest legal-institutional reforms (Shanghai, Shenzhen, and other
open or experimental cities), but the cumulative benefits under this system
are available everywhere the old system is in place. This fact should help
significantly in the effort to motivate local governments to experiment with
this and other individuating housing rights reforms.
b. Sale and transfer of housing rights
Much as did early post-Liberation urban housing legislation, the
reform housing regulations provide that under prescribed conditions hous-
ing rights owners may sell, mortgage or otherwise transfer the right to
possess, use, and benefit from their housing. 295 The right to sell or alienate
property in autonomous profit-driven transactions is particularly important
as a prerequisite for the creation of public housing as a commodity and the
creation of housing markets.296 Unfortunately, the new laws impose
significant burdens on some of these transfer rights. Also, some of the con-
fusion and uncertainty endemic to registration generally also infects housing
sales.
The 1983 Urban Private Housing Management regulations, while
allowing housing sales by owners, also purport to control the particulars of
every sale of housing rights. These regulations require that all housing sales
be approved and registered by the seller and buyer in order to have legal
effect.297 Other provisions prescribe the special conditions for sale of
295 Property rights transfer (chanquan zhuanyi) is a generic term encompassing any property rights
transaction, including outright purchase and sale, exchange in kind, gift, and inheritance. The discussion
below and in following subparts will focus on sale and mortgage of housing.
296 One area of beneficial rights transfers which will not be discussed at length below is that of
private leasing. Rental is being discouraged for newly privatized public housing, and far fewer people rent
than own private property. See, 1983 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 95, at 97 tbl.2 (only 2.2% of
workers and staff rented private [individual] housing in 1983). See also, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI TONGJI ZILIAO
[CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICAL INFORMATION] 101, tbl.2 (State Statistical Bureau, Social Statistics Dep't
ed., 1990) [hereinafter 1988 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS] (only 2.3% of workers and staff rent private
[individual] housing).
Still, rent relations are pervasive in the public sector, and at any rate, all of the reform-era housing
rights laws recognized substantially similar rent rights in housing owners of all descriptions. These
regulations all include the necessity for contracting, and specify default rights and duties for repairs and
payment, termination of the contract and breach, and for disposition of the property by the landlord. See
generally, 1983 Urban Private Housing Management Regulations, supra note 258, arts. 15-22.
297 1983 Urban Private Housing Management Regulations, supra note 258, art. 9. Seller and buyer
must also both produce documentary proofs in order to gain registration. The seller must produce a
ownership rights certificate and personal identification, while the purchaser must provide personal identi-
FEB. 1995
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
jointly owned 298 and rental property.299 Also, the price terms of sales trans-
actions must comply with local standards, and are subject to direct approval
by local housing management organs.300 More puzzling still, organs, asso-
ciations, military units, SOEs and work units are prohibited under the 1983
regulations from directly or covertly purchasing private housing property
unless they face special circumstances and receive approval from the
people's government above county level. 301
A final restriction in the 1983 Urban Private Housing Management
Regulations is also particularly germane (and inappropriate) in light of the
ongoing efforts to sell public commodity housing to individuals. 302 These
regulations provided that individuals enjoying government, work unit, or
enterprise housing subsidies or who purchase or construct housing at
reduced prices could only sell the property to the original unit or local
housing management bureau.303 This type of compulsory sale would
substantially emasculate the right to sell this property, which is one of the
constitutive features of housing ownership under all definitions.
Consequently, this policy appears to have been widely abandoned in favor
of a formula merely prohibiting housing sales within a specified time period
and giving the owning unit a right of first refusal.304
While they omit some of these early restrictions, later local legisla-
tion retains strong governmental controls in many areas. The Shenzhen
regulations offer some examples. The 1989 Shenzhen Real Property
Regulations prohibit a wide range of individuals from purchasing com-
modity residential property (shangpin zhuzhai), including those lacking
fication and proof of permission to purchase the housing. Id Presumably, in the case of Chinese units and
enterprises at least, this permission must come from the actors' DIC.
298 Sale ofjointly owned property is contingent on approval of each owner, and the co-owner has a
right of first refusal in the sale of the other's interest. Id art. 10.
299 The lessor must give the lessee three months advance notice, and the lessee has an (undefined)
right of first refusal to purchase. Id. art. 11.
300 Id. art. 12.
301 Id art. 13. It is not clear from later law that this prohibition any force today. As note earlier,
later national and local legislation in Shenzhen and elsewhere permit such diverse actors to register housing
purchases. From all the evidence in the booming property markets, this appears to be the actual trend in
the more advanced reform areas. Apparently, most property in these areas is considered to face "special
circumstances".
302 See infra notes 351-365 and accompanying text on the sale of public housing.
303 1983 Urban Private Housing Management Regulations, supra note 258, art. 14.
304 See Major Cities Will Take the Lead in Housing Reform, Xinhua, No. 0102033, Jan. 2, 1992,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File (stating that housing owners would not be able to sell
within five years, that the original unit should have a first right of refusal in sale, and that housing could be
inherited but not given as a gift). For further discussion of land owner rights, see infra notes 354, 357.
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Shenzhen household registration, peasants with land, those who already
own or rent commodity housing at subsidized prices, and minors.305 While
foreigners and overseas Chinese may purchase commodity housing, the
number of foreign-owned commodity houses may be limited by the
Shenzhen Municipal Construction Bureau. The Construction Bureau is also
empowered to grant the housing purchase approval which is required for the
(necessary) registration of foreigners' property rights with the Municipal
Land Registry. 306
The 1989 Shenzhen Real Property Regulations also empower the
local government to set the prices and profits in real property sales transac-
tions. The price of real property sold for the first time by the government is
determined according to a cost-plus formula: cost + planned profit + sales
tax.307 Under privatization, a great deal of house property will be sold for
the first time, and this cost-plus formula is very favorable for local govern-
ment because it allows the municipal government to avoid setting upper
limits on its own or its branches' profits from initial real property sales.
The Shenzhen Real Property Regulations limit profits from secondary
land transactions through the application of substantial transfer fees on
profits from housing sales. These fees do not limit price, but instead allow
the government to fix its profits by providing for a sliding fee scale based
on the owner's net profit. Profit is limited to 300% of the owner's basis in
the land,3 08 and the government itself determines the depreciation and other
values in the applicable formula.309 This should allow the municipal
government significant flexibility in fixing its profits from aftermarket
transactions, just as it does in primary use rights sales by the state.3 10
305 1989 Shenzhen Real Property Regulations, supra note 284, art. 36. Household registration is
not housing rights registration. It is administrative proof of one's permission to reside where one does -
i.e., at a particular address and/or work unit in the SEZ. I
300 The standards for granting this housing purchase permission to foreigners are not specified. Id
art. 40. Registration is required for any and all housing sales, regardless of the actors' nationalities. See id
arts. 46 (registration of allocated land), 17 (registration in the advance sale of real property), 28 (rights in
sales transactions not protected without registration).
307 Id art. 31 (emphasis supplied].
308 Id art. 30(iv).
309 The land use rights transfer fee for secondary market transactions varies according to the excess
of the current over the previous sale price adjusted for capital improvements and depreciation. Id The tax
varies from 40 to 100% of net profit so determined, and is set at 100% on any value [profit] in excess of
300% of the original sale price. Id art. 30. The fee derived from this calculation is determined by the
Municipal Land Registry, to which the applicant can apply for a reappraisal. Id art. 32.
A10 Note that a profit-maximizing municipality or administration in this situation can increase fees
only to a point. If fees drive up marginal costs to a point where they exceed the sellet's opportunity costs,
no transaction, no registration and no profits will be forthcoming.
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In the final analysis, while these layers of regulations significantly
clarify and enable the exercise of urban real property owners' transfer
rights, they also clarify the government's continuing willingness to burden
these rights in order to maintain administrative and fiscal control over
housing rights use, transfer, price, and profits. However, if one's goal is to
create property markets, the fact that property sales are booming precisely
where these laws and institutions are most developed suggests that they are
a significant part of the solution, not the problem.311 Regulations enabling
the advance sale of commodity housing have contributed more directly
toward this end in advanced reform areas.
c. Advance sale and mortgage of housing property
Relatively early in the reform period, so called "commodity hous-
ing"312  (shangpin fangwu) constructed by approved real property
development companies became the subject of special regulations intended
to facilitate the construction and marketization of this housing property.
Reform regulations allow property development companies to acquire land
use rights, construct housing, and sell housing property (even in advance of
its actual construction) or own and rent it as a prdperty manager.
Purchasers at both levels are also allowed to use the rights so received as
security for loans for the purchase price of the land use or housing owner-
ship rights.
The result is a complex of subtle property rights comprising a nascent
system for financing real property development, construction, and purchase
through the collateralization of real property rights. Another result is con-
311 Although comprehensive national statistics comparing housing sales across different areas are
not available, the greatest successes appear to be registered in the advanced coastal provinces. One repre-
sentative report from Jiangmen City in Guangdong Province indicated that over 22,000 apartments, 90% of
those available for sale, had been sold in the city. See More Jiangmen Residents Buy Housing, Xinhua, no.0510047, May 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. The problem with this
figure, however, is that not all housing may be available for sale.
However, it is notable that even these successes did not follow merely from the sanction of transfer
rights, but also from efforts to encourage the purchase of public housing by raising rents, among other
measures. See infra notes 338-65 and discussion of rent reform and public housing sales.
312 See 1983 Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations, supra note 212, art. 2. "Commodity
housing" is a broad concept, encompassing "residential houses, industrial and commercial buildings,
warehouses, parking lots and other houses" which are "build independently orjointly for sale or to let" by
S.O.E.s or foreign nationals and their corporations. Furthermore, the more general term "house property
right" is said to include the right to use underlying land.
VOL. 3 No. 2
URBAN REAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA
fusion in the developing but still incomplete area of housing conveyance
and finance law.
(1) Advance sale
The first regulations permitting both the advanced sale and mortgage
of commodity housing were the 1983 Shenzhen Commodity Housing
Regulations. As for advanced sale, under these and subsequent regulations
a "house property operator" possessing a "Land Use Certificate" and
"Housing Construction Permit" can enter into contracts for the advance sale
of houses if it meets certain capitalization requirements. 313 In Shenzhen,
the proposed advanced sale must be approved by the Municipal Land
Registry, 314 and advance sale contracts must be signed indicating the exact
location and limits of the housing, price and payment terms, the expected
date of completion, and liability for breach, among other matters.315 Even
under these and .other enabling regulations, significant questions remain
about the actual importance and functioning of these rights among the
government organs, development companies, work units, and individuals
involved.
There is significant risk here for potential housing purchasers. Under
the 1989 Shenzhen Real Property Regulations, for example, if the housing
development company fails to receive prior approval for these sales, the
advance sale contract could be declared void and the development unit or
individual fined by the Municipal Land Registry.316 No provision is made
in these regulations, at least, for restoring the purchaser and mortgagor to
their investments if the developer breaches this condition: although they
should logically be returned to their pre-contractual positions, especially if
the developer is clearly at fault and solvent. Neither is any indication given
313 Id art. 10. Property development companies always acquire land use rights either from the
government or work units in possession, and always through the local land administration bureau.
Significantly, negotiation, initially the only method of determining purchaser and price, has increasingly
been supplemented by the use of tender and auction for property sales in some urban areas. See Land
Lease Deals Benefit China's Development, Xinhua, no. 0520031, May 20, 1990, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, CHINA File (stating that about 40% of the land leasing [i.e., land use rights] deals thus
far had been conducted through auction or public bidding).
314 1989 Shenzhen Real Property Regulations, supra note 284, art. 17.
315 See 1983 Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations, supra note 212, art. 10(4), (requiring that
the property operator have 20% of total budget for current stage of construction on deposit with Shenzhen
bank before commencing advance sales), art. 10(3) (house property operator must open special account for
proceeds of advance sale), art. 1 (contract terms generally).
316 1989 Shenzhen Real Property Regulations, supra note 284, arts. 17, 19.
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as to the consequences of defects in contract formation, but even if defects
also void these advance sales contracts, general principles of contract law
would still seem to allow the possibility of restitution from whichever party
is in breach.
Registration responsibilities with respect to the advance sale are
divided among purchaser and seller, and this raises interesting questions
about the multiplication of rights in these transactions. Within thirty days
of entering into a land use contract, the developer must apply for a land use
rights certificate from the Municipal land administration. The real property
developer is also to undertake the "general registration" of the building, and
within thirty days must giye notice of the general registration to advance
purchasers and enter into "Real Property Assignment Contracts"
(fangdichan zhuanrang hetongshu) with these purchasers. 317 The housing
purchaser must register his advance purchase with the Shenzhen Municipal
Land Registry within fifteen days of the effective dated of the advance sale
contract. Finally, within thirty days of the effective date of this transfer
contract, "the parties" (dangshi ren) are to register the transfer and receive
new Real Property Certificates (fangdichan zheng).318 The 1989 Shenzhen
Real Property Regulations also prohibit advance purchasers from reselling
their property before obtaining this Real Property Certificate.319
The net result of these transactions is registration of the developer's
right to use the underlying land, registration of rights in the building as a
whole in housing development companies and/or units, and the registration
of individual purchasers' housing property within the building. Also, indi-
vidual interests may or may not include interests in the building or land use
right. This point highlights the potential confusion in this web of rights.
If the individual householder's fractional interest in the land is merely
specified in the housing transfer contract and recorded with its registration,
convenience is served because no notation need be made on the underlying
land use or general building registration records. However, because regis-
tration is nine-tenths of ownership under this new system, it is simply not
clear that registration of a housing right alone is sufficient to secure land use
rights. The same point is true, of course, of individual rights in buildings,
structures, fixtures, attachments, common areas or, even more abstractly,
building funds.
317 Id. art. 22.
318 Id armt 23.
319 Id
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Even if contractual or statutory solutions to these complexities are
possible, this system of registering advance sales of housing property still
fails to fully provide for the condition that each apartment owner in a
subdivided building should have a proportionate interest in the underlying
land. It also creates a great deal of general confusion about the relationship
between the rights and duties created in this series of overlapping registra-
tions. This confusion is multiplied when mortgage rights are added to the
mix.
(2) Mortgage of commodity housing
The 1983 Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations have the dis-
tinction of being the first legislation in the P.R.C. to sanction the mortgage
of commodityhousing purchased in advance sales.320 As the details of this
practice are worked out over time, this basic approach should provide a
powerful means of financing new construction. It will also create new
rights, complexity, uncertainty, and opportunities for conflict.
320 See Christopher G. Oechsli, The Developing Law of Mortgages and Secured Transactions in the
People's Republic of China, 5 CHINA L. REP. 1, 8 (1988). While this is undoubtedly true of commodity
housing, the practice of mortgaging real property has old roots in China which were never completely
irradicated by the socialization of urban real property commencing in the mid-1950s. Indeed, it is some-
what ironic that while a great deal of statutory ink has been spent in the reform period defining the basic
rights to own, register, and alienate (including mortgage) real property, mortgage rights disputes have
remained common fare in the courts throughout.
For examples of mortgage disputes from 1984 to 1989, see ZHONGOUO DALU FAGUI BIAN
[COLLECTION OF MAINLAND CHINESE LAW] 160-63 (Chen Changwen ed., Wunan Tushu Chuban Gongsi
[Wunan Library Publishing Company], 1992). For even more diverse examples of mortgage policies and
disputes, see REAL PROPERTY POLICY, LAW & PRACTICE, supra note 13 1, at 216-48. A significant propor-
tion of the reported disputes appear to be caused by the absence of specified periods in the original
agreements. Confusion around this issue further infects latent disputes over redemption rights.
It is debatable whether a real property mortgage right could be found in the penumbra of the general
transfer rights granted in early reform legislation. Notably, though, none of the major reform-era national
civil laws or real property laws either explicitly provided for or even mentioned mortgage rights. The word
"mortgage" does not appear in any form in the 1982 Provisional Recordation Measures or the 1983 Urban
Private Housing Management Regulations. The more comprehensive 1983 regulations mention the
registration (and hence recognition) of new construction, construction expansions, sales, purchase, ex-
change, inheritance, division, and demolition, but not mortgage, of house property. See 1983 Urban
Private Housing Management Regulations, supra note 258, art. 7. Neither are mortgage property, trans-
actions or rights mentioned in the 1987 Provisional Registration Measures, the G.P.C.L. , or even the 1991
Housing Recordation Measures. Nevertheless, as will be seen below, the lack of express national support
for mortgage rights has not prevented provincial and municipal govemments and banks from recognizing
significant mortgage rights in real property.
For comprehensive explanations of many aspects of the traditional pledge rights under diandang and
security rights under dianya, see DICTIONARY OF REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 56, at 250-61.
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Mortgage loan transactions are largely a matter of independent
agreement under the early Shenzhen and later regulations.32 1 Mortgage
rights and duties are created upon the completion of application formalities
at the bank, and the 1983 Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations
specify the types of terms that should be provided for in the written mort-
gage agreement. 322 Significantly, state-owned enterprises, foreign nation-
als, overseas Chinese, foreign enterprises, cooperatives, or any natural or
legal persons investing in Shenzhen house property may own and mortgage
commodity housing property. 323 The regulations promote these transactions
by allowing commodity housing to be mortgaged even by purchasers in
advanced sales.324 It was only later, however, that regulations in the locali-
ties expressly permitted the mortgage of land use rights.325
The ability to mortgage commodity housing in advanced sales should
in theory be particularly useful as a method of financing new housing
purchases, although the process appears backward and raises significant
questions. The early Shenzhen regulations provide that in the advance sale
of housing the mortgagor (purchaser/debtor) and mortgagee (bank/lender)
should first sign a mortgage contract.326 The mortgagor then receives a
"Housing Property Rights Certificate" from the local housing administration
based on his or her "house property contracts." 327 Presumably, this certifi-
cate will serve as proof of ownership (title), but it is not clear what contracts
- land use, housing mortgage, housing purchase, etc. - are required for
321 A year and a half after the Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations were released, the Beihai
Municipal People's Government also issued commodity housing regulations allowing the mortgage of this
type of roperty. See Beihai Property Measures, supra note 267, art. 5.32 2Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations, supra note 212, arts. 18 (application procedure),
19 (necessary mortgage contract terms).
323 Id arts. 2 & 5 (specifying different loci of ownership of commodity housing rights), and arts
18-26 (on mortgage rights exercised by house property owners).
324 Id. art. 20. Similar provisions for the mortgage of property for advanced sale are included in the
Beihai regulations. See Beihai Property Measures, supra note 267, art. 19.
325 Later Shenzhen regulations reinforced this presumption. For example, Article 24 of the 1989
Shenzhen Real Property Regulations, supra note, art. 24, which expressly prohibited the mortgage of land
use rights.
Nevertheless, bank mortgage loan regulations have sanctioned the mortgage of land use rights since at
least 1988. See, e.g., Shanghai Provisional Regulations on RMB Loans Secured by Mortgages, art. 6
(promulgated June 9, 1988 by the People's Bank of China, Shanghai Branch), translated in E. ASIAN
EXEC. REP., Sept. 15, 1988, at 24 [hereinafter 1988 Shanghai B.O.C. Mortgage Loan Regulations]
("mortgageable property" includes "buildings and other structures on the land" as well as "land use
rights"). These bank regulations also permit mortgage of commodity housing in advance of sale. Id art. 8.
326 See Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations, supra note 212, art. 20.
327 Id. Similarly, the Beihai regulations require a "property owner who has a sales contract and a
certificate of property rights" to apply to a Beihai registered bank for a mortgage loan. See Beihai Property
Measures, supra note 267, art. 19.
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the grant of the certificate. At any rate, the mortgagor is next to turn over
the property rights certificate to the mortgagee "for preservation," and the
mortgagee is to make the payments specified in the mortgage contract.328
This arrangement may not look very attractive to potential investors.
Its apparent result is to leave the owner with possession of the property and
contracts for its purchase and mortgage. The mortgagee, however, holds the
ace because he retains the certificate of ownership to the property. In addi-
tion, the mortgagor is dependent on the mortgagee to pay the stipulated
contract price to the seller: a potential concern in a developing banking and
creditor-debtor rights systems. Both of these situations, the fragmentation
of ownership proofs and payment responsibilities, create imbalances in the
relationship and could spawn confusion and disputes. On the other hand,
both parties are surely in a much better initial position acting under these
regulations than if they had no contract, registration or recognized rights at
all, as was true in the past.
The 1988 Shanghai B.O.C. Mortgage Loan Regulations, while
significantly clarifying some areas of substantive mortgage rights, create
even more confusion as to how these rights in different property and actors
are related. These regulations clarify issues with respect to mortgage
ratios, 329 mortgage loan contracts,330 possession and use of the property, 331
disposition of mortgaged property on breach,332 and liabilities and condi-
tions for breach of contract. 333 The Shanghai Regulations also make clear
that these rights and liabilities can now be exercised by each property rights
holder in these transactions, and herein lies the source of their confusion.
Under the Shanghai Regulations, land use rights, buildings and
housing can all be mortgaged by their respective owners, even in advance of
construction. These regulations provide that land can be mortgaged on the
strength of land use contracts.334 As indicated previously, land use rights
can be held by diverse actors, from individuals to government work units:
but state-owned enterprises, at least, need permission before mortgaging
328 See Shenzhen Commodity Housing Regulations, supra note 212, art. 20(3). One can only guess
from these regulations that the mortgagee is then to pay the seller the contract price, but this will surely be
provided for in the mortgage contract itself.
329 See generally 1988 Shanghai B.O.C. Mortgage Loan Regulations, supra note 325, ch. 3.
330 See id ch. 4.
331 Id ch. 5.
332 Id ch. 6 (the conditions for breach include failure to pay the loan principle and interest and the
declaration of the mortgagor's bankruptcy or dissolution, art. 26)
333 Id ch. 7.
334 Id ch. 2, art. 8.
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their fixed assets. 335 Contractors, on the other hand, can mortgage buildings
on the strength of either certificates of building ownership or, in advance of
construction, construction contracts. 336 Finally, individuals can use the pre-
sale agreement (advance sale contract) as collateral for loans from local
banks.337 The result of these layers of rights may be, among other things, to
allow the separation of land use rights and housing rights. This would
violate a fundamental tenet of Chinese urban real property doctrine, but this
fact may not present as much of a problem as the sheer confusion engen-
dered by this system.
Potentially, if the land use right alone is used as collateral and the
mortgagor breaches, the bank could foreclose on the land use right alone.
Unless a land use mortgage somehow magically (or by rule) concurrently
gives rights in buildings, the result is a transfer of a valuable interest in land
without the transfer of an interest in the buildings attached thereto. The
same result follows if the mortgagee of the building is allowed to take rights
in and foreclose on the building alone.
Any foreclosure on interests in the land or building may impact indi-
viduals common whole and individual fractional interests in unpredictable
ways. Individuals are to own a pro-rata interest in the land use right, yet
that land use right as a whole can be mortgaged by developers and presum-
ably foreclosed upon by mortgagee banks. Individuals may also own
common rights to the building depending on their purchase contract, yet
developers can mortgage buildings in their entirety. It is simply not clear
from these regulations how all of these rights are to be accounted for and
related.
The only conclusion that can be drawn from this morass is that it
looks set to create significant difficulties in future mortgage foreclosures.
Only with clearly defined rights and duties spelled out in a series of closely
integrated interlocking agreements or statutory provisions will this confu-
sion be rectified. Nevertheless, as in other areas, it is still true that the
reforms have served to significantly diversify the scope of real property
mortgage rights, the property to which mortgage rights can attach, and the
variety of actors empowered to exercise these rights; all of which amounts
to further privatization. The reform of public housing has similar goals, and
much more explicitly so.
335 Id ch. 2, art. 9.
336 Id ch. 2, art. 8.
337 Id
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4. Public Housing Reforms: Rent Reform and Subsidized Sales
In reform-era China, the state very much wants to sell off public
housing (both old and new) to individuals in order to decrease the fiscal
burden on the state and its agents. Although the refurbished rights struc-
tures outlined above go some way toward encouraging private investment,
their mere publication has not been sufficient to significantly encourage
individual investment in public housing.
Although it might seem a truism that individuals would rather own
their homes than rent them, this is not necessarily so in China. In China
after Mao, the fact that the average lessee spent roughly as much of their
incomes on newspapers and magazines as on rent meant that individuals
have had very little incentive to spend more money in order to purchase
existing or new housing.338 Also, given the reports of the general state of
disrepair in the housing stock, it would not be surprising if people were
unwilling to pay more for roughly the same privilege to live in the same
hovel. Finally, the same low wage rates that initially necessitated low rents
have also meant that most households could not afford to pay the real costs
of their housing even if they wished to purchase it.
The leadership's solution to these difficulties has been to attempt to
couple rent reform with the subsidized sale of housing.
a. Rent reform
Very early in the reform period, when public housing administrations
were still in disarray, there was very little that the government could do in
the way of rent reform. The national government's only response to the
problem of low rents was to call for the revival of the policy of "using rents
to develop housing" (yi zu yangfang).339 This was the policy, adopted in
the immediate post-Liberation period but subsequently widely ignored,
which called for the collection of rents by government units and enterprises
338 Official statistics estimate that in 1981 average spending on books, newspapers and magazines
was .95% of annual wages, while average spending on rent was slightly higher, at 1.39% of annual wages.
1988 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 296, at 92.
339 See Guanyu jiaqiang chengshi gongfang guanli gongzuo de yijian [Opinion on Strengthening
the Work of Managing Urban Public Housing] (National Urban Construction Bureau, July 19, 1980),
reprinted in COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 675, 677 [hereinafter 1980
Public Housing Opinion].
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in amounts which would at least pay the costs of housing.340 The formula
promoted in the early 1980s was substantially the same, and likewise called
for rents to include a component for depreciation, repair and management
fees, taxes, and interest.341
Perhaps in realization that rents could not simply be unilaterally
raised without raising wages, all of the subsequent rent reforms have com-
bined city-wide rent increases with some sort of subsidy to compensate for
the increase. Rent increases are seen to be essential in motivating people to
purchase housing or, failing this, at least to conserve housing and not use
more than they need. Subsidies are used to soften the burden of these
increases on individuals, but in doing so undermine a basic purpose of the
rent increases - to conserve government fiscal resources by shifting hous-
ing costs to individuals and enterprises.
In Yantai, the most famous experimental city, rents increased from an
average of 0.073 yuan (2 cents) to 1.17 yuan (31.5 cents) per square meter
of living space in 1987, and were made to vary by quality, location, and
other factors.3 42 Here and in other areas, work units or local governments
provide a subsidy that is paid to landlords, and hence to workers, in the
form of either cash payments or coupons in an amount at or just below the
rent increase.343 These rent increases, as well as the proceeds from housing
sales, then serve as one source for housing funds and developments
managed by enterprises and municipalities. However, it is also intended
that these government subsidies gradually be reduced, leaving units to pick
up the difference.344 Most recently, rent increases and countervailing
subsidies have increasingly been supplemented by forced contributions to
340 See supra notes 64-75 and accompanying text on the genesis and fate of this policy in the early
post-Liberation period.
341 1980 Public Housing Opinion, supra note 339, at 678.
342 David Holley, Reform Goal: Ending Subsidies; Some Raise Roof as China Raises Rents for
Housing, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1987, at AI (reporting on the rent increases implemented in Yantai). Most
notable among the local plans, because it served as the basic model for others, is that developed and
gradually implemented by Yantai Municipality in Shandong Province. See Yantaishi chengzhen zhufang
zhidu gaige shixing fangan [Experimental Plan of Yantai Municipality for the Reform of the Urban
Residential Housing System] (published by the State Council on July 20, 1987), reprinted in COLLECTION
OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 855.
343 Holley, supra note 342, at Al. See also Three Different Ways ofApproaching Housing Reform,
BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 15, 1988, at FE/0100/B2/I, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, CHINA File.
344 Three Different Wys of Approaching Housing Reform, BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts,
Mar. 15, 1988, at FE/0100/B2/1, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File.
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work unit housing funds, but these extractions may also be offset by
equivalent subsidies. 345
There are obvious limits to the effectiveness and appeal of this
system. Most clearly, as long as subsidies rise as fast as rent, rent cannot be
used as a lever to encourage housing purchases, although the threat of future
unsubsidized rent increases may serve to encourage some to purchase hous-
ing in advance of further rent reform. Another difficulty is that while this
policy avoids shifting costs to individuals, it does so at the cost of enter-
prises, work units, or local governments who provide the rental subsidies.
Because the rent subsidies ultimately come from local governments, only
those with sufficient funds are able to implement this policy in its full
form.346 Perhaps it is for this reason that some governments have begun the
reforms in factories which "own the bulk of houses ... and can afford to
carry out the reform. ' 347 At any rate, the success of this "beneficial cycle"
of increasing rents, funds, investment, and purchases clearly depends upon
the wealth of the local governments, enterprises, work units, and individuals
involved.
It is perhaps not surprising given these difficulties that the reforms
have not generally succeeded in significantly increasing rent rates. What is
surprising is that spending on rent has actually decreased as a percentage of
total consumption. This is not a good sign for the reforms. Official statis-
tics indicate that average per capita rental expenditures increased from 6.36
yuan per year in 1981 to 7.83 yuan per year in 1988: an increase of almost
one-quarter. 348 However, while rental expenditures accounted for 1.39% of
total household expenditures in 1981, rent accounted for only 0.71% of
household expenditures in 1988: a decrease of almost one-half.3 49 Another
indication of continuing low relative rent rates is the fact that in 1991 citi-
zens even in relatively affluent Shanghai still on average spent more than
345 Shanghai People's Congress Approves Housing7 Reform Scheme, BBC-Summary of World
Broadcasts, Feb. 12, 1991, at FE/0994/B2/l, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. These
exactions are generally reported to be assessed at 5% of the worker's income.
346 See Case Studies in Housing Reform in Townships, in JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE:
CHINA, No. 89-005, Jan. 13, 1989, at 26. Smaller cities and townships, in particular, appear less likely to
have the funds for significant subsidies.
347 Shenyang Begins Housing Reform in Enterprises, Xinhua, No. 0922109, Sept. 22, 1987,
available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File..
348 1988 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 296, at 92 tbl.29.
349 Id
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twice as much on cigarettes, wine and tea than on rent.350 If the leaders'
goal is to motivate individuals to purchase housing by increasing their rent
burdens, they have clearly not yet succeeded.
b. Sales ofpublic housing
While the leadership has been consistently committed to selling
public housing to individuals, the same cost considerations evidenced in
rent reform have caused vacillation between subsidization and self-
sufficiency in housing sales policy. The bare practice of selling public
housing to individuals was described in central government documents as a
fairly broad experiment quite early in the reform period.351 While the
method of sale in the earliest experiments is unclear, as early as 1982 the
State Council approved the experimental subsidized sale of residential hous-
ing in four cities.352 Under these reforms, individuals could pay only one-
third of the cost of their apartments in installments over time, and the work
unit and local government would pay the balance. 353 However, because
these purchases were heavily subsidized, they commonly resulted in
"limited ownership" with restrictions on resale and transfer rights.354
350 See 4 CHINA STAT. MONTHLY 55, 56, (no. 10-11-12 1992) The figure for Beijing, where rents
are cheaper and consumable spending higher, is even more astounding. There, individuals spend ap-
proximately seven times as much of their incomes on cigarettes, wine and tea than on rent.
351 One early housing conference report indicated that experiments in housing sales were begun by
the National Urban Construction Bureau after a 1978 statement by a central government leading cadre
calling for the release of private activism to help solve the housing problem. The same report indicated
that one 128 cities in 12 provinces and autonomous regions had begun experiments with the private pur-
chase and construction of residences by late 1980. See Guanyu zuzhi chengzhen zhigong, jumin jianzao
zhuzhai he guojia xiang siren chushou zhuzhai jingyan jiaoliuhui qingkuang de baogao [Report of the
Conference on Experiences in Organizing the Construction of Residences by Workers, Staff, and Residents
and the Sale of Housing to Individuals by the State] (published by the State Council on Apr. 10, 1981),
reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra note 257, at 102.
352 See Guanyu chengshi chushou zhuzhai shidian wenti de baogao [Situation Report of the
Conference on the Work of Experimental Sales of Urban Housing] (published by the State Council on Apr.
17, 1982), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra note 257, at 105.
353 This basic policy was spelled out in the State Council report announcing the beginning of the
experimental sales in designated cities. This report stated that "when individuals purchase housing, in
general [they] should pay one-third of the sales price, and the other two-thirds should be paid by the con-
structing unit." Id. If they were state-owned, constructing units could then presumably pass on these ex-
penses to the government.
For some evidence that subsidized sales was in fact the practice in the experiment areas, see
China's Housing Management Under Reform, Xinhua, No. 012144, Jan. 28, 1984, available in LEXIS,
ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. See also "People's Daily" Article Favours Commercialization of Urban
Housin, supra note 155, at FE/7905/B11/1.
3 Holley, supra note 342 (reporting on the purchase of "limited ownership housing" in Yantai).
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By the mid-1980s the P.R.C. government began attempts to both limit
the practice of subsidized sales and extend housing reform throughout the
country. In 1986, the government admitted that it was not saving money
because of increasing subsidies and decreasing housing prices, that low
rents impeded individuals incentives to purchase housing, aid that enter-
prises did not have the funds available to build subsidized housing.355
Thus, the 1986 Subsidized Sales Notice stated that future sales were
generally to take place at full prices unless the unit could afford subsi-
dies.356 This notice also made explicit the limited nature of ownership
granted in subsidized sales. 357
In responding to the excessively cheap sale (jianjia chushou) of
public housing an "emergency notice" promulgated in 1988358 took this
policy to more drastic lengths, and hence reversed it. This 1988 Emergency
Notice stated that all sales of public housing were to take place at full prices
without exception, that subsidized sales with limited property rights were
prohibited, and that the sale of housing at any price less than 120 yuan per
square meter was also prohibited.3 59 Moie ominously for purchasers, the
1988 Emergency Notice stated that the property rights of any housing sold
355 See generally Guanyu chengzhen gongfang butie chushou shidian wenti de tongzhi [Notice
Concerning Issues (Problems) in the Experimental Subsidized Sale of Urban Housing] (Urban-Rural
Construction and Environment Protection Ministry, March 1, 1986), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
REFORM supra note 257, at 131.
356 Id
357 It stated that rights in housing already sold with subsidies would be confirmed, but that "it is not
permissible to rent or pledge [housing]" and that "if it is necessary to sell or transfer [the ], it must be sold
or transferred to the original selling unit or to the local real property administration." Id
358 Chengjianbu guanyu zhizhi jianjia chushou gongyou zhufang de jinji tongzhi [Urban
Construction Ministry Emergency Notice on Curbing the Sale of Public Residential Housing at Excessively
Cheap Prices] (Urban Construction Ministry, June 8. 1988), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra
note 257, at 160 [hereinafter 1988 Emergency Notice].
359 1988 Emergency Notice, supra note 358, at 160. These low priced sales appear to be in part the
result of property managers' determination that it was better to sell off housing at almost any price rather
than to simply continue incurring management and repair costs. See generally Vice-minister: Cheap Home
Sales 'Welfare Oriented' not 'Genuine Housing Reform,' BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts, Aug. 8,
1994, at FE/2068/6, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. Another, less benign, cause of
excessively cheap sales is the practice by local cadres of arranging preferrential purchases of public
housing for themselves and their families and friends. So serious is this problem that this was one of the
five practices singled out (but little more) in the CCP Central Discipline Inspection Committee's Third
Plenary Session. See Opinions of Discipline Inspection Committee on Ensuring Integrity of Cadres, BBC -
Summary of World Broadcasts, May 18, 1994, at FE/2000/G, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library,
CHINA File.
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at depressed prices since the 1986 notice could be stripped or the owner
compelled to pay compensation. 360
From the latest round of housing reforms, it is clear that, despite its
costs, subsidization (with limited rights) will continue to be an enduring
aspect of housing sales. While the plan for the expansion of housing reform
issued by the State Council in 1988 states that subsidized sales should not
continue,36 1 later housing policies have come to equate "standard prices" for
housing as prices which include subsidies.3 62
At any rate, instead of subsidies, the State Council plan encourages
units to sell housing to workers and staff who should, preferably, pay the
total amount in a lump sum. Purchasers can also, however, pay 30% down
and secure bank or unit financing for the remainder of the purchase price, to
be paid over varying periods and at appropriate interest rates.363 At the
same time, experimentation continues in efforts to set up housing funds,
specialized development banks, new mechanisms of bank financing, and
new means of vesting housing rights in organizations and individuals. 364
360 Id. It should be noted, however, that this notice contradicted a document issued just six months
earlier which, while prohibiting sales at excessively cheap prices nevertheless permitted sales at
"preferential prices" (youhuiia). See Guanyu guli zhigong goumai gongyou jiu zhufang yijian [Opinion
on Encouraging the Purchase of Existing Housing by Workers and Staff] (State Council Housing System
Reform Leading Group, Feb. 25, 1988), reprinted in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF REFORM, supra note 257, at 158..
361 By far the most comprehensive national statement of the housing reform policy was promul-
gated by the State Council in 1988; although this, as does much national legislation, appears to be more a
distillation of local experience than an innovation of the center. See State Council's Plan for Housing
Reform in Urban Areas, BBC-Summary of World Broadcasts, Mar. 25, 1988, at FE/0109/CI/l, available
in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. For the original Chinese version of this plan, see Guanyu zai
quanguo chengzhen fenqi fenpi tuixing zhufang zhidu gaige de shixing fangan [Provisional Plan for the
Phased National Implementation of Urban Housing System Reform] (promulgated by the State Council on
Feb. 25, 1988), reprinted in COLLECTION OF P.R.C. REAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 158, at 873
[hereinafter 1988 Housing Reform Plan].
362 See Major Cities will Take the Lead in Housing Reform, supra note 300. See also Vice-minister
Details Measures to Accelerate Urban Housing Reform, BBC - Summary of World Broadcasts, Feb. 2,
1994, at FEII91 I/G, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File (part of the price "is determined
by the amount of housing funds and subsidies in the [enterprise].").
363 Interest rates and loan terms are to be determined according to ability to repay, and loan terms
should vary according to whether it is old or newly-constructed housing. 1988 Housing Reform Plan,
supra note 361, at 880.
364 One potentially promising, but probably illusory, form of "private" housing development vehi-
cle is the cooperative, whereby individuals pool their funds to construct new buildings and share in the
ownership of the new structure. The first housing cooperative was reported to have completed construction
in 1988. However, it is not clear how private citizens could construct an entire building by pooling funds if
individuals have difficulty purchasing single apartments even at one-third the true cost. In fact, an early
report on the new cooperatives stated that they depend "on individually raised funds with the help of the
government or enterprises". Co-operatives New Phase in Housing Reform. BBC-Summary of World
Broadcasts, Nov. 15, 1988, at FE/0313/1B2/1, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC Library, CHINA File. It is
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However, cost remains a basic factor in the reforms. Even with long-
term loans instead of outright subsidies, these reforms depend on either
cheap credit or higher wages, both of which are hard to come by in the best
of times, and especially so during government austerity programs. 365 Thus,
here as elsewhere, continued progress in privatization and marketization
will depend at least in part on institutional and economic factors quite
extrinsic to real property rights alone.
V. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF HOUSING REFORM IS THE FUTURE OF
ALL REFORM
The main story of this examination has been the Chinese leaders'
attempt to vest effective property rights in economic actors so as to spur
investment in urban real property and reverse the ill effects of the supply
system of housing. Statistical indicators of ownership and investment
indicate that these policies have enjoyed some success, but that public own-
ership and control of urban public housing still predominates by far.
However, given the interdependence of housing and property rights reform
with other policy areas, a great deal of institutional reform will be required
to continue progress toward commoditization, marketization, and privatiza-
tion.
It is quite clear that private housing has come to constitute a larger,
and public housing a smaller, proportion of urban housing. Statistics indi-
cate that private ownership increased from 9.36 to 19.63% of the total from
1983 to 1988.366 This represents almost a doubling of the share of privately
owned urban housing. At the same time, publicly owned housing decreased
from 88.44 to 77.72% of the total.367 Thus, if these statistics are accurate,
the increased levels of private ownership are still dwarfed by the continuing
therefore most likely that, in the absence of an independent source of market-rate capital, the cooperatives
will remain merely another new vessel in which is poured the same old state-subsidized wine.
365 On the threat to reform generally,'see Jeoffrey Crothall, China Housing Scheme in Danger of
Collapse, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Jan. 3, 1990, in Reuter Textline, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library, CHINA File. One expert proposed a system for pricing long term loans which would both cover
more costs and allow more people to purchase housing. However, the viability of this plan may be un-
dermined by the fact that it required interest rates to remain below two percent. See Mentality Said to
Hinder Housing Reform in China, Xinhua, No. 1023049, Oct. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, ASIAPC
Library CHINA File. Clearly, a great deal more than mentality is hindering these reforms.
36 1983 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 95, at 97 tbl.2; 1988 CHINESE SOCIAL
STATISTICS, supra note 296, at 101 tbl.2.
367 1983 CHINESE SOCIAL STATISTICS, supra note 95, at 97 tbl.2; 1988 CHINESE SOCIAL
STATISTICS, supra note 296, at 101 tbl.2.
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dominance of the public sector. This is true even though the government
has pursued policies of actively creating and protecting property rights and
promoting the sale of public housing to individuals.
The foregoing examination has revealed several critical, interrelated
sets of difficulties which must be addressed in order to promote future
privatizing reforms. Although significant substantive rights reforms have
resurrected old and created some new property rights in different actors, it is
clear that significant efficiencies can still be gained by reducing the costs of
exercising or enjoying those rights.
First, at the level of real property legislation, rules on everything from
the definition of "ownership" to the process for registering apartment hous-
ing are still extremely ambiguous and difficult to apply, and generally grant
insufficient enforcement rights. This not only creates uncertainty and inse-
curity for individual "owners" and increases their information and enforce-
ment costs, it is also partially responsible for allowing manipulative rent-
seeking behavior and illegality on the part of powerful bureaucratic
interests.
Second, similar problems also follow from continuing confusion and
weakness at the level of real property rights administration and adjudica-
tion. The lack of administrative resources, expertise and will allows
continuing subversion of registration, investigative, and enforcement
mechanisms by local bureaucratic interests. This increases public and
private owners' enforcement costs and allows enterprises, individuals and
units in possession of public property to avoid compliance with relevant
property rights policies, engage in rent-seeking behavior, and impose exter-
nalities on other actors and society at large.
For the immediate term however, the government is most concerned
with a much narrower question that largely assumes substantial private
property rights: how to construct housing and sell it to individuals without
massive subsidies. Thus, a narrower solution than that above is also in
order. It appears that the most expedient and effective way to gain the most
rapid results in the area of public housing reform - i.e., the sale of public
housing new and old - will be to promote and enable mortgage lending
and bank financing of housing purchases.
This is the only method which could perform all of the beneficial
functions of fully covering costs, effectively vesting ownership and control
in individuals, and collateralizing loans, all without the need for massive
government subsidies or wage increases for individuals. Longer-term loans
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would be particularly useful in this regard insofar as they would allow
larger principal payments. Still, even long-term loans will not be affordable
at the current low wage rates if interest rates are not held down, and the
provision of anything less than market rate credit would still amount to a
subsidy. This proposal does, however, have the advantage of falling well
within the range of current policy prescriptions.
In the final analysis, however, enhanced mortgage rights only add to
the requirements for successful reform. In addition to assuming effective
private individual property rights, mortgage lending also assumes banks'
freedom from control or coercion by local debtor enterprises or DICs, as
well as an accurate means of valuing property for the long term. Thus, the
promotion of mortgage lending, as with any other policy, will only be truly
successful if there is progress in all areas, including but not limited to
substantive rights definitions with regard to all forms of benefits and liabili-
ties, real property registration and regulation, rights enforcement and
dispute resolution, company law and regulation, and administrative and/or
criminal law effectively governing the behavior of government agents and
private actors alike. In short, property rights reform ultimately depends
upon the institution of the rule of law in all relations impinging upon the
exercise of those rights.
Clearly, a great deal of work remains to be done but, just as clearly, a
great amount of progress and experience has already been gained. What is
not so certain is whether or when the leadership at different levels and in
different areas will have the incentives, will and resources to overcome the
inertial drag of existing institutional and economic configurations which,
while costly to society at large, may nevertheless continue to benefit those
charged with formulating and implementing these reforms.
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